Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2004

Ralph Leroy Menzies v. Hank Galetka : Addendum
to Opening Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Assistant Attorneys General; Thomas B. Brunker and Erin Riley; Attorneys for Mr. Galetka.
Elizabeth Hunt; Attorney for Mr. Menzies.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Menzies v. Galetka, No. 20040289.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/2502

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

RALPH LEROY MENZIES,
Petitioner/Appellant,
v.
HANK GALETKA,

Case No. 20040289-SC

Respondent/Appellee.

ADDENDUM TO OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ASSISTANT ATTORNEYS GENERAL
ELIZABETH HUNT L.L.C.
THOMAS B. BRUNKER AND ERIN RILEY ELIZABETH HUNT (5292)
160 EAST 300 SOUTH, 6TH FLOOR
569 BROWNING AVE.
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84105
P.O. BOX 140854
(801)461-4300
SALT LAKE CITY, UT, 84114-0854
ATTORNEYS FOR MR. GALETKA

ATTORNEY FOR MR. MENZIES

CONTENTS OF ADDENDUM
Constitutional Provisions, Statutes and Rules
Ruling Denying Motion for Relief
Ruling on Destruction of Evidence
ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of
Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases
7.1,10.5,10.7,10.8 and 10.15.1
Menzies' Journal Entries Mentioned In Ruling and Brief
Menzies' Written Correspondence to Brass
Brass's Written Correspondence to Menzies

Cot!%t!f!j(h»ii;il P f n y i s f o n s , S l J f u k !• line 1 Ruli

Constitution of Utah, Article I § 2
All political power is inherent in the people; and all free governments are founded on their authority
for their equal protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter or reform their government as
the public welfare may require.
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 5
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or
invasion, the public safety requires it.
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 7

N o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 11
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property
or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered without
denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending
before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 12
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person and
by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have
compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged
to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused
person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights
herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife,
nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of that
examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay
evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the

defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule.
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 24
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.
Constitution of Utah, Article V § 1

The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three distinct departments,
the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of powers
properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either
of the others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted.
Constitution of Utah, Article VI § 26
No private or special law shall be enacted when a general law can be applicable.
Constitution of Utah, Article VIII § 4
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by this
constitution or by statute and power to issue all extraordinary writs. The district court shall
have appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute. The jurisdiction of all other courts, both
original and appellate, shall be provided by statute. Except for matters filed originally with
the Supreme Court, there shall be in all cases an appeal of right from the court of original
jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause.

United States Constitution, Amendment V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any
person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.
United States Constitution, Amendment VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by
an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,

which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence.

United States Constitution, A m e n d m e n t VIII

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual
punishments inflicted.

United States Constitution, A m e n d m e n t XIV, § 1

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. N o State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Utah Administrative Code R 25-14

R25-14. Payment of Attorneys Fees in Death Penalty Cases.
R25-14-1. Authority and Purpose.
(1) This rule is implemented pursuant to Section 78-35a-202.
(2) The purpose of the rule is to establish the procedures and maximum compensation
amounts to be paid for attorneys fees and litigation expenses by the Division of Finance to
legal counsel appointed by district courts to represent indigent persons sentenced to death
who request representation to file an action under Title 78, Chapter 35a, Post-Conviction
Remedies Act.
R25-14-2. Request for Payment.
In order to obtain payment for attorney's fees and litigation expenses, counsel appointed by a
district court, pursuant to Section 78-35a-202(2)(c), shall present to the Division of Finance a
certified copy of the district court order of appointment of legal counsel and a signed
Request for Payment verifying the work has been performed as provided in Section R25-144 pursuant to the schedule of payments set forth in that section.
R25-14-3. Scope of Services.
(1) All appointed counsel, by accepting the court appointment to represent an indigent client
sentenced to death and by presenting a Request for Payment to the Division of Finance,
agree to provide all reasonable and necessary post-conviction legal services for the client,
including timely filing an action under the provisions of Title 78, Chapter 35a, PostConviction Remedies Act and representing the client in all legal proceedings conducted
thereafter including, if requested by the client, an appeal to the Utah Supreme Court.

(2) All appointed counsel agree to accept as full compensation for the legal sendees
performed and litigation costs incurred the amounts provided in the Schedule of Payments
of Attorneys Fees found in Section R25-14-4.
R25-14-4. Schedule of Payments of Attorneys Fees.
All counsel appointed to jointly represent a single client shall be paid, in the aggregate,
according to the following schedule of payments upon certification to the Division of
Finance that the specified legal sendee was performed or the specified events have occurred:
(1) $5,000.00 upon appointment by the district court and presentation of a signed Request
for Payment to the Division of Finance.
(2) $5,000.00 upon timely filing a petition for post-conviction relief
(3) $10,000.00 after all discovery has been completed, all prehearing motions have been ruled
upon, and a date for an evidentiary hearing has been set.
(4) If an evidentiary hearing is required, $5,000.00 on the date the first witness is sworn.
(5) $7,500.00 if an appeal is filed from a final order of the district court. $5,000.00 of the total
shall be paid when the brief on behalf of the indigent person is filed and $2,500.00 when the
Utah Supreme Court finally remits the case to the district court.
(6) An additional fee of $100 per hour, but in no event to exceed $5,000.00 in the aggregate,
shall be paid if:
(a) counsel satisfy the requirements of Rule 4-505, Utah Code of Judicial Administration; and
(b) the district court finds:
(i) that the appointed counsel provided extraordinary legal services that were not reasonably
foreseeable at the time of accepting the appointment, such as responding to or filing a
petition for interlocutory appeal, and
(ii) the services were both reasonable and necessary for the presentation of the client's claims.
(c) These additional fees shall be paid upon approval by the district court and compliance
with the provisions of this rule.
R25-14-5. Payment of Reasonable Litigation Expenses.
The Division of Finance shall pay reasonable litigation expenses not to exceed a total of
$20,000.00 in any one case for court approved investigators, expert witnesses, and
consultants. Before payment is made for litigation expenses, the appointed counsel must
submit a request for payment to the Division of Finance including:
(1) a detailed invoice of all expenses for which payment is requested; and
(2) written approval of the district court certifying that the expenses were both reasonable
and necessary for the presentation of the client's claims.
R25-14-6. Withdrawal of Counsel.
(1) If an attorney appointed under Section 78-35a-202 is permitted to withdraw by the court
or, due to death or disability, is unable to continue, the attorney shall be paid only for the
actual work performed to tne date of withdrawal as certified by the court.
(2) If withdrawal is ordered by the court because of counsel's improper conduct or the court
finds that a foreseeable conflict of interest which should have been disclosed prior to
appointment existed, all compensation received by the attorney shall be repaid to the
Division of Finance.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-3.5
(1) An agency's written statement is a rule if it conforms to the definition of a rule under g e c t 4 o n 53,
46a-2, but the written statement is not enforceable unless it is made as a rule in accordance with the
requirements of this chapter.

(2) An agency's written statement that is made as a rule in accordance with the requirements of this
chapter is enforceable and has the effect of law.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-308
Counsel assigned by a court to represent an indigent in criminal, post-conviction, or habeas corpus
proceedings is immune from suit if the attorney provides the legal services:
(1) at no cost; or
(2) for only a substantially reduced cost that is applied to, but does not cover, expenses of the
service; and
(3) without gross negligence or willful misconduct.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106
(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground that:
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion;
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal;
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal;
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction relief or could have been, but
was not, raised in a previous request for post-conviction relief; or
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78-35a-107.
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(c), a person may be eligible for relief on a basis that the ground
could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal, if the failure to raise that ground was due to
ineffective assistance of counsel.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-202
(1) A person who has been sentenced to death and whose conviction and sentence has been
affirmed on appeal shall be advised in open court, on the record, in a hearing scheduled no
less than 30 days prior to the signing of the death warrant, of the provisions of this chapter
allowing challenges to the conviction and death sentence and the appointment of counsel for
indigent defendants.
(2)(a) If a defendant requests the court to appoint counsel, the court shall determine whether
the defendant is indigent and make findings on the record regarding the defendant's
indigency. If the court finds that the defendant is indigent, it shall promptly appoint counsel
who is qualified to represent defendants in death penalty cases as required by Rule 8 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
(b) A defendant who wishes to reject the offer of counsel shall be advised on the record by
the court of the consequences of the rejection before the court may accept the rejection.

(c) Costs o f c o u n s e l a n d o t h e r r e a s o n a b l e litigation e x p e n s e s i n c u r r e d in p r o v i d i n g t h e
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n p r o v i d e d for in this section shall b e paid from state funds b y t h e Division o f
F i n a n c e a c c o r d i n g t o rules established p u r s u a n t t o Title 6 3 , C h a p t e r 46a, U t a h
Administrative Rulemaking Act.
Utah Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3
A. Judicial Duties in General. T h e judicial duties of a full-time judge take precedence over all the
judge's other activities. T h e judge's judicial duties include all the duties of the judge's office
prescribed by law. In the performance of these duties, the following standards apply.
B. Adjudicative Responsibilities.
(1) A judge shall hear and decide matters assigned to the judge except those in which disqualification
is required or permitted by rule, or transfer to another court occurs.
(2) A judge shall apply the law and maintain professional competence. A judge shall not be swayed
by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism.
(3) A judge should maintain order and decorum in proceedings before the judge.
(4) A judge shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and
others with w h o m the judge deals in an official capacity, and should require similar conduct of
lawyers, and of staff, court officials, and others subject to judicial direction and control.
(5) A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice. A judge shall not, in the
performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice, including but not
limited to bias or prejudice based u p o n race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual
orientation or socioeconomic status, and should not permit, and shall use all reasonable efforts to
deter, staff, court officials and others subject to judicial direction and control from doing so. A judge
should be alert to avoid behavior that may be perceived as prejudicial.
(6) A judge should require lawyers in proceedings before the judge to refrain from manifesting, by
words or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age,
sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, against parties, witnesses, counsel or others. This Canon
does not preclude legitimate advocacy when race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual
orientation or socioeconomic status, or other similar factors, are issues in the proceeding.
(7) A judge shall accord to every person w h o is legally interested in a proceeding, or that person's
lawyer, full right to be heard according to law. Except as authorized by law, a judge shall neither
initiate nor consider, and shall discourage, ex parte or other communications concerning a pending
or impending proceeding. A judge may consult with the court personnel whose function is to aid the
judge in carrying out the judge's adjudicative responsibilities or with other judges provided that the
judge does n o t abrogate the responsibility to personally decide the case pending before the court.
N o communication respecting a pending or impending proceeding shall occur between the trial
judge and an appellate court unless a copy of any written communication or the substance of any
oral communication is provided to all parties. A judge may obtain the advice of a disinterested
expert on the law applicable to a proceeding before the court if the judge gives notice to the parties
of the person consulted and the substance of the advice, and affords the parties reasonable
opportunity to respond. A judge may, with the consent of the parties either in writing or on the
record, confer separately with the parties and their lawyers in an effort to mediate or settle matters
pending before the judge.
(8) A judge shall dispose of all judicial matters promptly, efficiently, and fairly.
(9) A judge shall not, while a proceeding is pending or impending in any court, make any public
comment that might reasonably be expected to affect its outcome or impair its fairness or make any
nonpublic c o m m e n t that might substantially interfere with a fair trial or hearing. A judge should
require similar abstention on the part of court personnel subject to judicial direction and control.
This Canon does n o t prohibit a judge from making public statements in the course of official duties
or from explaining for public information the procedures of the court. This Canon does not apply to

proceedings in which a judge is a litigant in a personal capacity.
(10) A judge shall not c o m m e n d or criticize jurors for their verdict other than in a court order or
opinion in a proceeding but may express appreciation to jurors for their service to the judicial
system and the community.
(11) A judge shall not disclose or use, for purposes unrelated to judicial duties, information acquired
in a judicial capacity that is not available to the public.
C. Administrative Responsibilities.
(1) A judge shall diligently discharge the judge's administrative responsibilities without bias or
prejudice, maintain professional competence in judicial administration, and cooperate with other
judges and court officials in the administration of court business.
(2) A judge should require staff, court officials and others subject to judicial direction and control to
observe the standards of fidelity and diligence that apply to the judge and to refrain from
manifesting bias or prejudice in the performance of their official duties.
(3) A judge with supervisory authority for the judicial performance of other judges should take
reasonable measures to assure the prompt disposition of matters before them and the proper
performance of their other judicial responsibilities.
(4) A judge shall not make unnecessary appointments, shall exercise the power of appointment
impartially and on the basis of merit, and shall avoid nepotism and favoritism. A judge shall not
approve compensation of appointees beyond the fair value of services rendered.
D . Disciplinary Responsibilities. A judge should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures
against a judge or lawyer for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may become aware. This
section does not apply to information generated and communicated under the policies of the
Judicial Performance Evaluation Program.
E. Disqualification.
(1) A judge shall enter a disqualification in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might
reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where:
(a) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer, a strong personal
bias involving an issue in a case, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceeding;
(b) the judge had served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, had practiced law with a lawyer
who had served in the matter at the time of their association, or the judge or such lawyer has been a
material witness concerning it;
(c) the judge knows that the judge, individually or as a fiduciary, or the judge's spouse, parent or
child wherever residing, or any other member of the judge's family residing in the judge's household,
has an economic interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or has
any other more than de minimis interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding;
(d) the judge or the judge's spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of
them, or the spouse of such a person:
(i) is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party;
(ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(iii) is known by the judge to have a more than de minimis interest that could be substantially
affected by the proceeding;
(iv) is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding.
(2) A judge shall keep informed about the judge's personal and fiduciary economic interests, and
should make a reasonable effort to keep informed about the personal economic interests of the

judge's spouse and minor children residing in the judge's household.
F. Remittal of Disqualification. A judge disqualified by the terms of Canon 3 E may disclose the basis
of the judge's disqualification and ask the parties and their lawyers to consider, out of the presence
of the judge, whether to waive disqualification. If following disclosure of any basis for
disqualification other than personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, the parties and lawyers,
without participation by the judge, all agree that the judge need not be disqualified, and the judge is
then willing to participate, the judge may participate in the proceeding. T h e agreement shall be
entered on the record, or if written, filed in the case file.

Utah R. App. P. 11
(a) Composition of the record on appeal. The original papers and exhibits filed in the trial court,
including the presentence report in criminal matters, the transcript of proceedings, if any, the index
prepared by the clerk of the trial court, and the docket sheet, shall constitute the record on appeal in
all cases. A copy of the record certified by the clerk of the trial court to conform to the original may
be substituted for the original as the record on appeal. Only those papers prescribed under
paragraph (d) of this rule shall be transmitted to the appellate court.
(b) Pagination and indexing of record.
(b)(1) Immediately u p o n filing of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the trial court shall securely fasten
the record in a trial court case file, with collation in the following order:
(b)(1)(A) the index prepared by the clerk;
(b)(1)(B) the docket sheet;
(b)(1)(C) all original papers in chronological order;
(b)(1)(D) all published depositions in chronological order;
(b)(1)(E) all transcripts prepared for appeal in chronological order;
(b)(1)(F) a list of all exhibits offered in the proceeding; and
(b)(1)(G) in criminal cases, the presentence investigation report.
(b)(2)(A) The clerk shall mark the b o t t o m right corner of every page of the collated index, docket
sheet, and all original papers as well as the cover page only of all published depositions and the
cover page only of each volume of transcripts constituting the record with a sequential number
using one series of numerals for the entire record.
(b)(2)(B) If a supplemental record is forwarded to the appellate court, the clerk shall collate the
papers, depositions, and transcripts of the supplemental record in the same order as the original
record and mark the b o t t o m right corner of each page of the collated original papers as well as the
cover page only of all published depositions and the cover page only of each volume of transcripts
constituting the supplemental record with a sequential number beginning with the number next
following the number of the last page of the original record.
(b)(3) The clerk shall prepare a chronological index of the record. The index shall contain a
reference to the date on which the paper, deposition or transcript was filed in the trial court and the
starting page of the record o n which the paper, deposition or transcript will be found.
(b)(4) Clerks of the trial and appellate courts shall establish rules and procedures for checking out
the record after pagination for use by the parties in preparing briefs for an appeal or in preparing or
briefing a petition for writ of certiorari.
(c) Duty of appellant. After filing the notice of appeal, the appellant, or in the event that more than
one appeal is taken, each appellant, shall comply with the provisions of paragraphs (d) and (e) of this
rule and shall take any other action necessary to enable the clerk of the trial court to assemble and
transmit the record. A single record shall be transmitted.
(d) Papers on appeal.
(d)(1) Criminal cases. All of the papers in a criminal case shall be included by the clerk of the trial
court as part of the record on appeal.
(d)(2) Civil cases. Unless otherwise directed by the appellate court upon sua sponte motion or motion

of a party, t h e c l u i
* *
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*
record on appeal.
(d)(3) Agency cases. Unless otherwise directed by the appellate court upon sua sponte motion or
motion of a party, the agency shall include all papers in the agency file as part of the record.
(e) The transcript of proceedings; duty of appellant to order; notice to appellee if partial transcript is ordered.
(e)(1) Requestfor transcript; time for filing. Within 10 days after filing the notice of appeal, the appellant
shall request from the court executive a transcript of such parts of the proceedings not already on
file as the appellant deems necessary. The request shall be in writing and shall state that the
transcript is needed for purposes of an appeal. Within the same period, a copy shall be filed with the
clerk of the trial court and the clerk of the appellate court. If the appellant desires a transcript in a
compressed format, appellant shall include the request for a compressed format within the request
for transcript. If no such parts of the proceedings are to be requested, within the same period the
appellant shall file a certificate to that effect with the clerk of the trial court and a copy v. nh tin • vrk
of the appellate court.
(e)(2) Transcript required of all evidence regarding challengedfindingor conclusion. If the appellant intends to
urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, die
appellant shall include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or
conclusion. Neither the court nor the appellee is obligated to correct appellant's deficiencies in
Miv
^tiding the relevant portions of the transcript.
vcyv3) Statement of issues; cross-designation by appellee. Unless the entire transcript is to be included, uw
appellant shall, within 10 days after filing the notice of appeal, file a statement of the issues that will
be presented on appeal and shall serve on the appellee a copy of the request or certificate and a copy
of the statement. If the appellee deems a transcript of other parts of the proceedings to be necessary,
the appellee shall, within 10 days after the service of the request or certificate and the statement of
the appellant, file and serve on the appellant a designation of additional parts to be included. Unless
within 10 days after service of such designation the appellant has requested such parts and has so
notified the appellee, the appellee may within the following 10 days either request the parts or move
in the trial court for an order requiring the appellant to do so.
(f) Agreed statement as the record on appeal. In lieu of the record on appeal as defined in paragraph
(a) of this rule, the parties may prepare and sign a statement of the case, showing h o w the issues
presented by the appeal arose and were decided in the trial court and setting forth only so many of
the facts averred and proved or sought to be proved as are essential to a decision of the issues
presented. If the statement conforms to the truth, it, together with such additions as the trial court
may consider necessary fully to present the issues raised by the appeal, shall be approved by the trial
court. The clerk of the trial court shall transmit the statement to the clerk of the appellate court
within the time prescribed by Rule 12(b)(2). The clerk of the trial court shall transmit the index of
the record to the clerk of the appellate court upon approval of the statement by the trial court.
(g) Statement of evidence or proceedings when no report was made or when transcript is
unavailable. If no report of the evidence or proceedings at a hearing or trial was made, or if a
transcript is unavailable, or if the appellant is impecunious and unable to afford a transcript in a civil
case, the appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings from the best available
means, including recollection. The statement shall be served on the appellee, who may serve
objections or propose amendments within 10 days after service. The statement and any objections
or proposed amendments shall be submitted to the trial court for settlement and approval and, as
settled and approved, shall be included by the clerk of the trial court in the record on appeal.
(h) Correction or modification of the record. If any difference arises as to whether the record truly
discloses what occurred in the trial court, the difference shall be submitted to and settled by that
court and the record made to conform to the truth. If anything material to either party is omitted
from the record by error or accident or is misstated, the parties by stipulation, the trial court, or the
appellate court, either before or after the record is transmitted, may direct that the omission or
misstatement be corrected and if necessary that a supplemental record be certified and transmitted,
i uc moving party, or the court if it is acting on its own initiative, shall serve on the parties a
statement of the proposed changes. Within 10 days after sendee, any party may serve objections to
the proposed changes. All other questions as to the form and content of the record shall be

presented to the appellate court.

Utah R. Civ. P. 26
(a) Required disclosures; Discovery methods.
(a)(1) Initial disclosures. Except in cases exempt under subdivision (a)(2) and except as
otherwise stipulated or directed by order, a party shall, without awaiting a discovery request,
provide to other parties:
(a)(1)(A) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each individual likely to
have discoverable information supporting its claims or defenses, unless solely for impeachment,
identifying the subjects of the information;
(a)(1)(B) a copy of, or a description by category and location of, all discoverable documents, data
compilations, and tangible things in the possession, custody, or control of the party supporting its
claims or defenses, unless solely for impeachment;
(a)(1)(C) a computation of any category of damages claimed by the disclosing party, making
available for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 all discoverable documents or other
evidentiary material on which such computation is based, including materials bearing on the
nature and extent of injuries suffered; and
(a)(1)(D) for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 any insurance agreement under which any
person carrying on an insurance business may be liable to satisfy part or all of a judgment which
may be entered in the case or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment.
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the disclosures required by
subdivision (a)(1) shall be made within 14 days after the meeting of the parties under subdivision
(f). Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, a party joined after the
meeting of the parties shall make these disclosures within 30 days after being served. A party
shall make initial disclosures based on the information then reasonably available and is not
excused from making disclosures because the party has not fully completed the investigation of
the case or because the party challenges the sufficiency of another party's disclosures or because
another party has not made disclosures.
(a)(2) Exemptions.
(a)(2)(A) The requirements of subdivision (a)(1) and subdivision (f) do not apply to actions:
(a)(2)(A)(i) based on contract in which the amount demanded in the pleadings is $20,000 or less;

(,i Hi)(y\)(nj lor judicial review ol adjudicative proceedings or rule making proceedings ol an
ni I ni ninistrative agency;
(a)(2)(A)(iii) governed by Rule 65B or Rule 65C;
(a)(2)(A)(iv) to enforce an arbitration award;
(a)(2)(A)(v) for water rights general adjudication under Title 73, Chapter 4; and
(a)(2)(A)(\i) in which an> part) not admitted to the practice Uu\ in Utah is not represented b) counsel.
(a)(2)(B) Jn an exempt action, the matters subject to disclosure under subpart (a)(1) are subject to
discovery under subpart (b).
(a)(3) Disclosure of expert testimony.
(a)(3)(A) \ part) shall disclose to other parties the identity of any person who may be used at
trial lo present evidence under R u l e s m m o r 705 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

(a)(3)(B) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered b> the court, this disclosure shall,
with respect to a witness who is retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the
case or whose duties as an employee of the party regularly in voh e gi\ ing expert testimonj, be
accompanied by a written report prepared and signed by the witness or party. The report shall
contain the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify; the substance of the facts
and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify; a summary of the grounds for each
opinion; the qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications authored by the
witness within the preceding ten years; the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony;
and a listing of any other cases in which the witness has testified as an expert at trial oi b\
deposition within Ihe preceding four years.

(a)(3)(C) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, Ihe disclosures
required by subdivision (a)(3) shall be made within 30 days after the expiration of fact discovery
as provided by subdivision (d) or, if the evidence is intended solely to contradict or rebut
evidence on the same subject matter identified by another parly under paragraph (^)(B) n illiin
60 days after the disclosure made by the other party.

(a)(4) Pretrial disclosures. A party shall provide to other parties the tollo" linn inhumation
regarding the evidence that it may present at Irial other than solely for impi .it IIIIK nl

(a)(4)(A) the name and, if not previously provided, the address and telephone number of each
witness, separately identifying witnesses the party expects to present and witnesses the party may
call if the need arises;

(a)(4)(B) the designation of witnesses whose testimony is expected to be presented by means of a
deposition and, if not taken stenographically, a transcript of the pertinent portions of the
deposition testimony; and

(a)(4)(C) an appropriate identification of each document or other exhibit, including summaries of
other evidence, separately identifying those which the party expects to offer and those which the
party may offer if the need arises.

Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the disclosures required by
subdivision (a)(4) shall be made at least 30 days before trial. Within 14 days thereafter, unless a
different time is specified by the court, a party may serve and file a list disclosing (i) any
objections to the use under Rule 32(a) of a deposition designated by another party under
subparagraph (B) and (ii) any objection, together with the grounds therefor, that may be made to
the admissibility of materials identified under subparagraph (C). Objections not so disclosed,
other than objections under Rules 402 and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, shall be deemed
waived unless excused by the court for good cause shown.

(a)(5) Form of disclosures. Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, all
disclosures under paragraphs (1), (3) and (4) shall be made in writing, signed and served.

(a)(6) Methods to discover additional matter. Parties may obtain discovery by one or more of the
following methods: depositions upon oral examination or written questions; written
interrogatories; production of documents or things or permission to enter upon land or other
property, for inspection and other purposes; physical and mental examinations; and requests for admission.

(b) Discovery scope and limits. Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance
with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows:

(b)(1) In general Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or
defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the
existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other
tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable

matter. It is i lot giuui.u K*r objection thai liic iuionnation sought w ill be inadmissible at the trial
if the information souuht appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

(b)(2) Limitations, I he frequency or extent 01 use oi nit discovery methods set forth in
Subdivision (a)(6) shall be limited by the court if it determines that: (i) the discovery sought *s
unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more
convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample
opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the information sought; or (iii) the discover}" is
unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in
controversy, limitations on the parties' resources, and the importance of the issues at stake \
litigation. The court may act upon its own initiative after reasonable notice or pursuant to a
motion under Subdivision (c).

(b)(3) 1 rial preparation: Materials. Subject to the provisions of Subdivision (b)(4) ol tiw:,.
party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under
Subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or foi trial b\ or lor
another party or by or for that other party's representative (including the party's attorney,
consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking
discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the case and that the pan- is
unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other
means. In ordering discovery of such materials when the required show ing has been made, the
court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinion or legal
theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation,

A party may obtain, without the required showing a statement concerning the action or its subject
matter previously made by that party. Upon request, a person not a party may obtain without the
required showing a statement concerning the action or its subject matter previously made by that
person. If the request is refused, the person may move for a court order. The provisions of Rule
37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the motion. For purposes of this
paragraph, a statement previously made is (A) a written statement signed or otherwise adopted or
approved by the person making it, or (B) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other
recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement
by the person making i1 ' m/1 'v^tomporaneo^b' record^1

(b)(4) Trial preparation: Experts.

(b)(4)(A) A party may depose any person who has been identified as an expert whose opinions
may be presented at trial. If a report is required under subdivision (a)(3)(B), any deposition shall
be conducted within 60 days after the report is provided.

(b)(4)(B) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been retained
or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and
who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial, only as provided in Rule 35(b) or upon a
showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party seeking
discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means.

(b)(4)(C) Unless manifest injustice would result,

(b)(4)(C)(i) The court shall require that the party seeking discovery pay the expert a reasonable
fee for time spent in responding to discovery under Subdivision (b)(4) of this rule; and

(b)(4)(C)(ii) With respect to discovery obtained under Subdivision (b)(4)(A) of this rule the court
may require, and with respect to discovery obtained under Subdivision (b)(4)(B) of this rule the
court shall require, the party seeking discovery to pay the other party a fair portion of the fees and
expenses reasonably incurred by the latter party in obtaining facts and opinions from the expert.

(b)(5) Claims of Privilege or Protection of Trial Preparation Materials. When a party withholds
information otherwise discoverable under these rules by claiming that it is privileged or subject
to protection as trial preparation material, the party shall make the claim expressly and shall
describe the nature of the documents, communications, or things not produced or disclosed in a
manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties
to assess the applicability of the privilege or protection.

(c) Protective orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought,
accompanied by a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer
with other affected parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without court action, and for good
cause shown, the court in which the action is pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a
deposition, the court in the district where the deposition is to be taken may make any order which
justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or
undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following:

(c)(1) that the discovery not be had;

(c)(2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a
designation of the time or place;

(c)(3) that the discovery i nay be 1 lad oi iJI> b ; ' ai :t lethod of disco\ ery otl: lei tl lai i tl mt selected b;y 11: ic
party seeking discovery;

(c)(4) that certaii 11 i latters not be inquired mio. or nun me scope oi uie <J]sco\er\ he \r,\\i , -.1 to
certain matters;

(c)(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons designated by the court;

(c)(6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the court;
(LJ(/ ; nidi ti • J
not be disci,

--aci oi oinci coiiiiuciiuai rescarcn, uexelopment, or commercial information
he disclosed DIIK in :\ drsipnated u.-i\

(c)(8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed
envelopes to be opened as directed by the court.

If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part,, the court may, on such terms
and conditions as are just, order that any party or person provide or permit discovery, rhe
provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the motion

(d) Sequence and timing of discovery. Except for cases exempt: under subdivision (a)(2), except
as authorized under these rules, or unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the
court, a party may not seek discovery from any source before the parties have met and conferred
as required by subdivision (f). Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court,
fact discovery shall be completed within 240 days after the first answer is filed. Unless the court
upon motion, for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interests of justice, orders
otherwise, methods of discovery may be used in any sequence and the fact that a part; i
conducting discovery, whether by deposition or otherwise, shall not operate to delay am oihe;
party's discovery

(e) Supplement-.*^-*!; *.<f i espouses. A party who has made a disclosure under subdivision (a) or
responded to a request lor discovery with a response is under a duty to supplement the disclosure
or response to in^,,H>-» "^Wmaiion thereafter acquired if ordered by the court or in the following circumstance

(e)(1) A party is under a duty to supplement at appropriate intervals disclosures under
subdivision (a) if the part} learns that in some material respect the information disclosed is

incomplete or incorrect and if the additional or corrective information has not otherwise been
made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing. With respect to
testimony of an expert from whom a report is required under subdivision (a)(3)(B) the duty
extends both to information contained in the report and to information provided through a
deposition of the expert.

(e)(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response to an interrogatory, request
for production, or request for admission if the party learns that the response is in some material
respect incomplete or incorrect and if the additional or corrective information has not otherwise
been made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing.

(f) Discovery and scheduling conference.

The following applies to all cases not exempt under subdivision (a)(2), except as otherwise
stipulated or directed by order.

(f)(1) The parties shall, as soon as practicable after commencement of the action, meet in person
or by telephone to discuss the nature and basis of their claims and defenses, to discuss the
possibilities for settlement of the action, to make or arrange for the disclosures required by
subdivision (a)(1), and to develop a stipulated discovery plan. Plaintiffs counsel shall schedule
the meeting. The attorneys of record shall be present at the meeting and shall attempt in good
faith to agree upon the discovery plan.

(f)(2) The plan shall include:

(f)(2)(A) what changes should be made in the timing, form, or requirement for disclosures under
subdivision (a), including a statement as to when disclosures under subdivision (a)(1) were made
or will be made;

(f)(2)(B) the subjects on which discovery may be needed, when discovery should be completed,
whether discovery should be conducted in phases and whether discovery should be limited to
particular issues;

(f)(2)(C) what changes should be made in the limitations on discovery imposed under these rules,
and what other limitations should be imposed;

(f)(2)(D) the deadline for filing the description of the i acti ml ai id legal basis foi allocatii lg fai ill: to
a non-party and the identity of the non-party; and

(f)(2)(E) ai ly otl lei 01 dei s tl lat si 1.01 lid be entered tiy tl le court,.

(f)(3) Plaintiffs counsel shall submit to the court within 14 days after the meeting and in any
event no more than 60 days after the first answer is filed a proposed form of order in conformity
with the parties' stipulated discovery plan. The proposed form of order shall also include each of
the subjects listed in Rule 16(b)(l)-(6), except that the date or dates for pretrial conferences, final
pretrial conference and trial shall be scheduled with the court or may be deferred until the close
of discovery. If the parties are unable to agree to the terms of a discover} phm or am putt dieieol.
the plaintiff shall and any party may move the court for entry of a discovery order on any lopk- on
which the parties are unable to agree. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, the presumptions
established by these rules shall govern any subject not included within the mrii<V slinulnn*d
discovery plan.
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(f)(5) A party joined after the meeting of the parties is bound by the stipulated discovery plan and
discovery order, unless the court orders on stipulation or motion a modification of the discovery
plan and oH<^ Th<* ^pu'ation or motion shall be filed within a reasonable time after joinder,

(g) Signing of discovery requests, responses,, and objections. Every request for discovery or
response or objection thereto made by a party shall be signed by at least one attorney of record or
by the party if the party is not represented, whose address shall be stated. The signature of the
attorney or party constitutes a certification that the person has read the request, response, or
objection and that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief formed after
reasonable inquiry it is: (1) consistent with these rules and warranted by existing law or a good
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; (2) not interposed for
any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the
cost of litigation; and (3) not unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive, given the needs
of the case, the discovery already had in the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance
of the issues at stake in the litigation. If a request, response, or objection is not signed, it shall be
stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the party
making the request, response, or objection, and a party shall not be obligated to take any action
with respect to it until it is signed.

If a certification is made in violation of the rule, the court, upon motion or upon its oxinitiative, shall impose upon the person who made the certification, the pari) on whose beiuu *he

request, response, or objection is made, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an
order to pay the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the violation, including a
reasonable attorney fee.

(h) Deposition where action pending in another state. Any party to an action or proceeding in
another state may take the deposition of any person within this state, in the same manner and
subject to the same conditions and limitations as if such action or proceeding were pending in
this state, provided that in order to obtain a subpoena the notice of the taking of such deposition
shall be filed with the clerk of the court of the county in which the person whose deposition is to
be taken resides or is to be served, and provided further that all matters arising during the taking
of such deposition which by the rules are required to be submitted to the court shall be submitted
to the court in the county where the deposition is being taken.

(i) Filing.

(i)(l) Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a party shall not file disclosures or requests for
discovery with the court, but shall file only the original certificate of service stating that the
disclosures or requests for discovery have been served on the other parties and the date of
service. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a party shall not file a response to a request for
discovery with the court, but shall file only the original certificate of service stating that the
response has been served on the other parties and the date of service. Except as provided in Rule
30(f)(1), Rule 32 or unless otherwise ordered by the court, depositions shall not be filed with the court.

(i)(2) A party filing a motion under subdivision (c) or a motion under Rule 37(a) shall attach to
the motion a copy of the request for discovery or the response which is at issue.

Utah R. Civ. P . 60
(a) Clerical Mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors
therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own
initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the
pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in the
appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected with leave of the
appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud, etc. On motion
and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his
legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1)
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due
diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of

an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (:\i the judgment has been satisfied, released, or
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based bus been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it
is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable
time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or
proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of
a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an
independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a
judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be
by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.

I

1

(a) A defendant charged with a public offense has the right to self representation, and ll I I K . : ^ .,.,
has the right to court-appointed counsel if the defendant faces a substantial probability of
deprivation of liberty.
(b) In all cases in which counsel is appointed to represent an indigent defendant who is charged with
an offense for which the punishment may be death, the court shall appoint two or more attorneys to
represent such defendant and shall make a finding on the record based on the requirements set forth
below that appointed counsel is proficient in the trial of capital cases. In making its determination,
the court shall ensure that the experience of counsel who are under consideration for appointment
have met the following minimum requirements:
(1) at least one of the appointed attorneys in
four years or twenty-five felony cases total;

's
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(2) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have appeared as counsel or co-counsel in a capital
or a felony homicide case which was tried to a jury and which went to final verdict;
(3) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have completed or taught within the past five years
an approved continuing legal education course or courses at least eight hours of which deal, in
substantial part, with the trial of death penalty cases; and
(4) the experience ••*-**" >* : • <r . •• -\-.. : <:- -.; .
practice of law.

•.

•

; n m live years in the active

(c) In making its selection of attorneys for appointment in a capital case, the court shouUi aUo
consider at least the following factors:
(1) whether one or more of the attorneys under consideration have previously appeared as counsel
or co-counsel in a capital case;
(2) the extent to which the attorneys under consideration have sufficient time and support and can
dedicate those resources to the representation of the defendant in the capital case now pending
before the court with undivided loyalty to the defendant;
(3) the extent to windi the attorneys under consideration have engaged in the active practice of

criminal law in the past five years;
(4) the diligence, competency and ability of the attorneys being considered; and
(5) any other factor which may be relevant to a determination that counsel to be appointed will
fairly, efficiently and effectively provide representation to the defendant.
(d) In all cases where an indigent defendant is sentenced to death, the court shall appoint one or
more attorneys to represent such defendant on appeal and shall make a finding that counsel is
proficient in the appeal of capital cases. T o be found proficient to represent on appeal persons
sentenced to death, the combined experience of the appointed attorneys must meet the following
requirements:
(1) at least one attorney must have served as counsel in at least three felony appeals; and
(2) at least one attorney must have attended and completed within the past five years an approved
continuing legal education course which deals, in substantial part, with the trial or appeal of death
penalty cases.
(e) In all cases in which counsel is appointed to represent an indigent petitioner pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-35a-202(2)(a), the court shall appoint one or more attorneys to represent such
petitioner at post-conviction trial and on post-conviction appeal and shall make a finding that
counsel is qualified to represent persons sentenced to death in post-conviction cases. T o be found
qualified, the combined experience of the appointed attorneys must meet the following
requirements:
(1) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have served as counsel in at least three felony or
post-conviction appeals;
(2) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have appeared as counsel or co-counsel in a postconviction case at the evidentiary hearing, on appeal, or otherwise demonstrated proficiency in the
area of post-conviction litigation;
(3) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have attended and completed or taught within the
past five years an approved continuing legal education course which dealt, in substantial part, with
the trial and appeal of death penalty cases or with the prosecution or defense of post-conviction
proceedings in death penalty cases;
(4) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have tried to judgment or verdict three civil jury or
felony cases within the past four years or ten cases total; and
(5) the experience of at least one of the appointed attorneys must total not less than five years in the
active practice of law.
(f) Mere noncompliance with this rule or failure to follow the guidelines set forth in this rule shall
not of itself be grounds for establishing that appointed counsel ineffectively represented the
defendant at trial or on appeal.
(g) Cost and attorneys' fees for appointed counsel shall be paid as described in Chapter 32 of Title
77.

(h) Costs and attorneys fees for post-conviction counsel shall be paid pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78-35a-202(2)(c).

Utah R. Evid. 507
(a) A person upon w h o m these rules confer a privilege against disclosure of the confidential matter
or communication waives the privilege if the person or a predecessor while holder of the privilege
voluntarily discloses or consents to the disclosure of any significant part of the matter or
communication, or fails to take reasonable precautions against inadvertent disclosure. This rule does
not apply if the disclosure is itself a privileged communication.

(b) Evidence of a statement or other disclosure of privileged matter is not admissible against the
holder of the privilege if disclosure was

(1) compelled erroneously or

(2) made without opportunity to claim the privilege.
(c)(1) Comment or Inference Not Permitted. T h e claim of privilege, whether in the present proceeding or
upon a prior occasion, is not a proper subject of comment by judge or counsel. N o inference may be
drawn therefrom.

(2) Claiming Privilege Without Knowledge of Jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the
extent practicable, so as to facilitate the making of claims of privilege without the knowledge of the
jury.
(3) jury Instruction. U p o n request, any party against w h o m the jury might draw an adverse inference
from the claim of privilege is entitled to instruction that no inference may be drawn therefrom.
(4) Exception. In a civil action, the provisions of subparagraph (c) do not apply w h e n the privilege
against self-incrimination has been invoked.

Ruling Denying Motion for Relief

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

RALPH LEROY MENZIES,

RULING ON MOTION TO
SET ASIDE JUDGMENT

Petitioner,

vs.

Case No. 030106629

HANK GALETKA, Utah' State Prison
Warden,
Respondent.

Judge Pat B. Brian

This case is before the court on Petitioner's Motion to Set
Aside Judgment.

The court has thoroughly reviewed the parties'

memoranda, the relevant case law, and all applicable

statutory

provisions.

the oral

Additionally,

the

court

has

considered

arguments provided by counsel at the hearing on the motion and the
evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing.

Now being fully

advised, the court makes the following ruling:
Applicable Rules
Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as
are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve
a party or his legal representative from a final judgment,
order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; . . . (4) the
judgment is void; (5) . . . it is no longer equitable that the
judgment should have prospective application; or (6)
any
other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time
and for reason[] (1) . . . not more than 3 months after the
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion
under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a
judgment or suspend its operation. . . . The procedure for
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as
prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.

nnor?n^

Procedural Hi s tory
On February 25, 1986, the body of Maurine Hunsaker was found
by a hiker at Storm Mountain.
on March
murder,

Following a month-long jury trial,

8, 1988, Petitioner was found guilty of first degree
a capital

degree

felony,

waived

the

offense, and

aggravated

kidnapping,

in the death of Ms. Hunsaker.

jury

for

the

penalty

phase

sentenced to death by the trial judge.

of

the

He

a first

subsequently

trial

and

was

Petitioner filed a motion

for a new trial alleging that errors in the recording and transcribing

of

the

trial

rendered

purposes of appellate review.

the

record

unsatisfactory

for

This motion was denied by the trial

court and Petitioner appealed the denial to the Utah Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial and ordered
Petitioner to proceed with his direct appeal on the merits.
State v. Menzies, 845 P.2d 220, 242 (Utah 1992).

See

In Petitioner's

direct appeal on the merits, he raised numerous claims of error,
all of which were ultimately denied by the Court.

The Court

affirmed the jury's guilty verdict and the trial court's imposition
of the death penalty.

See State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 406-07

(Utah 1994), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 1115

(1995).

On April 20, 1995, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus and/or Post Conviction Relief.

An Amended Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus and/or Post Conviction Relief was filed
on May 2, 1995. The amended petition included seventy-three claims
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for relief, including claims of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel.

On June 26, 1995, Respondent filed his Answer to Amended

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and/or Post Conviction Relief as
well as a motion for discovery.

On November 13, 1995, Respondent

moved the trial court to dismiss the first seventy-one claims on
the ground that they had previously been raised and rejected by the
Utah Supreme Court. Respondent did not, however, request that the
ineffective assistance of counsel claims be dismissed.

Petitioner

responded to this motion on December 11, 1995.
On December 13, 1995, Respondent moved the trial court for
permission to conduct discovery and Petitioner responded on January
10, 1996.

On February 7, 1996, Petitioner requested the trial

court to direct Respondent to provide funds for investigating his
claims of innocence and other substantial claims.
objected and filed its response on March 18, 1996.

Respondent
On April 3,

1996, the trial court signed an order deferring ruling on Respondent's motion to dismiss until after an evidentiary hearing could
be conducted with respect to the ineffective assistance of counsel
claims.

In April 1996, the trial court granted the motion for

permission to conduct discovery, although the order was not filed
until June 12, 1996.
On May 3, 1996, Petitioner motioned the trial court to review
the affidavit of Ron Lax in camera as evidence in support of
Petitioner's claim of innocence as well as his claims that trial
and appellate counsel had been ineffective.

On May 17, 1996,
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Respondent filed his First Set of Interrogatories to Petitioner.
On June 12, 1996, the trial court entered an order awarding
Petitioner the sum of $2,000 for investigation fees.

On June 19,

1996, Petitioner filed a Motion for Protective Order and a Motion
to Stay Depositions. Petitioner did not timely file answers to the
interrogatories submitted by Respondent on May 17, 1996.

On July

8, 1996 Respondent filed a Motion for Order Compelling Answers to
Interrogatories.
protection

For the next several months, Petitioner sought

from the trial court with respect

to Respondent's

attempts to discover files related to Petitioner's case that were
in the possession of the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association. On
August 23, 1996, Respondent sought the trial court's permission to
depose

Petitioner.

On

September

16,

1996, the

trial court

reaffirmed its order awarding monies to Petitioner and granted
Respondent's motions to compel interrogatory answers and to depose
Petitioner.

The trial court ordered Petitioner to complete his

answers to the first interrogatories by October 9, 1996, which he
failed to do. On October 22, 1996, Respondent moved for sanctions.
While the motion for sanctions was pending Petitioner served his
answers to the first set of interrogatories on January 10, 1997.
On February 3, 1997, Petitioner moved for an increase in the
investigation funds and on February 18, 1997, Respondent filed his
response in opposition.

Petitioner's motion was denied by the

trial court on February 24, 1997. On March 6, 1997, Judge Uno was
assigned to Petitioner's post-conviction case.
4

In May 1997, all

proceedings were voluntarily stayed until after July 1, 1997, which
was the effective date for new legislation governing the appointment and payment of counsel and investigative resources in postconviction cases where a petitioner has been sentenced to death.
On October 27, 1997 and December 16, 1997, pursuant to the new
legislation, Petitioner

requested Judge Uno to appoint

counsel

qualified under Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure to
handle post-conviction capital cases.

On November 3, 1997, at the

hearing on the motion, Judge Uno required Petitioner's counsel to
prepare

a list

of Rule

8 qualified

attorneys

detailing their background and qualifications.

with

affidavits

After Petitioner's

counsel failed to timely create a list for the court, additional
time was granted.

On December 3, 1997, Kenneth R. Brown filed an

affidavit related to the appointment of Rule 8 qualified counsel
which indicated that he could not take the case and, moreover, that
Petitioner had uninvestigated claims of innocence, that a mitigation investigation had never been performed, and that it would cost
approximately $50,000 to properly investigate Petitioner's case.
Relevant Facts
On March 3, 1998, Judge Uno filed an order appointing Ed Brass
to represent Petitioner.

Mr. Brass believed he was appointed for

the sole purpose of representing Petitioner at the evidentiary
hearing.

Petitioner asserts that Mr. Brass was appointed to assist

him in seeking relief

from his death

sentence

and conviction.

5
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Petitioner also asserts that Judge Uno never inquired into Mr.
Brass's qualifications under Rule 8.
entered

a

scheduling

order

which,

On March 13, 1998, Judge Uno
among

other

things,

gave

Petitioner until April 16, 1998 to amend his petition for postconviction relief and set the discovery cut-off date for October
15, 1998.

The amended petition was not filed on the date ordered

and Judge Uno gave Petitioner until August 17, 1998 to file his
amended petition.
August 31, 1998.

A multiple page amended petition was filed on
Respondent's answer and Motion to Dismiss Second

Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief was filed on September
25, 1998. On October 10, 1998, Respondent moved the trial court to
extend the discovery cut-off deadline from October
December 15, 1998.

15, 1998 to

This extension was granted by Judge Uno on

October 29, 1998.
On November 24, 1998, Respondent provided notice of his intent
to depose Petitioner and a December 10, 1998, date was set for the
deposition.

The day before the deposition, Respondent asserts that

Petitioner refused to be deposed without providing any legal reason
for the refusal.

The deposition was ultimately cancelled.

On

December 16, 1998, the parties stipulated to extend the discovery
cut-off date and on December 22, 1998, Respondent filed a motion to
compel Petitioner's deposition.

Petitioner did not respond to this

motion.
In a January 6, 1999, memorandum decision, Judge Uno ruled on
Respondent's motion to dismiss filed on November 13, 1995.
6

The

court dismissed

claims

1 through 71 on the grounds that these

claims had been previously
circumstances
adjudicated

justified

claims.

adjudicated

granting

On

and because

a hearing

February

28,

on

1999,

the

the

no unusual
previously

time

for the

production of discovery was extended to March 26, 1999.

On June

11, 1999, Judge Uno granted Respondent's December 22, 1998, motion
to compel Petitioner's deposition.

Because of scheduling con-

flicts, Respondent motioned the court to strike the discovery cutoff deadline and a new scheduling order was entered on July 19,
1999 which gave the parties until December 31, 1999 to complete
discovery.

Petitioner's deposition was ultimately scheduled for

November 5, 1999. Mr. Brass did not attend the deposition, but Ms.
Julie

George

Petitioner

was

present

answered

counsel's advice

and

representing

several preliminary

Petitioner.

Although

questions, he

followed

invoked his Fifth Amendment

right not to

answer questions related to conversations with his trial counsel.
On December

3,

1999, Respondent

filed

a Second Motion to

Compel Petitioner's Deposition or Impose Sanctions. Petitioner did
not respond to this motion.

On December 23, 1999, Respondent filed

a motion to strike the discovery cut-off date.

Judge Uno granted

this motion on February 28, 2000, and on March 13, 2000, Respondent's second motion to compel the deposition was granted.

After

the passage of several months, Respondent filed a Motion to Permit
Additional Interrogatories on October 9, 2000.
this motion on December 20, 2000.

Judge Uno granted

Petitioner, however, failed to

7
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answer the second i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s .

On February 15, 2001, Respon-

dent f i l e d a Motion to Compel Discovery Responses.
not respond to t h i s motion.

P e t i t i o n e r did

In an order entered on March 28, 2001,

Judge Uno ordered P e t i t i o n e r to immediately provide the discovery
responses requested by Respondent.

Petitioner

f a i l e d to comply

with the c o u r t ' s order and, on April 19, 2001, Respondent moved for
sanctions pursuant to Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of C i v i l Procedure.
This motion asked the court to p r o h i b i t P e t i t i o n e r from introducing
evidence to support h i s claims beyond what was already a v a i l a b l e in
the record of the underlying criminal case and in the discovery
t h a t had been d i s c l o s e d previous to t h a t p o i n t .

Petitioner

failed

to respond to the motion for s a n c t i o n s .
On June 27, 2001, Judge Uno issued h i s Findings of

Fact,

Conclusions of Law, and Order Granting Respondent's Motion for Utah
R. Civ. P. 37 Sanctions.

On October 29, 2001, Respondent f i l e d h i s

Motion for Summary Judgment.
motion and f a i l e d
December

7,

P e t i t i o n e r f a i l e d to respond to t h i s

to ask for a d d i t i o n a l

2001, Judge

Uno granted

time to respond.

the

motion

for

On

summary

judgment, and on January 11, 2002, the court dismissed P e t i t i o n e r ' s
p e t i t i o n for p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n

relief.1

x

On February 1 1 , 2002, P e t i t i o n e r f i l e d h i s n o t i c e of a p p e a l , b u t f a i l e d
t o f i l e a d o c k e t i n g s t a t e m e n t w i t h i n t h e time r e q u i r e d by Rule 9 of t h e Utah
Rules of A p p e l l a t e P r o c e d u r e .
The Supreme Court a l l o w e d P e t i t i o n e r t o avoid
d i s m i s s a l of h i s a p p e a l by f i l i n g a t r a n s c r i p t r e q u e s t with t h e Court.
P e t i t i o n e r i n d i c a t e d t h a t he d i d n o t need a t r a n s c r i p t and, i n a l e t t e r d a t e d
June 24, 2002, t h e Court s e t t h e b r i e f i n g s c h e d u l e i n t h e c a s e . P e t i t i o n e r was
given u n t i l August 6, 2002 t o f i l e h i s b r i e f .
He f a i l e d t o meet t h i s d e a d l i n e
and r e q u e s t e d an e x t e n s i o n t o October 16, 2002 t o f i l e h i s b r i e f . This r e q u e s t
was g r a n t e d on August 8, 2002. D e s p i t e t h i s g r a n t of a d d i t i o n a l t i m e , P e t i t i o n e r
8
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On April 11, 2002, Petitioner filed a Motion to Set Aside
Judgment and indicated in the pleading that he would supplement the
motion with a memorandum setting forth the specific grounds for
relief-

On January 10, 2003, Respondent moved the trial court for

permission to file a late response to Petitioner's Motion to Set
Aside Judgment.

Petitioner did not respond to this motion and on

January 29, 2003, Respondent filed a notice to submit.

Prior to

the filing of the Respondent's motion, Judge Leslie Lewis was
assigned

to the case.

On March

6, 2003,

Judge Lewis

recused

herself.

Petitioner's case was then re-assigned to Judge Pat Brian

on March 27, 2003.
There is no indication that Respondent's motion to file a late
response was ever decided by the trial court.
Elizabeth
memorandum

Hunt appeared
supporting

as counsel

On August 12, 2003,

for Petitioner

the motion Petitioner

and filed a

filed on April 11,

2002, to set aside Judge Uno's order granting summary judgment in
favor of Respondent.

On August 15, 2003, Petitioner moved the

court for an order temporarily vacating the summary judgment.
August

29, 2003, Respondent

filed his response

Motion to Set Aside Judgment.
withdrew as counsel.

On

to Petitioner's

On September 9, 2003, Mr. Brass

On September 15, 2003, Respondent filed his

failed to file a brief. Respondent moved to dismiss the appeal and Petitioner
failed to respond.
On November 21, 2002, the Supreme Court dismissed Petitioner's appeal, but indicated that if his brief was filed within ten days, the
appeal would automatically be reinstated. Petitioner failed to file a brief and,
on December 19, 2002, the Court entered its notice of decision dismissing
Petitioner's appeal.
On December 30, 2002, Petitioner moved the Court to
reinstate his appeal. This motion was denied.

9

response to the motion to temporarily vacate the summary judgment
order.

On September 17, 2003, Petitioner filed his reply memoran-

dum in support of his motion to set aside.

Oral arguments were

held before Judge Brian on September 22, 2003 and the motion was
taken under advisement.
Memorandum

Regarding

On September 25, 2003, Petitioner filed a

Coleman v. Thompson.

Respondent

filed a

motion to strike Petitioner's memorandum addressing the Coleman
case and Petitioner filed his response in opposition to Respondent's motion on October 3, 2003.
On November

7, 2003, Judge Brian scheduled

an evidentiary

hearing for the limited purpose of obtaining evidence related to
any communication between Petitioner and Mr. Brass or Petitioner
and the court concerning the status and progress of Petitioner's
post-conviction case. Prior to the evidentiary hearing, Petitioner
filed a Memorandum Regarding T.S. v. State on December 10, 2003.
Respondent responded on December 24, 2003 and Petitioner replied on
December 29, 2003.

The evidentiary hearing was ultimately held on

January 15-16, 2004.
Summary of the Parties' Arguments
Petitioner' s Claims
Petitioner

asserts that, in furtherance

of justice, Judge

Uno's order entered on January 11, 2002, granting

Respondent's

motion for summary judgment and dismissing the petition for postconviction

relief,

should

be

set

aside.

He

argues

that

the

10
~

^ <"! h«* ,<I f \

ineffective assistance of counsel by Mr. Brass entitles him to
relief under any one of four separate subsections of Rule 60(b) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, Petitioner argues
that (1) under subsection (b) (1) he should not be punished for Mr.
Brass's

ineffective

conviction

case

assistance

because

of

counsel

Petitioner

regarding

has meritorious

the postclaims

and

defenses, including a claim of actual innocence, and Respondent
will not suffer substantial prejudice if the order is set aside;
(2) under subsection (b)(4) Mr. Brass's ineffective assistance of
counsel resulted in a fundamental denial of due process of law,
thereby rendering Judge Uno's order void;
(b)(5),

as

a result

of Mr. Brass's

(3) under

ineffective

subsection

assistance

of

counsel, it would not be equitable to allow Judge Uno's order to
apply prospectively; and (4) under subsection (b)(6), Mr. Brass's
ineffective assistance of counsel resulted in grossly negligent
representation and a denial of procedural due process.
Respondent's Response
Respondent argues that although Petitioner asserts that he is
entitled to relief under Rule 60(b) (1), (4), (5), and (6), because
each of the allegations he raises relies upon

the

ineffective

assistance of counsel provided by Mr. Brass, the court should only
determine the appropriateness of Rule 60(b) relief by considering
whether Mr. Brass's

ineffective

result

inadvertence,

of

"mistake,

11

assistance
or

of

excusable

counsel

was

the

neglect" under

subsection (b) (1) . When subsection (b) (1) applies, the limitations
period for seeking relief is three months and a litigant cannot
rely upon

another

subsection

to avoid

this

limitation

period.

According to Respondent, based upon the subsection (b) (1) limitations period, Petitioner failed to timely file his motion to set
aside and, therefore, the court is without jurisdiction to consider
the motion.
Although Petitioner filed a pleading within a reasonable time
as required under the rules, this pleading did not comport with the
particularity requirement of Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure insofar as it failed to articulate any grounds for relief
or provide any authority or legal analysis in support of the relief
he was seeking.

As a result, the pleading merely provided notice

that Petitioner intended to seek Rule 60(b) relief, but it was not
itself a motion for Rule 60(b) relief.

Additionally, while the

pleading indicated that a memorandum in support would be forthcoming, this memorandum was not filed until thirteen months later and
relied

on

information

Accordingly,

Respondent

that had
contends

only
that

recently
this

been

discovered.

memorandum

viewed as a new motion to set aside the judgment.

must be

Since it was not

filed within a reasonable time, the court lacks jurisdiction to
consider Petitioner's request for relief.
Respondent also argues that even if the motion to set aside
was timely filed, it should be denied on the merits.
subsection

First, under

(b) (1), any ineffective assistance of counsel by Mr.
12
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Brass in his representation must be borne by Petitioner because
Utah appellate courts have repeatedly held that negligence on the
part of an attorney is attributable to the client. Petitioner also
cannot show that Judge Uno's entry of the order granting summary
judgment was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable
neglect on the part of Mr. Brass.

On the contrary, Mr. Brass

admitted that the inadequacy of his representation was the result
of wilful failures on his part. Moreover, although Petitioner has
asserted numerous claims, including claims of innocence, he has
failed to demonstrate a specific factual basis to support any of
the claims he believes are sufficiently meritorious to set aside
the summary judgment order. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled
to relief under subsection (b) (1) .
Second,

under

subsection

(b)(4),

Respondent

argues that

Petitioner has not shown that Judge Uno's order is void. Specifically, Petitioner has not demonstrated that Mr. Brass's ineffective
assistance of counsel resulted in Judge Uno entering the summary
judgment order in violation of Petitioner's right to due process of
law.

According

to Respondent, while

constitutional right to meaningful access

inmates have a federal
to the courts, they do

not have a constitutional right to counsel.

Mr. Brass's ineffec-

tive assistance of counsel did not affect Petitioner's constitutional right to meaningful court access or result in a denial of
due process. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to relief under
subsection (b) (4) .
13

Third, Respondent argues that Petitioner cannot demonstrate
under subsection

(b)(5) that Judge Uno's order has prospective

application and that events have occurred that render enforcement
of the order inequitable.

While there may be collateral conse-

quences for Petitioner as a result of Judge Uno's order granting
summary judgment, this does not constitute "prospective application" under subsection (b) (5) as that term has been interpreted in
Utah case law.

Moreover, Petitioner's allegation that Mr. Brass

was unaware that his ineffective assistance of counsel would have
adverse consequences to Petitioner's case and that Petitioner was
unaware

of

his

counsel's

deficiencies

does

not

justify

the

conclusion that enforcement of Judge Uno's order would be inequitable.

Therefore, Petitioner

is not entitled

to relief under

subsection (b)(5).
Finally, Respondent argues that Petitioner cannot rely upon
subsection (b)(6) for relief because he cannot show that there is
"any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment."

First,

Petitioner's

allegations

of

ineffective

assistance of counsel by Mr. Brass are the same types of allegations he raises under subsection (b) (1) . Simply reasserting these
allegations under subsection (b)(6) does not constitute "any other
reason" justifying relief.

Second, Petitioner

does not, and

cannot, demonstrate that his due process rights were violated by
Mr. Brass.

The fact that Petitioner did not receive notice of

Judge Uno's order is not a violation of due process.
14

Third,

although

Petitioner

alleges

that

Mr.

Brass's

representation

amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner is not
entitled to effective representation in a civil proceeding that
collaterally challenges his conviction and death sentence. Fourth,
although

Petitioner

including

asserts

a claim of

that

innocence

develop, he has not provided

he

that

has

meritorious

further

any specific

claims,

investigation may

evidence

that would

suggest that additional investigation would prove fruitful. Fifth,
Petitioner also

requests relief on the ground that if Judge Uno's

order is not set aside, all of his federal avenues for review will
be defaulted.

However, Petitioner may still raise issues related

to claims he exhausted on direct appeal and he may still raise
issues related to his claim of actual innocence.
reasons, Respondent

argues

that Petitioner

For all of these

is not

entitled to

relief under subsection (b)(6).
Petitioner's Reply
In a lengthy reply memorandum, Petitioner provides various
rejoinders to many of Respondent's arguments.

After setting forth

a litany of failures alleging ineffective assistance of counsel by
Mr. Brass, Petitioner argues that he personally

tried to avoid

unnecessary delay in relation to discovery and was cooperative
during

the

deposition

process.

Moreover,

there

were

several

instances where Respondent was responsible for prolonging the case
by asking for continuances.

With respect to the timeliness issue,

15
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Petitioner contends that the motion to set aside was filed within
the three month period mandated for subsection (b)(1) and within a
reasonable

time as required by subsections

(b) (4),

(b) (5), and

(b) (6) . No authority supports Respondent's position that memoranda
in support of the motion must also be filed within the limitations
period.

In any case, not filing the supporting documents within

the limitations period should be excused because Petitioner was
unaware

of

Mr.

Brass's

ineffective

assistance

of

counsel.

Alternatively, Petitioner argues that the filing of the supporting
memorandum may be viewed as a "supplemental" Rule 60(b) motion that
was

filed

within

a

reasonable

time

under

subsections

(b) (4),

(b) (5), and (b) (6) . Any delay was necessary to allow Petitioner's
present counsel to assess the case. Additionally, while Respondent
argues that, because the motion to set aside fails to comport with
the particularity requirements of Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure and, therefore, it is not a motion but merely a pleading
indicating an intention to file a motion, the court's jurisdiction
does not turn on whether there has been a technical compliance with
Rule 7.
As

for

Respondent's

argument

that

the

negligence

of

an

attorney is attributable to the client, Petitioner argues that this
agency theory does not apply to cases involving an indigent capital
defendant

with

appointed

counsel.

The

general

rationale

for

attributing the negligence of an attorney to the client is that the
client

has

voluntarily

chosen

his

or

her

attorney

and must,

16
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therefore, bear the consequences of the chosen attorney's nonperformance.

Petitioner argues, however, that this rationale

simply does not apply to his case because he is indigent and did
not choose Mr. Brass to represent him.

Moreover, Petitioner

asserts that in cases of gross negligence on the part of an
attorney, courts generally do not hold the client responsible,
particularly where the client himself has not been negligent or
indifferent.

Petitioner argues that he consistently asked his

attorneys, including Mr. Brass, to investigate his case and raise
all valid issues.
Petitioner also argues that in considering

the issue of

prejudice under Rule 60(b), the court should recognize that it is
Petitioner, and not Respondent, who has been prejudiced by the
delay in the case because he has yet to be represented by competent
counsel and have his case properly investigated.

Although society

has an interest in the finality of judgments, that interest is not
superior to society's interest in ensuring the reliability of
Petitioner's conviction and death sentence.

The same is true in

relation to the interests of the victim representatives.
their

interests

are

important,

they

do

not

trump

While

society's

interests in ensuring the reliability of a capital conviction and
death sentence.
Finally, Petitioner asserts that because he has meritorious
claims, he is entitled to relief from Judge Uno's order. Although
Respondent argues that Petitioner must set forth a specific factual
17
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basis for the meritorious claims he asserts, Utah appellate courts
only require the presentation of a clear and specific proffer of a
claim that, if proven, would preclude recovery by the opposing
party.

If this is done, the litigant has shown a meritorious claim

for the purposes of setting aside a default judgment. According to
Petitioner, the claims asserted in his amended petition relating to
ineffective assistance of counsel and the right to a jury trial
satisfy the above standard for a meritorious claim.
Legal Analysis
Introduction
The general policy underlying Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil

Procedure

is

to

strike

a balance

between

two

competing

objectives of the legal system: "the strong public policy interest
in recognizing the finality of judgments with the equally strong
policy interest in attempting to ensure that disputes are decided
on their merits

and that

justice

is done."

United States v.

Kavser-Roth Corp., 103 F. Supp.2d 74, 78 (Dist. R.I. 2000).

See

also Laub v. South Central Utah Telephone A s s o c , 657 P.2d 1304,
1306 (Utah 1982) (under Rule 60(b), N\ . . final judgments should
not be lightly disturbed and . . . unjust judgments should not be
allowed to stand . . . .") • In light of the balancing that must be
done, the relief available under Rule

60(b)

N

'is a creature of

equity designed to relieve against the harshness of enforcing a
judgment, which may occur through procedural

18

difficulties, the

wrongs of the opposing party, or misfortunes which prevent the
presentation of a claim or defense."
260 P.2d 741, 742 (Utah 1953),

Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co.,

See also Olsen v. Cumminqs, 565

P.2d 1123, 1124 (Utah 1977) ("Because an application to set aside
a default is equitable in nature and is addressed to the conscience
of the court, all the attendant circumstances should be considered."); Kettner v. Snow, 375 P.2d 28, 30 (Utah 1962) (A party may
be relieved from a final judgment "only where it is made to appear
that for one or more of the reasons specified in Rule 60(b) justice
has been so thwarted that equity and good conscience demand that .
. . relief be granted.").
Because Rule 60(b) relief is equitable in nature, trial courts
are entitled to exercise broad discretion "to balance the equities
on a case-by-case basis, including such considerations as the
preference to allow the presentation of all claims and defenses,
any delay or unfairness of a party's conduct, the need for finality
of judgments, and the respective hardships in denying or granting
relief."

Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 n.2 (Utah 1986).

See

also Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114, 1117 (UtahCt. App. 1989) ("The
trial court is afforded broad discretion in ruling on a motion for
relief from judgment under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b), and its determination will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion."). The
Utah Supreme Court has held that trial courts "should be generally
indulgent toward setting a judgment aside where there is reasonable
justification or excuse for the [movant's] failure[s] and when
19

timely application is made.

Where there is doubt about whether a

default should be set aside, that doubt should be resolved in favor
of doing

so."

Katz,

732

P.2d

at

93.

See

also

Helgesen v.

Invanqumia, 636 P.2d 1079, 1081 (Utah 1981) P[D]iscretion should
be exercised in furtherance of justice and should incline towards
granting relief in a doubtful case to the end that the party may
have a hearing.7').

On the other hand,

xx

[t]he interests of the

[opposing parties] should also be taken into consideration, and the
judgment

should

not

be

set

aside

injustice or inequity to them."

if

to

do

so

would

work

an

Pitts v. Pine Meadows Ranch, Inc./

589 P.2d 767, 768-69 (Utah 1978).

Generally,

each case must . . . depend upon its own peculiar facts
and circumstances.
"No general rule can be laid down
respecting the discretion to be exercised in setting
aside or refusing to set aside a judgment by default . .
. but the discretion should always be so exercised as to
promote the ends of justice."
Heath

v. Mower,

597

P.2d

855,

859

(Utah

1979)

(quoting

Utah

Commercial & Savings Bank v. Trumbo, 53 P. 1033, 1037 (Utah 1898)).
Applicable Standard Under Rule 60(b)
With

few exceptions, in order to prevail

on a Rule 60(b)

motion, the movant must show that (1) the motion was timely filed;
(2) at least one of the six reasons specified in the rule applies
that would justify relief; and
worthy of adjudication.

(3) there is a meritorious claim

See Utah State Dept. of Social Services v.

Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053, 1055-556 (Utah 1983).
be by a preponderance of the evidence.
20

This showing must

Johns v. Shulsen# 717 P.2d

1336,

1338

(Utah 1986)

pit

is universally recognized that the

standard of proof in civil actions is by a preponderance of the
evidence.") . Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has held that these
requirements must be considered in a serial manner.
court must

first determine whether the motion

That is, the

to set aside is

timely and that there is a justifiable basis for relief under one
of the Rule 60(b) subsections before determining whether there has
been

a

proper

showing

of

a meritorious

claim.

Erickson

v.

Schenkers Int'l Forwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 1147, 1149 (Utah 1994)
P x Once timeliness and a basis for relief under Rule 60(b) . . .
have been established, the sole issue is whether, as a matter of
law,

a defendant's proposed Answer contains a defense which is

entitled

to be

tried.'"

(quoting Musselman,

667

P.2d

at

1059

(Durham, J., dissenting))).
Timeliness
Any motion made pursuant to Rule 60(b) must be filed "within
a reasonable time and for reason[]

(1) . . . , not more than 3

months after the judgement, order, or proceeding was entered or
taken."

Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b).

In cases where subsection (b) (1)

applies, a movant may not rely upon another subsection simply to
avoid the three month limitation period.

See, e.g./ Laub, 657 P.2d

at 1308; Gardiner & Gardiner Builders v. Swapp, 656 P.2d 429, 429
(Utah

1982);

Lincoln

Benefit

Properties, 838 P. 2d 672, 675

Life

Ins.

Co.

v.

D.T.

Southern

(Utah Ct. App. 1992); Richins v.

Delbert Chipman & Sons Co., Inc., 817 P.2d 382, 387 (Utah Ct. App.
21

1991).

"[A] a reasonable time under rule 60(b) 'depends upon the

facts of each case, considering such factors as the interest in
finality, the reason for delay, the practical ability of the
litigant to learn earlier of the grounds relied upon, and prejudice
to other parties.'"

Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah

1993) (quoting Maertz v. Maertz, 827 P.2d 259, 261 (Utah Ct. App.
1992)).

" x In general . . . the moving party need show only that

she acted diligently once the basis for relief became available,
and that

[any] delay in seeking relief

hardship to the opposing party.'"

[does] not cause undue

Workman v. Nagle Construction/

802 P.2d 749, 752 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoting J. Friedenthal, M.
Kane & A. Miller, Civil Procedure § 12.6 at 574 (1985)). However,
with respect to subsection (b)(4), "'there is no time limit on an
attack on a judgment as void.'"

Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288,

290 (Utah 1986) (quoting Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure: Civil § 2862 (1973)).
Grounds for Relief Under Rule 60(b)
In the context of the present case, four separate grounds for
relief are asserted under Rule 60(b)(1), (4), (5), and (6). Rule
60(b)(1) permits relief if the movant can demonstrate that the
final judgment or order was the result of "mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect."

Utah R. Civ.

P.

60(b)(1).

Although the rule is silent on the meaning of these terms, most
federal circuit courts of appeal have held that deliberate or
willful inaction in a case can never be mistake, inadvertence, or
22

excusable neglect.

See 12 Moore's Federal Practice, § 60.41[l][c]

(Matthew Bender 3d ed.).

Although relief under subsection (b)(1)

may be possible where inaction occurs based upon a reasonable, good
faith interpretation of the law that turns out to be erroneous, see
Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, 1116, 11 P.3d 277, "[gJross carelessness,
ignorance of the rules, or ignorance of the law are insufficient
bases for 60(b) (1) relief."

Edward H. Bohlin Co. v. Banning Co.,

6 F.3d 350, 357 (5th Cir. 1993).

See also Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co.

v.

380,

Brunswick

Assoc,

507

U.S.

392(1993)

("Inadvertence,

ignorance of the rules, or mistakes construing the rules do not
usually constitute ^excusable' neglect.").
Supreme Court, in order to demonstrate

According to the Utah

that a default was the

result of excusable neglect, the movant must show that his attorney
exercised due diligence, i.e., that the conduct of his attorney was
consistent with how a reasonably prudent attorney under similar
circumstances

would

have

acted.

See Mini

Spas

v.

Industrial

Comm'n, 733 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah 1987) ("We have heretofore defined
'excusable

neglect'

as

the

exercise

of

Mue

diligence'

by a

reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances.").
Rule 60(b)(4) permits relief where the movant
that the judgment is void.

demonstrates

In the context of this subsection,

"a judgment is not void merely because it is erroneous or
because some irregularity inhered in its rendition. It is
void only if the court that rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or of the parties or if the
court acted in a manner inconsistent with due process/'
Richins, 817 P.2d at 385 (quoting Automatic Feeder Co. v. Tobey,
23

558 P.2d 101, 104 (Kan. 1976)).

But see Bish' s Sheet Metal Co. v.

Luras, 359 P.2d 21, 22 (Utah 1961) (noting that a claim of a lack
of

due

process

could

fall

under

the

then

equivalent

of

Rule

60(b) (6) because relief from an order or judgment on the basis of
a lack of due process is not expressly provided for by any other
subsection

of

Rule

60(b)).

Moreover,

a

motion

filed

under

subsection (4)
"differs markedly from motions under the other clauses of
Rule 60(b).
There is no question of discretion on the
part of the court when a motion is under Rule 60(b) (4).
Nor is there any requirement, as there usually is when
default judgments are attacked under Rule 60(b), that the
moving party show that he has a meritorious defense.
Either a judgment is void or it is valid. Determining
which it is may well present a difficult question, but
when that question is resolved, the court must act
accordingly."
Garcia,

712 P.2d

at 290-291

(quoting Wright

Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2862 (1973)).

& Miller,

Federal

See also Orner v.

Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307, 1310 (10th Cir. 1994) (when a motion to set
aside is properly invoked, "relief is not a discretionary matter;
it is mandatory."); Recreational

Properties,

Mortgage Serv. Corp., 804 F.2d 311, 314
however,

the

motion

is

based

on

a

Inc. v. Southwest

(5th Cir. 1986) ("When,

void

judgment

under

rule

60(b)(4), the district court has no discretion—the judgment is
either void or it is not.").
Relief may be obtained under Rule 60(b) (5) if the prospective
application of a judgment or order would no longer be equitable.
Although "every court order causes at least some reverberations
24

oo.T/k: i

into the future, and has, in that literal sense, some prospective
effect [,] . . . [tjhat a court's action has continuing consequences
. . . does not necessarily mean that it has ^prospective application' for the purposes of Rule 60(b) (5)."
District

of

Columbia,

841

F.2d

1133,

Twelve John Does v.

1138

(D.C.

Cir.

1988).

Rather, the standard for "determining whether an order or judgment
has prospective application within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(5) is
whether it is ^executory' or involves
conduct or conditions.'"

y

the supervision of changing

Id. at 1139

(quoting Pennsylvania v.

Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. 421, 431 (1855) and United
States v. Swift & Co. , 286 U.S. 106, 114 (1932)).
S.A.

v. Morrison,

Maraziti

147

v. Thorpe,

52

F.3d
F.3d

759,

See also Stokors

762

(8th Cir.

1998)

(same);

252, 254

(9th Cir.

1995)

(same) ;

DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 38 F.3d 1266, 1275 (2nd Cir. 1994) (same).
Thus, unless, for example, a judgment compels a party to perform or
not to perform a future act or requires the court to engage in
continual supervision over the parties in the case, the judgment is
not "prospective" for purposes of Rule 60(b) (5).
Does,

841

F.2d

at

1138.

In

addition,

the

See Twelve John

movant

must

also

demonstrate that the circumstances, whether legal or factual, which
were present at the time of the judgment was entered have changed,
or new ones have since arisen, that render enforcement of the
judgment inequitable.

See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail,

502 U.S. 367, 384 (1992) (requiring party moving for Rule 60(b)(5)
relief to show u a significant change either in factual conditions
25

or in law . . . . " ) ;

System Federation No. 91, Railway Employees'

Department v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 647 (1961) (same).
Rule 60(b) (6) is the residuary provision and allows for final
judgments to be set aside for "any other reason justifying relief
from the operation of the judgment."

Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).

Subsection (b) (6) may be relied upon only if all other subsections
under Rule 60(b) are inapplicable.
(when subsection
other

than

See Laub, 657 P.2d at 1306

(b) (6) is relied upon, "the reason must be one

those

listed

Moreover, this subsection

in subdivisions

(1) through

"'should be cautiously

([5]).").

and

sparingly

invoked by the Court only in unusual and exceptional instances.'"
Id. at 1307-08

(quoting Hughes v. Sanders, 287 F. Supp. 332, 334

(E.D. Okla. 1968)).

Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has

indicated that while subsection (b) (6) "does not particularize the
factors that justify relief, . . . we have previously noted that it
provides courts with authority 'adequate to enable them to vacate
judgments

whenever

such

action

is

appropriate

to

accomplish

justice, ' while also cautioning that it should only be applied in
'extraordinary

circumstances.'"

Lilieberg

v.

Health

Services

Acguisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863 (1988) (quoting Klapprott v.
United States, 335 U.S. 601, 614-615 (1949) and Ackermann v. United
States, 340 U.S. 193, 202

(1950)).

See also Cashner v. Freedom

Stores, 98 F.3d 572, 579 (10th Cir. 1996) ("[A] district court may
grant a Rule 60(b)(6) motion only in extraordinary circumstances.
and only when necessary to accomplish justice.").
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Meritorious Claim
In order "to prevent the necessity of judicial review of
questions which, on the face of the pleadings, are frivolous,"
Musselman, 667 P.2d at 1060 (Durham, J., dissenting), the Utah
Supreme Court has held "that relief from judgment requires a
showing of a meritorious defense to a claim."
$28.

Lund, 2000 UT 75 at

"A defense is sufficiently meritorious to have a default

judgment set aside if it is entitled to be tried."

Erickson, 882

P.2d at 1149. Based upon this standard, "where a party presents a
clear and specific proffer of a defense that, if proven, would
preclude total or partial recovery by the [opposing party], it has
adequately shown a nonfrivolous and meritorious defense for the
purposes of its motion to set aside a default judgment."
2000 UT 75 at $29.

Thus, even general denials

requirement of a meritorious defense.

Lund,

satisfy the

See Erickson, 882 P.2d at

1149 ("These general denials, if proven at trial, would preclude
recovery by [the opposing party] and are therefore sufficient to
satisfy the meritorious defense requirement.").
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
A. Timeliness of the Motion
On January 11, 2002, Judge Uno granted Respondent's motion for
summary judgment and dismissed Petitioner's petition for postconviction

relief.

Three months

later, on April

Petitioner filed his Motion to Set Aside Judgment.

11, 2002,

However, the
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motion indicated that relief was being sought pursuant to "Rule
60(D)," an obvious misidentification of Rule 60(b) . Additionally,
the motion failed to provide any grounds for setting aside the
judgment, and Petitioner failed to specify any subsection under
Rule 60(b) he would be relying upon for relief.

Although the

motion did indicate that a subsequent memorandum would be filed
setting forth specific grounds for relief, his Memorandum Supporting Motion to Set Aside Judgment was not filed until August 12,
2003, sixteen months after the initial motion was filed.
As Respondent correctly points out, Rule 7 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure mandates that an "application to the court for
an order shall be by motion which . . . shall be in writing [and]
shall state with particularity the grounds thereof." Utah R. Civ.
P. 7(b) (1) (emphasis added).

Moreover, Rule 4-501 of the Code of

Judicial Administration expressly requires motions to "be accompanied by a memorandum of points and authorities . . . relied upon in
support of the motion."

Utah Code Jud. Admin.

4-501(1) (A).

Petitioner's Motion to Set Aside Judgment clearly failed to satisfy
either of these rules; the motion neither "state[d] with particularity" the grounds for relief, nor was it "accompanied" by a
memorandum of points and authorities.

While it may be true that

the intent of the Rules of Civil Procedure is to "liberalize both
pleading and procedure," Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v.
Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366, 1374 (Utah 1996), the failures exhibited in
Petitioner's motion are in direct contravention of the overall
28

purpose of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Code of Judicial
Administration, which is "to achieve . . . the development of a
more efficient and effective judicial system . . . ."
Utah Code Jud. Admin.

Forward,

Such deficiencies effectively undermine the

efficient and proper administration of justice by preventing an
opposing party from receiving what she is entitled to under the
rules, namely, "notice of the issues raised and an opportunity to
meet them."

Cheney v. Rucker, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (Utah 1963).

Respondent argues that Petitioner's failure to comply with
Rule 7 renders his Rule 60(b) motion untimely and therefore, the
court lacks jurisdiction to consider the merits of the motion.

In

making this argument, Respondent argues that a pleading which on
its face is a motion for some type of relief that is filed within
the statutory limitations period is not actually filed within the
limitations period if the pleading fails to state with particularity the grounds for relief.2

Based upon this principle, the court

must either interpret Petitioner's Motion to Set Aside Judgment as
not being what it clearly indicates it is and, therefore, find that
no "motion" was

actually

filed, or the

court must

accept the

pleading as a motion to set aside and then engage in some type of
legal fiction in order to find that the "filing" of the motion did
not actually occur on the date it was filed, but on a later date,

2

In his response memorandum, Respondent asserts that a movant does not
actually seek relief under Rule 60(b) until he complies with the rules by stating
with particularity the grounds for relief.
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namely, when the particularized grounds for relief were filed.

The

court, however, has been unable to find any case, either in Utah or
elsewhere, suggesting that Respondent's position is based on any
established principle of law; nor has the court been able to find
any case suggesting the validity of the more general claim that the
Rule 7 particularity requirement is a necessary prerequisite for
timeliness. Rather, the court finds that pleading with particularity is not

a logically necessary component

of timeliness

and,

therefore, a motion may be filed in a timely manner despite being
insufficient for various reasons including the fact that it lacks
particularity.

Consistent with this view, the court finds that

Petitioner's Motion to Set Aside Judgment was timely filed within
the three month limitations period imposed by Rule 60(b).
The court also finds that, although the motion was sufficient
to put Respondent

on

notice

that

Judge Uno's

order

was

being

challenged, it was clearly deficient in that it failed to state
with particularity the grounds for relief as required by Rule 7.
This raises the issue of whether a failure to satisfy the particularity

requirement

timely-filed motion.

deprives

the

court

of

jurisdiction

over a

See generally Registration Control Systems,

Inc. v. Compusvstems, Inc., 922 F.2d 805 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (distinguishing between timeliness and particularity in deciding jurisdictional nature of Rule 7 ) ; Nations v. Bonner Building Supply, 746
P.2d 1027 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987) (ruling that in context of motion
for

a

new

trial,

timeliness

and
30

particularity

are

separate

jurisdictional requirements). Although Utah appellate courts have
yet to consider this question, federal courts of appeal that have
addressed this question are split on its resolution.

See, e.g.,

Roy v. Volkswaqenwerk Aktienqesellschaft, 781 F.2d 670, 670-71 (9th
Cir. 1985) (a timely, but unparticularized motion for a new trial
is adequate to preserve the jurisdiction of the trial court to (1)
allow the movant to file a subsequent memorandum detailing the
grounds for relief and
Trailior,

556

F.2d

818,

(2) rule on the motion) ; Martinez v.
821

(7th

Cir,

1977)

(insufficiently

particularized motions cannot preserve the court's jurisdiction);
Registration Control Systems. 922 F.2d at 809 (Rule 7fs particularity requirement is jurisdictional) .
Consistent with the view that the Rules of Civil Procedure
"must all be looked to in the light of their . . . fundamental
purpose of liberalizing both pleading and procedure to the end that
the parties are afforded the privilege of presenting whatever
legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their dispute,"
Cheney, 381 P.2d at 91, it is the court's legal conclusion that the
Rule 7 particularity requirement is not jurisdictional. Therefore,
since Petitioner's motion was timely filed, his failure to state
with particularity the grounds for relief does not prevent the
court from exercising jurisdiction over the motion.

The court's

legal conclusion does not suggest that the particularity requirement need not be satisfied or that it may be satisfied in a manner
that places the opposing party at an unfair disadvantage.
31

This

conclusion does imply, however, that the court may grant a movant
who fails to state with particularity the grounds for relief time
to supplement

the motion with a memorandum setting forth the

grounds for relief with particularity even if the memorandum is
filed after the limitations period has expired.

See Roy, 781 F.2d

at 670-71 (if an initial motion is timely filed, but fails to state
with particularity the grounds for relief, it is within the court's
discretion to allow the movant to file a later document specifying
the grounds for relief).

Notwithstanding the liberalizing purpose

of the Rules of Civil Procedure, however, a movant should be
allowed to file a subsequent memorandum only "in furtherance of
justice and not as a reward for indifference or neglect, or where
prejudicial to the rights of the adverse party or placing him at an
unfair disadvantage." Johnson v. Brinkerhoff, 57 P.2d 1132, 113637

(Utah 1936) .

Moreover, the greatest liberality should be

exercised nearest the time when the initial motion is filed, but
necessarily decreases over time as the likelihood of prejudice to
the opposing party increases.

See id. at 1137 ("[T]he liberality

exercised in allowing amendments is greatest at the time the law
suit is commenced and decreases as the suit progresses . . . . " ) .
The memorandum in support of the motion to set aside was filed
by Petitioner on August 12, 2003, sixteen months after the motion
itself was filed.

Ordinarily, when a motion is timely filed, but

is lacking in particularity, the trial court will issue a scheduling order setting reasonable due dates for the movant to file a
32

subsequent memorandum advancing the grounds for relief and for the
opposing party to file a response to the motion.

In the present

case, this was apparently never done by the trial court judge nor
did the parties request that the trial court issue such an order.
Obviously, without the supporting memorandum, the motion to set
aside is fatally deficient and Petitioner cannot prevail.
question

then,

is

whether

allowing

Petitioner's

The

supporting

memorandum to be considered in ruling on his Motion to Set Aside
Judgment would exceed the reasonable bounds of liberality that
should be exercised by the court under the Rules of Civil Procedure.
On the one hand, the filing of the memorandum was more than
simply tardy.

Its filing, a full sixteen months after the initial

motion to set aside was filed, suggests that the failure to timely
file the memorandum was the result of indifference.

Moreover, at

this point Respondent's interest in the finality of Judge Uno's
order is significant.

On the other hand, although the initial

motion put Respondent on notice that the finality of the order was
being challenged, Petitioner's failure for such an extended period
of time to cure the insufficiency of the motion by setting forth
the grounds for relief, suggests that his interest in having his
case resolved on the merits is relatively weak.

Finally, in light

of the fact that it was Mr. Brass who represented Petitioner at the
time the motion to set aside was filed, had the promised supporting
memorandum been filed within a reasonable time, the deficiency of
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Mr.

Brass's

representation

would

not have

been

included.

As

Respondent aptly argues, the deficiency of Mr. Brass's representation underlies each of the grounds for relief asserted by Petitioner

in his memorandum.

To this extent Respondent would be

prejudiced by permitting Petitioner's supporting memorandum to be
considered in ruling on the motion to set aside, because it asserts
grounds for relief which arguably would not have been asserted had
it been timely filed.
On the other hand, Respondent also did not pursue a resolution
of the motion in a timely manner.

Rather than promptly raising an

objection to the lack of particularity of Petitioner's motion or
objecting that the promised subsequent memorandum was not forthcoming, Respondent did nothing for nine months.
January

10, 2003,

that

Respondent

finally

It was not until

filed

a motion

permission to file a late response to Petitioner's motion.

for

Twenty

days later a notice to submit was filed and the motion was taken
under advisement with a review date scheduled for March 31, 2003.
However, on March 7, 2003, a hearing was held during which Judge
Lewis disqualified herself from hearing the case.

The case was

then assigned to Judge Pat B. Brian on March 27, 2003.

The docket

does not indicate that Respondent again raised his motion to file
a

late

response

and

the

issue

was

never

expressly

resolved.

Finally, on August 12, 2003, Petitioner, with new counsel, filed a
memorandum in support of the motion to set aside setting forth with
particularity the grounds for relief.
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This court then scheduled

due dates for Respondent's response and Petitioner's reply.
The

above-stated

apparent

indifference

facts
of

suggest

that,

Petitioner

in

in

addition

filing

a

to the

supporting

memorandum, Respondent was also indifferent in pursuing a resolution of the motion to set aside.

Moreover, despite the lengthy

delays, Respondent was ultimately provided a fair opportunity to
address the grounds for relief raised in Petitioner's supporting
memorandum.

In light of these facts, the court finds that the

interests of Petitioner in having his motion to set aside decided
on the merits
finality.

outweighs

the

interests

of Respondent

regarding

The court therefore concludes that, in the interests of

justice, Petitioner's Memorandum Supporting Motion to Set Aside
Judgment will be considered in ruling on Petitioner's motion to set
aside.
B. Grounds for Relief Under Rule 60(b)
1. Subsection (b)(1)
Petitioner first contends that he is entitled to relief under
Rule 60(b) (1), which allows for an order to be set aside if the
movant

can

demonstrate

that

it

was

the

result

inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect."
60(b) (1).

of

"mistake,

Utah R. Civ. P.

His argument is that subsection (b) (1) applies because

he relied upon Mr. Brass to assert his interests, but instead Mr.
Brass failed to perform his duties as an effective advocate.
As

previously

noted,

Mr.
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Brass

was

ineffective

in

his

representation of Petitioner.3

No evidence has been presented to

the court, however, indicating that these failings were the result
of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect.

The reasons

advanced by Petitioner for Mr. Brass's repeated failures are: (1)
that Mr. Brass had no training in and lacked understanding of the
complex legal and procedural rules governing capital post-conviction litigation and (2) that Mr. Brass believed defaulting claims
in State court would have no collateral consequences when Petitioner sought relief in federal court.

These explanations do not

justify relief under subsection (b)(1), however.
Mr. Brass's ineffective representation did not result from
errors in applying esoteric legal standards, but were inexplicable
failures to follow rudimentary procedural requirements and comply
with court-ordered deadlines.

See Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 392.

In

addition, although relief under subsection (b) (1) is possible where
inaction occurs based upon a reasonable, good faith interpretation
of the law that turns out to be erroneous, see Lund, 2000 UT 75 at

3

Mr. Brass's ineffective representation is evidenced by (1) failing twice
to file an amended petition for post-conviction relief; (2) failing to respond
to Respondent's motion to compel Petitioner's deposition; (3) failing to attend
the deposition on November 5, 1999; (4) failing to respond to Respondent's second
motion to compel Petitioner's deposition; (5) failing to answer Respondent's
second set of interrogatories; (6) failing to respond to Respondent's motion to
compel discovery responses; (7) failing to comply with the trial court's order
to immediately provide discovery responses; (8) failing to respond to Respondent's motion for sanctions; (9) failing to respond to Respondent's motion for
summary judgment; (10) failing to obtain the $2,000 set aside by Judge Uno for
the investigation of Petitioner's case; (11) failing to provide Petitioner with
copies of legal materials; (12) failing to keep Petitioner fully informed of the
procedural posture of the case; (13) failing to comply with Rule 7 and Rule 4-501
in filing the motion to set aside; and (14) failing for over a year to file a
memorandum in support of the motion to set aside.
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failing to respond to motions, see Citicorp Mortgage/ Inc. v.
Bartolome, 16 P.3d 827, 842 (Haw. Ct. App. 2000), the ineffective
assistance of counsel of Mr. Brass exceeds any neglectful conduct
that could be deemed "excusable."

His inaction appears to have

been willful and deliberate rather than the result of ignorance or
carelessness. Such negligent conduct is not "excusable" within the
meaning of subsection (b) (1) . See Boughner v. Secretary of Health/
Education and Welfare, 572 F.2d 976, 978-79 (3d Cir. 1978) (in
context of a Rule 60(b)(1) motion the court held that "[t]he
conduct

of

[counsel]

indicates

neglect

so

gross

that

it is

inexcusable."); Universal Film Exchanges/ Inc. v. Lust/ 479 F.2d
573,

576

(4th Cir.

1973)

(attorney's

actions

were

"^grossly

negligent' and cannot be deemed excusable neglect under Rule
60(b) (1) .") ; Carcello v. TJX Companies, Inc./ 192 F.R.D. 61, 63 (D.
Conn. 2000) ("Gross negligence on the part of counsel does not fall
within

the

60(b)(1).").

scope

of

excusable

neglect

as

defined

by

Rule

In light of this finding, it is the court's conclu-

sion that Petitioner is not entitled to relief on the basis of
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.
Petitioner argues on equitable grounds that relief must be
granted under subsection

(b) (1) in order to avoid "punishing"

Petitioner for Mr. Brass's conduct. Petitioner argues that because
Mr. Brass's failures cannot be attributed to Petitioner, he cannot
be held responsible for Mr. Brass's inexcusable conduct in the
case.

Respondent's rejoinder is that this argument necessarily
38
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316, Petitioner cannot argue that Mr. Brass's inaction was the
result of a reasonable, good faith interpretation of the law. Mr.
Brass apparently believed that his inaction would not affect the
review of Petitioner's claims either in a subsequent post-conviction proceeding or in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. There is
no legal precedent for the view that defaulting claims in state
court will have no collateral consequences in federal court or in
subsequent post-conviction actions. Indeed, it is black letter law
that, barring unusual circumstances, failing to preserve an issue
will foreclose consideration of that issue in future proceedings of
whatever kind.
Furthermore, there has been no showing of due diligence that
would

indicate

that Mr. Brass's

excusable neglect.

failures were

the result of

See Mini Spas, 733 P.2d at 132; BLack' s Title,

Inc. v. Utah State Ins. Dep't, 1999 UT App 330, 310, 991 P.2d 607.
Nor do the facts show, as pointed out by Respondent, that these
failures

resulted

from

any

circumstances

beyond

Mr. Brass's

control, a lack of notice about deadlines, or legal or factual
misunderstandings about whether or when he was required to respond.
In fact, Mr. Brass candidly admitted at the evidentiary hearing
that there was no legal basis to object to Respondent's motion for
discovery,

motion

for

sanctions,

or

the

motion

for

summary

judgment.
Although subsection (b)(1) may properly apply in cases where
there is an instance or two of failing to answer interrogatories or
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fails as a matter of law because Utah appellate courts have clearly
held that, in the context of Rule 60(b)(1),
client's]

attorney

is

principles of agency."
(Utah 1984).

attributable

to

"any neglect by [a

[the

client]

through

Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193, 1195

See also Walker v. Carlson, 740 P.2d 1372, 1375 (Utah

Ct. App. 1987)

(under Rule

60(b)(1), ".

. . neglect on the

attorney's part is imputed to [the client] through principles of
agency.").

This is so because a client

voluntarily [chooses his] attorney as his representative
in the action, and he cannot . . . avoid the consequences
of the acts or omissions of this freely selected agent.
Any other notion would be wholly inconsistent with our
system of representative litigation, in which each party
is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and is
considered to have "notice of all facts, notice of which
can be charged upon the attorney."
Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 397 (quoting Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S.
626, 633-34
(1880)).

(1962)

(quoting Smith v. Aver, 101 U.S. 320, 326

According to Respondent, because Petitioner is bound by

the acts of his attorney through principles of agency, he cannot
avoid the consequences of Mr. Brass's ineffective representation.
Petitioner

argues

that

unlike other

civil

litigants who

voluntarily choose their attorney, he is an indigent inmate under
a sentence of death and he neither chose nor hired Mr. Brass as his
attorney. Rather, Mr. Brass was appointed by the court to provide
him with representation.

Therefore, the underlying rationale for

holding a client responsible for the conduct of his attorney does
not apply in his case, and he should not be held accountable for
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the conduct of Mr. Brass which amounted to ineffective representation.

See Franklin v. Lopez, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6550, *5 (N.D.

111. 1999) ("[Petitioner] may have an argument that this [agency]
rule should not apply in the case of misconduct by a courtappointed attorney.

In such cases the client has not chosen the

attorney, negating a primary rationale for holding parties strictly
liable for their attorney's mistakes.").
There is merit to Petitioner's argument.

In most civil

litigation, each litigant is entitled to hire an attorney of his
choice and may retain different counsel whenever a concern arises
with respect to the adequacy of the representation.

This is not

true where the post-conviction litigation involves an indigent
inmate under a sentence of death.

In such cases, the litigant is

statutorily entitled to the appointment of counsel pursuant to
Section 78-35a-202 (2) (a) and he is not necessarily entitled to make
a voluntary choice with respect to the attorney who will represent
him.

The appointment of counsel is left to the sound judgment of

the trial court judge. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-202 (2) (a) ("If
the court finds the defendant
appoint counsel . . . . " ) .

is indigent, it shall promptly

This circumstance argues in favor of

not holding Petitioner responsible for the inadequate representation of Mr. Brass.

In addition, the Utah Supreme Court has held,

at least in the context of proceedings that are equitable in
nature, that to "hold

[a client] accountable for her lawyer's

negligence, where she is statutorily entitled to appointed counsel/
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impermissibly undermines her r i g h t to c o u n s e l . ' '

T.S. v. State,

2003 UT 54, 511/ 487 Utah Adv. Rep. 16 (emphasis added).
upon t h i s language in T . S . , 4 because P e t i t i o n e r was
entitled

to

appointed

counsel

in pursuing

his

Based

statutorily

post-conviction

challenges, i t would be impermissible to hold P e t i t i o n e r accountable for Mr. B r a s s ' s inadequate r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .
Although P e t i t i o n e r cannot be held accountable for Mr. Brass's
f a i l u r e s does not mean t h a t he i s automatically e n t i t l e d to the
r e l i e f he seeks.

The Utah Supreme Court has held t h a t "[bjecause

an a p p l i c a t i o n to set aside a default i s e q u i t a b l e in nature and i s
addressed

to

circumstances

the

conscience

of

the

court,

should be considered."

(emphasis added).

Olsen,

all

the

attendant

565 P.2d at 1124

Consistent with t h i s view of e q u i t a b l e proceed-

ings, the Court in T.S. held t h a t determining whether a l i t i g a n t ' s
request for e q u i t a b l e r e l i e f should be granted does not end with an
examination of the a t t o r n e y ' s inadequate r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .

Rather,

a l i t i g a n t ' s own negligent or i n t e n t i o n a l a c t s might render r e l i e f
i n e q u i t a b l e even though he has made a showing t h a t h i s a t t o r n e y ' s
conduct has been grossly n e g l i g e n t .
tion

of

the

lawyer's

conduct

See i d . at SI 12 ("An examina-

does not

end the

trial

evaluation of the p a r t y ' s a p p l i c a t i o n for . . . r e l i e f .

court's
Although

4

Although t h e T . S . case i n v o l v e d t h e Utah Supreme Court c o n s i d e r i n g the
s t a t u t o r y r i g h t t o a p p o i n t e d c o u n s e l i n t h e c o n t e x t of a t e r m i n a t i o n of p a r e n t a l
r i g h t s c a s e , see Utah Code Ann. §78-3a-913 (1) (a) , t h e g e n e r a l n a t u r e of t h e c i t e d
language used by t h e Court s t r o n g l y s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e C o u r t ' s p o s i t i o n would
apply with equal f o r c e t o any s i t u a t i o n where a p e r s o n i s s t a t u t o r i l y e n t i t l e d
t o appointed c o u n s e l .
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a party is not responsible for his lawyer's conduct, a party's own
negligent or intentional acts might render . . . relief inequitable,

notwithstanding

counsel.").

a

showing

of

ineffective

assistance

of

The fact that Petitioner's acts may be considered in

determining whether relief should be granted implies that Petitioner himself bears the responsibility of acting reasonably with
respect to his case and that, while he cannot be held accountable
for Mr. Brass's conduct, he may be held accountable for his own
negligent or intentional conduct.
Petitioner authorized the filing of the petition for postconviction relief.

Therefore, he necessarily bears some personal

responsibility for prosecuting his case and keeping abreast of its
status and progress. Moreover, this principle of accountability is
consistent with Utah appellate court decisions holding that under
subsection 60(b)(1), " x the movant must show that he has used due
diligence . . . .'" Black's Title, 1999 UT App 330 at 110 (quoting
Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 513 P.2d 429, 431 (1973)).
See Reinsurance Co. of America, Inc. v. Administratia Asigurarilor
de Stat, 902 F.2d 1275, 1278 (7th Cir. 1990) ("[B]ecause of its
lack of diligence

in following

the course

of this

case, [the

client] is precluded from demanding Rule 60(b) relief due to the
negligence of its attorney.") .
Service,

769 F.2d

281, 287

See also Pryor v. U.S. Postal

(5th Cir. 1985)

("This court has

pointedly announced that a party has a duty of diligence to inquire
about the status of a case, and that Rule 60(b) relief will be
42
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afforded

only

in

^unique circumstances.' ") ; Couch

Diagnostic Clinic, 515 S.E.2d 30, 38 n.3

v. Private

(N.C. Ct. App. 1999)

(" [A] ttorney neglect can also constitute grounds for relief under
Rule 60(b) (1), if the client has been diligent in communicating
with his attorney and is not otherwise at fault."); Lynch v.
Meridian Hill Studio Apts., Inc., 491 A.2d 515, 519 (D.C. 1985)
("'Counsel's conduct will not be imputed to the client, and thus
relief will be available under Rule 60(b) (1), when that conduct "is
outrageously in violation of . . . his implicit duty to devote
reasonable efforts in representing his client,' provided that the
client himself is diligent in pursuing the claim." (quoting Railway
Express Agency, Inc. v. Hill, 250 A.2d 923, 926 (D.C. 1969)).5
Thus, if Petitioner was appropriately diligent and conscientious in

5

This view is also consistent with appellate decisions addressing relief
under subsection (b) (6) which have held that in cases where there is an
allegation that counsel has been grossly negligent, a client can only avoid
responsibility if he demonstrates that he has been diligent in monitoring his
case.
Inrvco v. Metropolitan Engineering Co., 708 F.2d 1225, 1234 (7th Cir.
1983) P[A]llowing relief under Rule 60(b)(6) requires a diligent, conscientious
client."); Dominguez v. United States, 583 F.2d 615, 618 (2nd Cir. 1978) (even
where the attorney has inexcusably and completely abandoned his responsibilities,
the client must still demonstrate his own diligent efforts to induce his attorney
to fulfill his duty); L. P. Steuart, Inc. v. Matthews, 329 F.2d 234, 235 (D.C.
Cir. 1964) (Rule 60(b) (6) "is broad enough to permit relief when as in this case
personal problems of counsel cause him grossly to neglect a diligent client's
case and mislead the client." (emphasis added)); Cobos v. Adelphi University, 179
F.R.D. 381, 388 (E.D.N.Y 1998) ("[A]n attorney's gross negligence is not a basis
for relief under Rule 60(b)(6) unless the gross negligence is explained by
exceptional circumstances and the movant makes a showing of client diligence in
the face of the attorney's negligence."); Binderman v. Schapiro, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1171, *6 (N.D. 111.1992) ("Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is . . . unwarranted
because plaintiff was not diligent and was sophisticated enough to know that he
should have been diligent in supervising his case and attorney.") ; In re Muzguiz,
122 B.R. 56, 59 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1990) ("[C]ourts that have considered an
attorney's gross negligence as grounds for relief under Rule 60(b)(6) have held
that it is the client's responsibility to be diligent in keeping up with their
lawsuit.") (citing Inryco, Inc. v. Metropolitan Engineering Co., 708 F.2d 1225
(7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Cirami, 535 F.2d 736 (2nd Cir. 1976)).
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fulfilling his responsibility of monitoring the status and progress
of his case, he may be entitled to the relief he seeks.

If not, he

is accountable for his own negligent or intentional conduct.
Petitioner is an impecunious inmate housed at the Utah State
prison

under

a sentence

of death.

Therefore,

his

monitor the status of his case might be restricted.
civil

litigants,

he

cannot

easily

meet

with

or

ability to
Unlike other

speak

to

his

attorney, nor does he have ready access to the court docket as a
means

of

independently

verifying

the progress

of

his

case or

keeping informed concerning what documents have been filed and what
hearings have been scheduled.

Although the level of diligence

which Petitioner might display will therefore be relatively low, he
must

still

exercise

that

level of diligence

that

prudent person in his circumstances would exercise.

a reasonably
See also Mini

Spas, 733 P.2d at 132.
Petitioner's second affidavit indicates that he "expressly
told Brass
about

[he] was innocent, expressed

extending

time

limits

[his] concerns to Brass

for the case, and expressed

[his]

concerns to Brass that he should not take more time than needed for
the

investigation

Affidavit

of

Ralph

of

[the]

Leroy

case,

Menzies,

as

delay

September

might

be

fatal."

17,

2003.

This

language clearly suggests that Petitioner was personally aware that
any delay in his case could have severe consequences regarding the
outcome

of his petition

for post-conviction

relief.

However,

Petitioner indicates that he was unaware that his case was not
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proceeding

expeditiously.

According to Petitioner, it was not

until August 12, 2003, that he learned that Mr. Brass had defaulted
on numerous motions during discovery, "that discovery sanctions
barring [Petitioner] from presenting further evidence were imposed
against

[him]

as

a

result

of

Brass's

failure

to

comply

with

discovery, [and] that a default summary judgment order which Brass
did not oppose
court."6

[had] been

Affidavit

of

granted

Ralph

against

[him]

in the trial

Leroy Menzies, August

12, 2003.

Petitioner also has stated that Mr. Brass told him that the "case
was under control and to trust him to take care of it."7 Affidavit
of Ralph Leroy Menzies, September 17, 2003.
Assuming Petitioner was told by Mr. Brass that the case was
under control and that Petitioner only recently had been informed
of Mr. Brass's inadequate representation and that court orders had
been entered against him, Petitioner was nonetheless independently
aware that his case was not proceeding in a timely fashion and that
there

were

serious

problems

with

Mr.

Brass's

representation.

Petitioner's original petition for post-conviction relief was filed
in April 1995, and three years later, in March 1998, Mr. Brass was

6
However, at the evidentiary hearing, Petitioner indicated that he learned
about the default summary judgment order on January 2, 2003.
7

It is unclear exactly what this quoted phrase means because no real
context has been provided. It could mean that Mr. Brass told Petitioner once,
at the beginning of his representation, that the case was under control; or it
could mean that Mr. Brass said this while the case was, in fact, under control,
but not after Mr. Brass's representation began to falter; or, it could mean that
Mr. Brass indicated to Petitioner throughout his representation that the case was
under control even when it clearly was not.
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appointed

to represent Petitioner.

Another four years passed

before Judge Uno issued his order granting Respondent's motion for
summary judgment.

Thus seven years of post-conviction litigation,

fourteen years after Petitioner's conviction and sixteen years
after the murder was committed, have lapsed.
Petitioner's own statements show the he was aware of circumstances that called

into question the quality of Mr. Brass's

representation and the progress of his case.

Petitioner asserts

that after Mr. Brass was appointed, he stopped receiving copies of
legal documents.
2003.

See Affidavit of Ralph Leroy Menzies, August 12,

For the duration of Mr. Brass's representation, Petitioner

was, for the most part, unable to contact his attorney by telephone
either because no one in Mr. Brass's office answered, his staff
refused to accept the collect call, or they simply hung up.8

See

Affidavit of Ralph Leroy Menzies, September 17, 2003. In addition,
many of Petitioner's journal entries and letters indicate he was
aware that there were problems with his case and with Mr. Brass's
representation.

In a June 16, 1998 letter to Mr. Brass, Petitioner

states that "I've been expecting to hear from you & haven't, so I'm
wondering what's up?

I'm not trying to rush you & in fact I guess

you should take what-ever time you feel necessary, I'm just curious

8

Telephone records from the Department of Corrections and Petitioner's own
journal indicate that during Mr. Brass's four years of representation, Petitioner
made literally hundreds of phone calls in an attempt to contact Mr. Brass. In
only a handful of these calls was Petitioner actually able to speak with Mr.
Brass or a member of his legal staff.
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as to how things stand.'7

On November 29, 1998, Petitioner comments

in his journal that he wrote Mr. Brass a letter about not opposing
the State's motion to dismiss and whether that would have an affect
on the post-conviction litigation.

In a March 4, 1999 letter, and

in a journal entry on the same date, Petitioner complains that he
is worried

"about

getting

our

investigation

done

. . .," and

expresses frustration that Mr. Brass has not "gotten the investigator on my case yet or any other experts, i.e.: mitigation experts,
mental

health

September

experts,

24,

1998,

etc."

September

In

letters

9,

1999,

to Mr.

and

Brass

January

2,

dated
2003,

Petitioner complains about his inability to contact Mr. Brass and
expresses frustration with the progress of his case.

Moreover,

attorneys Richard Uday, Lynn Donaldson, and Amy Brass all testified
at the evidentiary hearing that Petitioner repeatedly complained to
them about the lack of communication with Mr. Brass, Mr. Brass's
ineffective representation, and the lack of progress of his case.
At a hearing before Judge Uno held during July 1998, Petitioner

expressed

concern

that Lynn Donaldson,

Brass, was in court representing Petitioner's

rather

than Mr.

interests.

At the

November 5, 1998 deposition, Petitioner was well aware that Mr.
Brass failed to appear and that he had sent Julie George in his
stead.

Also, Petitioner only learned the day of his deposition

that attorneys for Respondent would be coming to the prison to
depose him.

In addition,

entries suggest

the docket and Petitioner's

that no court hearings were
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convened

journal
in Peti-

tioner's case from the beginning of 1999 through 2002, something he
must have been aware of.

Finally, Petitioner's journal indicates

that he had no contact with Mr. Brass for nearly an entire year,
from January 23, 2002 to January 13, 2003.
Petitioner's ability to monitor the status and progress of his
case was somewhat limited.

However, these problems were clearly

known to Petitioner9 and he was repeatedly, over a prolonged period
of time, independently put on notice that his case was languishing
and that there were serious problems with Mr. Brass's representation.

Petitioner's awareness of these problems is buttressed by

the fact that he was not a typical inmate: On October 29, 1991,
Petitioner

received

a Certificate

paralegal skills course.

of

Completion

for a basic

In light of Petitioner's cognizance that

any delay in his case "might be fatal, " and particularly in view of
the fact that he was proclaiming his innocence, a reasonably
prudent person in Petitioner's circumstances would have, at a
minimum, contacted the court about his concerns either by mail or
at any one of the several court hearings at which he was present.
Petitioner did not contact the court during the four years of Mr.

9
In a journal entry dated December 22, 1998, Petitioner states that he
received copies of the State's motion to dismiss and the motion to compel his
deposition. In a March 4, 1999 entry, it is clear that Petitioner is aware that
an amended petition for post-conviction relief has not yet been filed. Richard
Uday testified at the evidentiary hearing that he occasionally provided
Petitioner with copies of the case docket, including a copy of the docket dated
in August 9, 1999. In a January 23, 2002 journal entry, Petitioner indicates
that Mr. Brass told him that the trial court had granted the State's motion for
summary judgment, but that he should not worry because there was a discovery stay
in place.
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Brass's representation prior to the summary judgment being granted
even though Petitioner was fully aware that contacting the court
was achievable.

Petitioner had previously contacted by telephone

a clerk at the Utah Supreme Court, a Third District Court clerk,
Judge Lewis's court clerk in January 1995, and Third District Court
clerk Barbara Bond on June 30, 1997. In addition, Petitioner wrote
at least one letter to the Utah State Bar and one or two letters to
district court judges over several years. On at least one occasion
prior to Mr. Brass's appointment, Petitioner contacted the trial
court regarding his difficulties communicating with prior counsel
in his case.

At a hearing on January 29, 1997, the trial court

gave Petitioner's correspondence to counsel and requested counsel
and the attorneys for Respondent to work together to facilitate
communication between Petitioner and his counsel at the Utah State
Prison.
removed

See Tr., vol. IV at 1044.

Ultimately, prior counsel was

from his case at Petitioner's

request.

In July 2003,

Petitioner requested the court to remove Mr. Brass as counsel and
Elizabeth Hunt was appointed in September 2003.
This evidence strongly supports the conclusion that Petitioner
had the knowledge and the ability to inform the court of problems
he was encountering with his case.

However, despite his concerns

with Mr. Brass's representation and the lack of progress in his
case, Petitioner intentionally acquiesced in the delay of his case
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by keeping Mr. Brass as his attorney.10 A reasonably prudent person
in his circumstances would have dismissed Mr. Brass as counsel of
record.

The

court

concludes

that

Petitioner's

actions

were

objectively unreasonable under the circumstances.
Based upon the court's finding that the negligent conduct of
Mr. Brass was not excusable, Petitioner is not entitled to relief
under subsection

(b)(1).

Also, Petitioner's secondary argument

that he should not be "punished" for Mr. Brass's grossly negligent
conduct, is not persuasive under subsection

(b) (1) .

Petitioner

cannot be held responsible for the ineffective representation of
Mr. Brass.

However, in order to obtain relief under subsection

(b)(1), Petitioner must demonstrate that he acted as a reasonably
prudent person would have acted under similar circumstances. Given
the fact that Petitioner was repeatedly on notice that there were
problems with Mr. Brass's representation and that his case was not
proceeding expeditiously, and in light of the fact that he knew any

10

A March 5, 2003 journal entry is indicative of Petitioner's intention in
this regard:
Saw Ed Brass.
(Yea! Surprise, surprise!) Ed came out to tell me
that he has put a motion in to Judge Lewis to set aside the part of
my habeas that Judge Uno screwed me on just before he left (retired) . He said that Judge Lewis was prepared to rule in my behalf
but that because she was such good friends with Ed and Amy (she even
married them) , that it might be a conflict of interest for both him
to represent me & her to be my judge. He told me I had to choose
between him & Judge Lewis. I told Ed it was a no brainer. He was
my attorney & I didn't want a new attorney under any circumstances
and while I like Lewis, I would rather she left than him.
Even with the prospect that a judge would rule in his favor on the motion to set
aside if he gave up Mr. Brass as his attorney, and in the context of his repeated
complaints about the progress of his case and his expression of frustration with
Mr. Brass's representation, Petitioner still indicated that he "didn't want a new
attorney under any circumstances."
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delays could have serious consequences, any reasonably prudent
person in Petitioner's circumstances, particularly one professing
innocence, would have immediately and repeatedly contacted the
trial court regarding Mr. Brass's representation and the lack of
progress of his case. By intentionally choosing to keep Mr. Brass
as counsel of record, Petitioner failed to act as a reasonably
prudent person in his circumstances would have acted. The court
finds that Petitioner's actions and choices in keeping Mr. Brass as
his attorney were objectively unreasonable under the circumstances.
Therefore, it would be inequitable to grant Petitioner relief under
subsection (b)(1).
2. Subsection (b)(4)
Petitioner next contends that he is entitled to relief* under
Rule 60(b)(4) because the judgment is void.

He argues that Mr.

Brass's ineffective assistance of counsel resulted in a violation
of Petitioner's right to due process of law. Because a judgment is
void

"if the court

acted

in a manner

inconsistent

with due

process," Richins, 817 P.2d at 385, Petitioner argues that Judge
Uno's order granting Respondent's motion for summary judgment must
be declared void and should be set aside pursuant to Rule 60(b) (4) .
Respondent asserts that Petitioner is essentially arguing that the
order is void as a result of a due process violation because Mr.
Brass's representation was ineffective within the meaning of the
Sixth Amendment.

However, since "[t]here is no constitutional

right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings, . . . a
51

petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of
counsel in such proceedings."
752

(1991).

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,

As a result, Mr. Brass's inadequate representation

cannot rise to the level of constitutionally ineffective assistance
of counsel

in violation of Petitioner's

right

to due process.

Therefore, Respondent argues, it would be inappropriate for the
court to conclude that Judge Uno's order is void.11
Despite the parties' focus on the ineffective assistance of
counsel by Mr. Brass and whether his representation constituted a
violation of Petitioner's due process rights, cases

addressing

relief under Rule 60(b)(4) indicate that a judgment "is void only
if

the

court

acted

process."

Richins, 817 P.2d at 385 (emphasis added).

Garcia, 712 P.2d at 291 n.5

in

a manner

(same).

inconsistent

with

due

See also

The language of Richins and

Garcia clearly indicates that it must be the actions of the trial
court, not counsel, that are inconsistent with due process in order
for the judgment to be void for purposes of Rule 60(b)(4).
conclusion

is consistent with

the general meaning

This

of a "void"

judgment, namely, that in order "for a judgment to be void under

l:L
Although Petitioner may not be constitutionally entitled to the effective
assistance of counsel, he has argued elsewhere that because he is statutorily
entitled to appointed counsel, the representation he receives must be effective.
See State ex rel. E.H. v. A.H., 880 P.2d 11, 13 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). See also
T.S. v. State, 2003 UT 54, f7-fll, 487 Utah Adv. Rep. 16. Because the court
believes that both parties have erroneously focused upon the inadequate
representation of Mr. Brass under subsection (b)(4), it is unnecessary for the
court to resolve whether Petitioner's statutory right to appointed counsel in a
capital post-conviction case means that appointed counsel must thereby render
effective assistance.

52

Rule 60(b) (4), it must be determined that the rendering court was
powerless to enter it." V.T.A., Inc. v. Airco, Inc., 597 F.2d 220,
224

(10th

Cir.

1979)

(emphasis

added) .

See

also

Ben

Sager

Chemicals International, Inc. v. E. Tarqozs & Co., 560 F.2d 805,
812 (7th Cir. 1977) ("A void judgment has been narrowly defined .
. to exist

only where

a court usurps power

by

rendering a

judgment over matters beyond the scope of authority granted to it
by its creators.").

The fact that Petitioner's counsel may have

been ineffective does not warrant the conclusion that Judge Uno was
powerless to render a decision on Respondent's motion for summary
judgment.
In the context of a motion to set aside a civil judgment,
"'all that due process requires . . . is proper notice and service
of process[/] . . . [by] a court of competent jurisdiction,'" New
York Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d

137, 143

(quoting Fehlhaber v. Fehlhaber, 681 F.2d
1982)), and the opportunity to be heard.

(5th Cir. 1996)

1015, 1027

(5th Cir.

See Mullane v. Central

Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) ("The fundamental requisite
heard.").

of due process

of

law is the opportunity

to be

See also Ex parte Third Generation, 855 So.2d 489, 492

(Ala. 2003) ("[T]he term 'due process," in the context of providing
a foundation for declaring a judgment void, refers to procedural,
rather than substantive, due process:

x

It is established by the

decisions in this and in Federal jurisdictions that due process of
law means

notice,

a hearing

according
53

to

that

notice,

and a

judgment entered in accordance with such notice and hearing.'"
(quoting Frahn v. Grevling Realization Corp., 195 So. 758, 761
(Ala. 1940))); Worrall v. Qgden City Fire Dep't, 616 P.2d 598, 602
(Utah

1980)

("The

bare

essentials

of

due

process

have been

characterized as (1) notice of the proposed action, and (2) an
opportunity to be heard on the matter."); Fuller-Toponce Truck Co.
v. Public Service Commission, 96 P.2d 722, 725 (Utah 1939)
essential

("The

elements of due process of law are notice, and an

opportunity to be heard and to defend in an orderly proceeding
adapted

to the nature of

the case before

a tribunal having

jurisdiction of the cause." (emphasis in original)).
Petitioner also asserts two errors by Judge Uno: (1) that no
inquiry or assessment was made of Mr. Brass's qualifications under
Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and (2) that Mr.
Brass was not removed from Petitioner's case despite the "obvious
and glaring instances of substandard performance."
Mem. in Supp. at 25.

Petitioner's

Petitioner provides no argument, however,

that either of these alleged failures demonstrate that Judge Uno
"acted in a manner inconsistent with due process" or that he was
otherwise powerless to issue a ruling on Respondent's motion for
summary judgment.

Although an evidentiary hearing was never

convened that would have allowed Petitioner to present evidence in
his favor, this fact does not warrant the conclusion that Judge Uno
acted

in

a manner

that

opportunity to be heard.

prevented

Petitioner

from

having an

As noted by Petitioner himself, "Judge
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Uno . . , repeatedly expressed a willingness to consider all of
[Petitioner's] claims . . . ."

Petitioner's Mem. in Supp. at 25.

Moreover, "[d]ue process does not . . . require that the defendant
in every civil case actually have a hearing on the merits.
[court]

can,

defendant

for

who,

example,

. . .

enter

without

a default
justifiable

judgment

A

against a

excuse, violates a

procedural rule requiring the production of evidence necessary for
orderly adjudication."
(1971).

Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378

This is essentially what occurred in the present case

after Judge Uno granted Respondent's motion for sanctions.

For

these reasons, the court concludes that Petitioner cannot rely upon
subsection (b)(4) for relief.
3. Subsection (b) (5)
Petitioner also argues that he is entitled to relief under
Rule 60(b)(5) because "it is no longer equitable that [the order
granting summary judgment] should have prospective application."
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) (5) . Petitioner argues that Judge Uno's order
is prospective in nature and that circumstances of the case have
changed, rendering enforcement of the order inequitable.
there is no legal support for this position.

However,

Petitioner further

argues that, while Judge Uno's order will likely "be the foundation
of all of the State's future arguments in favor of expeditiously
executing

[Petitioner],"

Petitioner's

Mem.

in

Supp.

at

26, a

judgment has prospective application only if it requires a party to
perform or not perform a future act or the court to continually
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supervise the parties as a result of changing conditions.

See

Twelve John Does, 841 F.2d at 1138. There are no such requirements
that arise from Judge Uno's order granting the motion for summary
judgment.

The

Petitioner, but

order

will

have

continuing

this does not mean that

consequences

it has

for

"prospective

application" for purposes of subsection (b) (5) . See id.
Even if the order granting summary judgment has prospective
application, Petitioner has not shown that the circumstances that
existed at the time the order was entered have changed and,
therefore, that enforcement of the order would be inequitable.
Petitioner contends that the recent filing of several affidavits
counts as "subsequent events . . . which demonstrate that it would
be inequitable for the summary judgment order to have prospective
application . . . ."

Petitioner's Mem. in Supp. at 26. However,

Petitioner's affidavits simply explain the circumstances as they
existed at the time Judge Uno entered the order and neither the
filing of the affidavits nor the affidavits themselves demonstrate
that these circumstances have been altered. "Obviously, if neither
the law supporting [the] original [order] . . . nor the facts have
changed, there would be no need to decide the propriety of a Rule
60(b)(5) motion."

Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 216 (1997).

For these reasons, the court concludes that Petitioner cannot
prevail on subsection (b)(5) for relief.
4. Subsection (b) (6)
Finally, Petitioner argues that he is entitled to relief under
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subsection (b) (6), which allows for judgments to be set aside for
"any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment."

Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).

According to Petitioner,

"any other reason justifying relief" includes situations where
counsel has

performed incompetently or where, as a result of

counsel's performance, there has been a violation of due process.
In support of his claim that these reasons apply to his own case,
Petitioner again points to the inadequate and negligent

represen-

tation of Mr. Brass.

Reliance upon Mr. Brass's negligent conduct

renders

of

application

subsection

(b)(6)

problematic.

appellate courts have held that "subsection

Utah

([6]) may not be

employed for relief when the grounds asserted are encompassed
within subsection (1)." Lincoln Benefit, 838 P.2d at 674.

See

also Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 863 ("Rule 60(b) (6) . . . grants . . .
courts broad authority to relieve a party from a final judgment .
. . provided that the motion is macJe within a reasonable time and
is not premised on one of the grounds for relief enumerated in
clauses (b) (1) through (b) (5) .") .

Petitioner has already relied

upon the negligent conduct of Mr. Brass as a claim for relief under
subsection

(b) (1).

The court denied Petitioner relief under

subsection (b)(1) on the ground that Mr. Brass's conduct was not
excusable. It follows that this same inexcusably negligent conduct
alone cannot constitute "any other reason" for relief.

Unless

unusual or extraordinary circumstances are also present, subsection
(b)(6) cannot be relied upon by Petitioner.
57

Nevertheless, Petitioner's argument implicitly suggests that
subsection

(b) (1)

is

reserved

only

for

instances

of

"mere"

negligence, while instances of "gross" negligence must be considered under subsection (b) (6). Specifically, Petitioner relies upon
the case of Community Dental Services v. Tani, 282 F.3d 1164 (9th
Cir. 2002), which concluded that, in the jurisdictions that have
distinguished

between negligence

and gross

negligence

in the

context of a motion to set aside, courts have uniformly held that
"an unknowing client should not be held liable on the basis of a
default judgment resulting from an attorney's grossly negligent
conduct, and that in such cases sanctions should be imposed on the
lawyer, rather than on the faultless client."
According

Id. at 1169.

to the Tani court, "[w]hen an attorney

is grossly

negligent, . . . the judicial system loses credibility as well as
the appearance of fairness, if the result is that an innocent party
is forced to suffer drastic consequences."

Id. at 1170.

No Utah appellate court has directly addressed the issue
whether gross attorney negligence should be separately considered
under subsection (b) (6) . However, in the case of In re Interest of
A.G., 2001 UT App 87, 27 P.3d 562, the Court of Appeals stated in
a footnote that "Rule 60(b) (6) is 'sufficiently broad' to permit a
court

to set aside

counsel."

a judgment

Id. at 19 n.3.

for ineffective

assistance of

Petitioner argues that his statutory

right to counsel, see Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-202 (2) (a), entitles
him to the effective assistance of counsel and, therefore, because
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Mr.

Brass

provided

grossly

negligent

representation,

i.e.,

i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel, he i s e n t i t l e d to r e l i e f under
subsection (b) (6).

In support of his argument t h a t he i s e n t i t l e d

to the e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel, P e t i t i o n e r r e l i e s on the
case of T.S. v. S t a t e , 2003 UT 54.

In T.S., the Utah Supreme Court

expressly agreed with the Utah Court of Appeals holding in the case
of State ex r e l . E.H. v. A.H., 880 P.2d 11 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)
t h a t because a parent in a p a r e n t a l r i g h t s termination proceeding
i s s t a t u t o r i l y e n t i t l e d to counsel, t h a t parent i s a l s o e n t i t l e d to
the e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel.

See T.S./ 2003 UT 54 at 57.

The Court reasoned t h a t even though the Code section 1 2 e n t i t l i n g a
parent to be represented by counsel "does not e x p r e s s l y s t a t e t h a t
counsel must be e f f e c t i v e ,

the s t a t u t e would be meaningless or

i l l u s o r y i f i t guaranteed only i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel.
The l e g i s l a t u r e ' s omission of
suggest
counsel."

an

intent
Id.

According

to

provide

^effective'
only

should not be read to

ineffective

assistance

of

(quoting S t a t e ex r e l . E.H., 880 P.2d at 13).
to

Petitioner,

the

same

reasoning

necessarily

applies in the case of a c a p i t a l p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n l i t i g a n t .

That

12

The Code s e c t i o n e n t i t l i n g a p a r e n t t o t h e appointment of counsel i n a
p a r e n t a l r i g h t s t e r m i n a t i o n p r o c e e d i n g i s found i n S e c t i o n 7 8 - 3 a - 9 1 3 ( 1 ) ( a ) and
reads as f o l l o w s :
The p a r e n t s , g u a r d i a n , c u s t o d i a n , and t h e minor, i f competent, s h a l l
be informed t h a t t h e y have t h e r i g h t t o be r e p r e s e n t e d by counsel a t
every s t a g e of t h e p r o c e e d i n g s .
They have t h e r i g h t t o employ
counsel of t h e i r own c h o i c e and i f any of them r e q u e s t s an a t t o r n e y
and i s found by t h e c o u r t t o be i n d i g e n t , c o u n s e l s h a l l be appointed
by t h e c o u r t as p r o v i d e d i n s u b s e c t i o n ( 3 ) . The c o u r t may appoint
counsel w i t h o u t a r e q u e s t i f i t c o n s i d e r s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n by counsel
n e c e s s a r y t o p r o t e c t t h e i n t e r e s t of t h e minor or of o t h e r p a r t i e s .
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is,

the statute mandating

conviction

a right to counsel

cases would be meaningless

effective assistance of counsel.

in capital post-

if it did not

guarantee

In order "to give effect . . . to

every word of the statute," T.S. , 2003 UT 54 at SI8

(citations

omitted), Petitioner argues that the court must conclude that he is
statutorily entitled to effective representation.

See also Lozada

v. Warden, 613 A.2d 818, 821 (Conn. 1992) ("It would be absurd to
have the right to appointed counsel who is not
competent.

x

[C]ounsel

should be

appointed

required to be

in post

conviction

matters . . . .

When counsel is so appointed he must be effective

and competent.

Otherwise, the appointment is a useless formal-

ity. '" (quoting Cullins v. Crouse, 348 F.2d 887, 889
1965))); Commonwealth v. Albert, 561 A.2d 736, 738

(10th Cir.

(Penn. 1989)

(where petitioner has a statutory right to appointed counsel, he
has the concomitant right to the effective assistance of counsel) .
Petitioner argues that because he is entitled to the effective
assistance of counsel, subsection (b)(6) is a basis for relief.
Respondent counters that in enacting Section 78-35a-202, the
Legislature did not intend to create a right to effective postconviction counsel commensurate with the right to effective counsel
in criminal proceedings under the Sixth Amendment.
render capital post-conviction proceedings
counsel
direct

for post-conviction
appeal,

must

meet

proceedings,

the

same

To do so would

interminable.
as well

standards,

as

then

"[I]f

trial and
claims

of

ineffective assistance of counsel in the immediate prior proceed60

ings may be raised ad infinitum."
922, 925 (Nev. 1996).

Beiarano v. Warden, 929 P.2d

Rather, the Legislature has required that

appointed counsel meet minimum qualifications prescribed by Rule 8
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. According to Respondent,
because Petitioner has the benefit of counsel that is qualified
under Rule 8, Section 78-35a-202 should not be interpreted to
require that appointed counsel be effective within the meaning of
the Sixth Amendment.

Therefore, Petitioner

cannot rely upon

subsection (b)(6).
The court does not have to resolve this issue. Assuming that
Petitioner's argument has merit and that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel from Mr. Brass, he has not demonstrated that
he is entitled

to relief.

Under Rule

60(b) (6), which is a

proceeding in equity, "[c]ourts allowing . . . relief uniformly
require a diligent, conscientious client."
1234.

Inrvco/ 708 F.2d at

Indeed, as noted above, according to the Tani court a

litigant seeking relief under subsection

(b) (6) based upon the

gross negligence of his attorney must be "an unknowing client" or
"an innocent party."

Tani, 282 F.3d at 1169, 1170.

See also

Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 393 ("To justify relief under subsection (6),
a party must show ^extraordinary circumstances' suggesting that the
party is faultless in the delay.");

United States v. Moradi, 673

F.2d 725, 728 (4th Cir. 1982) (in the context of Rule 60(b)(6),
"justice also demands that a blameless party not be disadvantaged
by the errors or neglect of his attorney which cause final,
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involuntary termination of proceedings." (emphasis added)); In re
Ireco Industries, Inc., 2 B.R. 76, 83

(Bankr. D. Ore. 1979)

("[C]ourts have shown considerable sympathy for the plight of the
diligent litigant with an incompetent or sloppy lawyer.7' (emphasis
added)).
As previously noted, "[b]ecause an application to set aside a
default is equitable in nature and is addressed to the conscience
of the court, all the attendant circumstances should be considered."

Olsen, 565 P.2d at 1124 (emphasis added).

Thus, M[a]n

examination of the lawyer's conduct does not end the trial court's
evaluation of the party's application for . . . [equitable] relief.
Although a party is not responsible for his lawyer's conduct, a
party's own negligent or intentional acts might render . . . relief
inequitable, notwithstanding a showing of ineffective assistance of
counsel."

T.S. , 2003 UT 54 at 512. In light of this guidance, the

court must carefully consider whether Petitioner himself acted as
a reasonably prudent person would have acted in similar circumstances.

As previously discussed, Petitioner was put on notice

over a period of many months that there were numerous, ongoing
problems with Mr. Brass's representation and that his case was not
proceeding expeditiously. Confronted repeatedly with these facts,
Petitioner knew any delays could have serious consequences. Thus,
any

reasonably

prudent

person

in

Petitioner's

circumstances,

particularly one professing to be innocent, would have, at a
minimum, contacted the trial court about the ineffective assistance
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of counsel by Mr. Brass and the lack of progress of his case.
Petitioner had numerous opportunities and the ability to contact
the court

regarding his concerns.

Petitioner

repeatedly and

deliberately elected to keep Mr. Brass as counsel.

Therefore,

Petitioner failed to act as a reasonably prudent person in his
circumstances would have acted.

Thus, consistent with the court's

conclusions with respect to Petitioner's request for relief under
subsection

(b)(1), it would be inequitable to grant Petitioner

relief under subsection (b) (6) . See Inrvco, 708 F.2d at 1234 ("The
defendants here were not diligent

in pursuing

this case and

therefore would not prevail even if gross negligence qualified as
another Rule 60 (b) ground for relief . . . .

Affidavits submitted

by the defendants showed that they failed to follow the progress of
the case and failed to regularly inquire of their lawyer or the
court as to the case's current status.").
C. Meritorious Claims
In light of the court' s conclusions that Petitioner is not
entitled to the relief he seeks under any of the Rule 60(b)
subsections upon which he has relied, it is unnecessary for the
court to determine whether Petitioner has any meritorious claims.
See Erickson, 882 P.2d at 1149 ("'Once timeliness and a basis for
relief under Rule 60(b) . . . have been established, the sole issue
is whether, as a matter of law, a defendant's proposed Answer
contains a defense which is entitled to be tried.'"

(quoting
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Musselman, 667 P.2d at 1059 (Durham, J., dissenting))).

Even if

such claims exist for purposes of Rule 60(b), Petitioner would
still not be entitled to have Judge Uno's order granting Respondent's motion for summary judgment set aside.
Conclusion
Petitioner, Ralph Leroy Menzies, has requested this court,
pursuant to Rule 60 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to
exercise its equitable powers and grant his motion to set aside
Judge Uno's order granting Respondent's motion for summary judgment
and dismissing Petitioner's petition for post-conviction relief.
Generally, Petitioner argues that because his attorney, Ed Brass,
provided ineffective representation, he is entitled to relief under
subsections
argues

that

(1), (4), (5), and
because

(6) of Rule 60(b).

Petitioner's

motion

did

not

Respondent
state

with

particularity the grounds for relief, his motion was untimely.
Therefore, this court does not have jurisdiction to consider
Petitioner's motion.

However, after a careful review of the

applicable rules and statutes, as well as governing case law, it is
the court's conclusion that although Petitioner's motion failed in
several significant respects to comport with established procedural
rules, the motion was nevertheless timely filed within the three
month period mandated by Rule 60(b) when relief is sought under
subsection (1). Therefore, the court has jurisdiction to consider
Petitioner's motion.
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With respect to Petitioner's claim for relief under subsection
(b)(4), he has failed to demonstrate that Judge Uno's order is
void.

Under established law, in order for a judgment to be void,

the movant must demonstrate that the rendering court was powerless
to enter it. The fact that Petitioner's counsel provided ineffective representation does not warrant the conclusion that Judge Uno
was powerless to render a decision on Respondent's motion for
summary judgment.

Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to relief

under Rule 60(b) (4) .
Petitioner has also failed to demonstrate that he is entitled
to relief under subsection (b) (5) . He argues that it is inequitable that

the order granting summary judgment has prospective

application and, therefore, the order should be set aside.

An

order or judgment has prospective application if it requires a
party to perform or not perform a future act or if it requires the
court to continually supervise the parties as a result of changing
conditions.

These requirements are simply not a part of Judge

Uno's order granting the motion for summary judgment.

It is true

that the order will have continuing consequences for Petitioner,
but this does not mean that it has "prospective application" for
purposes of subsection

(b) (5) .

Therefore, Petitioner is not

entitled to relief under Rule 60(b) (5).
Under subsection (b)(1), Petitioner argues that he is entitled
to relief on the grounds of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect because he relied upon Mr. Brass to effectively
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represent him, and Mr. Brass failed to do so. Although Mr. Brass's
representation was ineffective, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that any of Mr. Brass's failings were the result of mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. On the contrary, Mr.
Brass's negligent representation appears to have been wilful and
deliberate and, therefore, clearly not excusable.

Petitioner is

not entitled to relief under subsection (b)(1).
Petitioner also argues that relief must be granted under
subsection (b) (1) in order to avoid "punishing" him for Mr. Brass's
negligent conduct.
tion proceedings

Respondent contends that because post-convicare civil, rather than criminal, in nature,

governing case law mandates that Petitioner must bear the burden of
his attorney's ineffective assistance.

This court concludes that

in light of recent case law, Petitioner cannot be held accountable
for Mr. Brass's ineffective representation. Nevertheless, amotion
to set aside a judgment is equitable in nature and is addressed to
the conscience of the court.

Therefore, all of Petitioner's

conduct and choices must be considered by the court, including
Petitioner's

intentional

acts and choices.

Petitioner stated

repeatedly that he was clearly aware that any delay in his case
could be detrimental and have severe consequences regarding the
outcome of his petition for post-conviction relief.

Petitioner

contends that he only recently learned that his post-conviction
case was not proceeding expeditiously.

However, the evidence

presented to the court clearly shows that he was personally and
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repeatedly on notice for several years that there were problems
with Mr. Brass's representation and that his case was languishing.
Petitioner's original petition for post-conviction relief was
filed in April 1995, and three years later, in March 1998, Mr.
Brass was appointed.

Another four years passed before Judge Uno

issued his order granting Respondent's motion for summary judgment.
Thus seven years of post-conviction

litigation,

fourteen years

after Petitioner's conviction and sixteen years after the murder
was committed, have lapsed.

Numerous telephone calls were made by

Petitioner to Mr. Brass's law office over the past several years.
Only a few of those calls resulted in Petitioner actually speaking
with Mr. Brass or a member of his legal staff.

Nearly a year went

by where he had no contact with Mr. Brass whatsoever.

The evidence

also shows that there were few court hearings from 1999 through
2002.

In letters to Mr. Brass and in Petitioner's own journal

entries,

he

repeatedly

expresses

frustration

with Mr. Brass's

representation.
Despite Petitioner's frustrations with Mr. Brass's representation, his keen awareness of the problems in his case and that any
delay "might be fatal," and particularly in view of the fact that
he was proclaiming his innocence, a reasonably prudent person in
Petitioner's circumstances would have contacted the court about his
concerns either by mail, by letter, or in person during one of his
court appearances.

Petitioner did not contact the court during the

entire

of Mr. Brass's

four

years
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representation

prior

to the

summary judgment being granted.
contacting
experience.

the

court

was

Petitioner was fully aware that

achievable,

Indeed, when he became

based

upon

his

dissatisfied

previous

with

counsel

appointed prior to Mr. Brass, he contacted the court, a hearing was
convened, and prior counsel was replaced by Mr. Brass.
this

evidence,

it

is the

court's

conclusion

that

In light of
even

though

Petitioner cannot be held accountable for Mr. Brass's ineffective
assistance,

Petitioner's

informed,

calculated,

repeated,

and

prolonged decisions to keep Mr. Brass as his attorney was objectively unreasonable.

Petitioner acted unreasonably.

Therefore, it

is the court's conclusion that it would be inequitable to grant
Petitioner relief under subsection (b) (1) .
Petitioner has also failed to demonstrate that he is entitled
to relief under subsection
subsection

(b) (6) .

Utah case law mandates that

(b) (6) is inapplicable when the grounds asserted for

relief are encompassed within subsection

(b) (1) .

Because Peti-

tioner relied upon the negligent conduct of Mr. Brass in asserting
a claim for relief under subsection (b)(1) and the court determined
this conduct to be inexcusable, it follows that this same inexcusably negligent conduct cannot constitute "any other reason" for
relief under subsection
that subsection

(b)(6).

Nevertheless, Petitioner argues

(b) (1) is reserved exclusively for instances of

"mere" negligence and, therefore, subsection (b)(6) may be relied
upon

when

negligent.

counsel's

conduct

is

more

egregious

or

"grossly"

According to Petitioner, Utah case law suggests that
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subsection (b) (6) is sufficiently broad to permit a court to set
aside a judgment because counsel was ineffective.

Petitioner also

contends that his statutory right to counsel would be meaningless
or illusory if that right did not guarantee effective representation. However, even assuming that Petitioner's argument has merit
and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel from Mr.
Brass, he has not demonstrated that he is entitled to relief under
subsection

(b) (6) .

As with subsection

(b) (1), whether relief

should be granted under subsection (b)(6) depends upon the conduct
of Petitioner and whether he acted as a reasonably prudent person
would have acted under the circumstances.

Petitioner intention-

ally, calculatedly, and repeatedly chose to keep Mr. Brass as
counsel instead of contacting the court and seeking help.
Petitioner failed to act as a reasonably prudent person in his
circumstances would have acted.

Therefore, Petitioner is also not

entitled to relief under subsection (b)(6).
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner's Motion to Set Aside
Judgment is DENIED.
DATED this 26th day of February, 2004.
BY THE COURT:
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Certificate of Delivery
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling
on Motion to Set Aside Judgment was either mailed or hand-delivered
on the 26th day of February, 2004 to the following:
Thomas B. Brunker
Erin Riley
Counsel for Respondent
Utah State Attorney General's Office, Appellate Division
Heber Wells Building
160 East 300 South, Suite 600
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Elizabeth Hunt
Counsel for Petitioner
P.O. Box 9419
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109-0419
Ralph Leroy Menzies
Utah State Prison
Inmate Number 13858
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020

Deputy Clerk
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Ruling on Destruction of Evidence

Thomas B. Brunker, #4804
Erin Riley, #8375
Assistant Attorneys General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF, #4666
Utah Attorney General
Heber Wells Bldg.
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Telephone: (801)366-0180
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CLERK OF IHcOISTRlCr COURT
Time

Respondent's counsel

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RALPH LEROY MENZIES,
Petitioner,

ORDER TO DESTROY
DOCUMENTS

v.
Case No. 030106629
HANK GALETKA, Utah State Prison
Warden
JUDGE BRIAN
Respondent.

On January 5, 2004, petitioner Menzies filed a motion and supporting memorandum
for a protective order. He also filed an INDEX OF WITHHELD DOCUMENTS, which identified
documents that petitioner withheld based on his claims of attorney client and work product
privileges. An evidentiary hearing in this case was already scheduled for January 15, 2004.
At a hearing on January 7, 2004, respondent asked for a continuance so that the issue
concerning the withlield documents and the motion for a protective order could be resolved
prior to the evidentiary hearing. The motion for a continuance was denied.

At the hearing on January 7, 2004, petitioner's motion for a protective order was
denied. The Court ordered petitioner Menzies to turn over all of the documents from the
INDEX OF WITHHELD DOCUMENTS, to the respondent. Respondent was allowed to make
c

Vorking documents" for the January 15th hearing. Respondent was ordered not to disclose

the documents or information from the documents to any third parties. No ruling was ever
entered as to whether the withheld documents were actually privileged.
At the evidentiary hearing, respondent sought to use and admit as exhibits certain
items received from the petitioner, which were on petitioner's INDEX OF WITHHELD
DOCUMENTS list. Petitioner objected. After reviewing the positions of the parties, and after
re-reading Salt Lake Legal Defender's Assoc, v. Uno, 932 P.2d 589 (Utah 1997), the Court
ordered as follows:
1.

Respondent may not use the information from the documents provided from
petitioner's INDEX OF WITHHELD DOCUMENTS to question or cross-examine
witnesses in the January 15 and 16, 2004 hearing, unless he can show a compelling
need to use the information, and that there is no alternative means of achieving its
legitimate purpose. Counsel must approach the bench for the Court's direction prior
to the use of any information from those documents.

2.

Following conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, respondent shall shred and destroy
all originals, copies, memorializations, electronic recordings, notes, and all
perpetuations of the documents which were on petitioner's INDEX OF WITHHELD
DOCUMENTS, and were provided to respondent by petitioner following the court's
2
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ruling on January 7, 2004. This order does not apply to documents or copies of
documents that were already in respondent's possession, or that were or may be
provided to respondent from some other source (even though they might be duplicates
of items on petitioner's INDEX OF WITHHELD DOCUMENTS).
Counsel for respondent are under a continuing order not to disseminate information
obtained from the documents on petitioner's INDEX OF WITHHELD DOCUMENTS list,
absent further court order. This order does not apply to information already in
respondent's possession, or that may be provided to respondent from some other
source, even though it might be duplicative of information from items on petitioners
INDEX OF WITHHELD DOCUMENTS list. In addition, it does not apply to information
which is now part of the record because it was admitted through testimony or exhibits
during the evidentiary hearing on January 15 and 16, 2004.
Counsel for respondent (and their staff) may not investigate matters learned of from
review of the documents on petitioner's INDEX OF WITHHELD DOCUMENTS list.
However, this order does not apply to information respondent learned from other
sources, even though the information might be duplicative of information contained
in items on petitioner's INDEX OF WITHHELD DOCUMENTS list. In addition, it does
not apply to information which is now part of the record because it was admitted
through testimony or exhibits during the evidentiary hearing on January 15 and 16,
2004.
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DATED this _ j ^

day of April, 2004.
$£<•
ST-^

^ *** .
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THE HON
JUDGE, TH

Approved as to form:

Counsel for petitioner Menzies
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the _[

day of April, 2004,1 served a copy of the foregoing

STATE'S PROPOSED ORDER TO DESTROY INFORMATION, by causing the same to
be mailed, via first class mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Elizabeth Hunt
PO BOX 9419
Salt Lake City, UT 84109-0419

5

ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of
Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases
GuideUnes 7.1, 10.5, 10.7, 10.8, 10.15.1

Guideline 7.1

ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases • February 2003

Guideline 7.1

Monitoring; Removal

A.

The Responsible Agency should monitor the performance of all defense counsel to
ensure that the client is receiving high quality legal representation. Where there is
evidence that an attorney is not providing high quality legal representation, the
Responsible Agency should take appropriate action to protect the interests of the
attorney's current and potential clients.

B.

The Responsible Agency should establish and publicize a regular procedure for
investigating and resolving any complaints made by judges, clients, attorneys, or
others that defense counsel failed to provide high quality legal representation.

C.

The Responsible Agency should periodically review the rosters of attorneys who have
been certified to accept appointments in capital cases to ensure that those attorneys
remain capable of providing high quality legal representation. Where there is
evidence that an attorney has failed to provide high quality legal representation, the
attorney should not receive additional appointments and should be removed from the
roster. Where there is evidence that a systemic defect in a defender office has caused
the office to fail to provide high quality legal representation, the office should not
receive additional appointments.

D.

Before taking final action making an attorney or a defender office ineligible to receive
additional appointments, the Responsible Agency should provide written notice that
such action is being contemplated, and give the attorney or defender office
opportunity to respond in writing.

E.

An attorney or defender office sanctioned pursuant to this Guideline should be
restored to the roster only in exceptional circumstances.

F.

The Responsible Agency should ensure that this Guideline is implemented
consistently with Guideline 2.1(C), so that an attorney's zealous representation of a
client cannot be cause for the imposition or threatened imposition of sanctions
pursuant to this Guideline.

History of Guideline
In the original edition, this Guideline provided that an attorney should receive no
additional capital appointments if counsel had "inexcusably ignored basic responsibilities of an
effective lawyer, resulting in prejudice to the client's case." In this edition, the standard has been
changed to prohibit future appointment where counsel "has failed to provide high quality legal
representation." The change was made because the former language was considered insufficiently
stringent. Subsection B is based on Commentary to the original edition of the Guideline.
Subsections C-E are taken from Subsections A and C of the original edition of the Guideline.
Subsection F is new and is intended to emphasize the importance of the principle enunciated in
Guideline 2.1(C).
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Related Standards
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES Standard 5-2.3
(3d ed. 1992) ("Rotation of assignments and revision of roster").
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES Standard 5-6.3
(3ded. 1992) ("Removal").
ABA TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM, Principle 10 (2002)
("Defense counsel is supervised and systematically reviewed for quality and efficiency according
to nationally and locally adopted standards").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF
ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEMS Standard 4.4 (1989) ("Supervision of Attorneys").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF
ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEMS Standard 4.4.2 (1989) ("Monitoring").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF
ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEMS Standard 4.5 (1989).
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF
ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEMS Standard 4.5.1 (1989) ("Penalties Less Thank Removal").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF
ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEMS Standard 4.5.2 (1989) ("Removal from Program Rosters").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF
ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEMS Standard 4.5.3 (1989) ("Reinstatement After Removal").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN THE
UNITED STATES, Guideline 5.4 (1976) ("Supervision and Evaluation of Defender System

Personnel").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN THE
UNITED STATES, Guideline 5.5 (1976) ("Monitoring and Evaluation of Assigned Counsel Program

Personnel").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR NEGOTIATING AND AWARDING
GOVERNMENTAL CONTRACTS FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES, Guideline III. 16 (1984)

("Supervision and Evaluation").
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Guideline 10.5

Relationship with the Client

A.

Counsel at all stages of the case should make every appropriate effort to establish a
relationship of trust with the client, and should maintain close contact with the client.

B.

1.

Barring exceptional circumstances, an interview of the client should be
conducted within 24 hours of initial counsel's entry into the case,

2.

Promptly upon entry into the case, initial counsel should communicate in an
appropriate manner with both the client and the government regarding the
protection of the client's rights against self-incrimination, to the effective
assistance of counsel, and to preservation of the attorney-client privilege and
similar safeguards.

3.

Counsel at all stages of the case should re-advise the client and the government
regarding these matters as appropriate.

C.

Counsel at all stages of the case should engage in a continuing interactive dialogue
with the client concerning all matters that might reasonably be expected to have a
material impact on the case, such as:
1.

the progress of and prospects for the factual investigation, and what assistance
the client might provide to it;

2.

current or potential legal issues;

3.

the development of a defense theory;

4.

presentation of the defense case;

5.

potential agreed-upon dispositions of the case;

6.

litigation deadlines and the projected schedule of case-related events; and

7.

relevant aspects of the client's relationship with correctional, parole, or other
governmental agents (e.g., prison medical providers or state psychiatrists).

History of Guideline
This Guideline collects, and slightly expands upon, material that was found in Guidelines
11.4.2, 11.6.1, and 11.8.3 of the original edition. The major revisions make this standard apply to
all stages of a capital case and note expressly counsel's obligation to discuss potential dispositions
of the case with the client.
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Related Standards
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-3.1
("Establishment of Relationship"), Standard 4-3.2 ("Interviewing the Client"), Standard 4-3.8
("Duty to Keep Client Informed"), and Standard 4-5.2 ("Control and Direction of the Case"), in
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION (3d

ed. 1993).
ABA TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM, Principle 3 (2002)
("Clients are screened for eligibility, and defense counsel is assigned and notified of appointment,
as soon as feasible after clients' arrest, detention, or request for counsel").
N A T ' L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER A S S ' N , PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL

Guideline 1.3(c) ("General Duties of Defense Counsel"), Guideline
2.2 ("Initial Interview") (1997).

DEFENSE REPRESENTATION,

Commentary
The Problem
Immediate contact with the client is necessary not only to gain information needed to
secure evidence and crucial witnesses, but also to try to prevent uncounseled confessions or
admissions and to begin to establish a relationship of trust with the client.
Anyone who has just been arrested and charged with capital murder is likely to be in a
state of extreme anxiety. Many capital defendants are, in addition, severely impaired in ways that
make effective communication difficult: they may have mental illnesses or personality disorders
that make them highly distrustful or impair their reasoning and perception of reality; they may be
mentally retarded or have other cognitive impairments that affect their judgment and
understanding; they may be depressed and even suicidal; or they may be in complete denial in the
face of overwhelming evidence. In fact, the prevalence of mental illness and impaired reasoning
is so high in the capital defendant population that "[i]t must be assumed that the client is
emotionally and intellectually impaired."176 There will also often be significant cultural and/or
language barriers between the client and his lawyers. In many cases, a mitigation specialist, social
worker or other mental health expert can help identify and overcome these barriers, and assist
counsel in establishing a rapport with the client.

See Rick Kammen & Lee Norton, Plea Agreements: Working with Capital Defendants,
THE ADVOCATE, Mar. 2000, at 31, available at
http://www.dpa.state.ky.us/library/advocate/marOO/plea.html; see also Lewis, supra note 91, at
840 (finding 40% of death row inmates to be chronically psychotic); Dorothy O. Lewis et al,
Neuropsychiatric, psychoeducational, andfamily characteristics of 14 juveniles condemned to
death in the United States, 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 584, 585 (1988) (finding 50% of death
sentenced juveniles in survey suffered from psychosis and all were severely abused as children).
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Counsel's Duty
Although ongoing communication by non-attorney members of the defense team is
important, it does not discharge the obligation of counsel at every stage of the case to keep the
client informed of developments and progress in the case, and to consult with the client on
strategic and tactical matters. Some decisions require the client's knowledge and agreement;177
others, which may be made by counsel, should nonetheless be fully discussed with the client
beforehand.
Establishing a relationship of trust with the client is essential both to overcome the client's
natural resistance to disclosing the often personal and painful facts necessary to present an
effective penalty phase defense, as discussed in the text accompanying notes 101-04 supra, and to
ensure that the client will listen to counsel's advice on important matters such as whether to testify
and the advisability of a plea.178 Client contact must be ongoing. An occasional hurried interview
with the client will not reveal to counsel all the facts needed to prepare for trial, appeal, postconviction review, or clemency. Similarly, a client will not - with good reason - trust a lawyer
who visits only a few times before trial, does not send or reply to correspondence in a timely
manner, or refuses to take telephone calls. It is also essential for the defense team to develop a
relationship of trust with the client's family or others on whom the client relies for support and
advice.
Often, so-called "difficult" clients are the consequence of bad lawyering - either in the
past or present.179 Simply treating the client with respect, listening and responding to his
concerns, and keeping him informed about the case will often go a long way towards eliciting
confidence and cooperation.180

See, e.g., Nixon v. Singletary, 758 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 2000) (ineffective assistance for
counsel to fail to obtain client's explicit prior consent to strategy of conceding guilt to jury in
opening statement in effort to preserve credibility for sentencing), cert, denied, 531 U.S. 980
(2000).
178

See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-5.2 & cmt.,

in ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION

(3d ed. 1993). See also Kevin M. Doyle, Heart of the Deal: Ten Suggestions for Plea Bargaining,
THE CHAMPION, NOV. 1999, at 68 (counsel should not expect client to accept plea bargain unless
opinion is founded on experience and leg work investigating the case); White, supra note 2, at
371, 374 (thorough investigation and relationship of trust key to persuading client to accept
appropriate plea offer).
179

See White, supra note 2, at 338 ("Often, capital defendants have had bad prior experiences
with appointed attorneys, leading them to view such attorneys as 'part of the system' rather than
advocates who will represent their interests. Appointed capital defense attorneys sometimes
exacerbate this perception by harshly criticizing their clients' conduct or making it clear that they
are reluctant to represent them. A capital defendant who experiences, or previously has
experienced, these kinds of judgments understandably will be reluctant to trust his attorney.").
180

A lawyer can frequently earn a client's trust by assisting him with problems he encounters
in prison or otherwise demonstrating concern for the client's well being and a willingness to
advocate for him. See id.; Lee Norton, Mitigation Investigation, in FLORIDA PUBLIC DEFENDER
70

ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases • February 2003

Overcoming barriers to communication and establishing a rapport with the client are
critical to effective representation. Even apart from the need to obtain vital information,181 the
lawyer must understand the client and his life history.182 To communicate effectively on the
client's behalf in negotiating a plea, addressing a jury, arguing to a post-conviction court, or
urging clemency, counsel must be able to humanize the defendant. That cannot be done unless the
lawyer knows the inmate well enough to be able to convey a sense of truly caring what happens to
him.183
Counsel's Duties Respecting Uncooperative Clients
Some clients will initially insist that they want to be executed - as punishment or because
they believe they would rather die than spend the rest of their lives in prison; some clients will
want to contest their guilt but not present mitigation. It is ineffective assistance for counsel to
simply acquiesce to such wishes, which usually reflect overwhelming feelings of guilt or despair
rather than a rational decision.184 Counsel should initially try to identify the source of the client's
hopelessness. Counsel should consult lawyers, clergy or others who have worked with similarly
situated death row inmates. Counsel should try to obtain treatment for the client's mental and/or
emotional problems, which may become worse over time. One or more members of the defense
team should always be available to talk to the client; members of the client's family, friends, or
clergy might also be enlisted to talk to the client about the reasons for living; inmates who have
accepted pleas or been on death row and later received a life sentence (or now wish they had),
may also be a valuable source of information about the possibility of making a constructive life in
prison. A client who insists on his innocence should be reminded that a waiver of mitigation will
not persuade an appellate court of his innocence, and securing a life sentence may bar the state
from seeking death in the event of a new trial.
25 (2001). Accordingly, such advocacy is an
appropriate part of the role of defense counsel in a capital case. Indeed, a lawyer who displays a
greater concern with habeas corpus doctrine than with recovering the radio that prison authorities
have confiscated from the client is unlikely to develop the sort of a relationship that will lead to a
satisfactory legal outcome.

ASS'N, DEFENDING A CAPITAL CASE IN FLORIDA

101

One important example is the fact that the client is mentally retarded - a fact that the client
may conceal with great skill, see, e.g., James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded
Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 484-86 (1985), but one which counsel
absolutely must know. See Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2252 (2002) (holding that
mentally retarded defendants may not constitutionally be executed).
182

See Goodpaster, supra note 2, at 321.

183

See Norton, supra note 180, at 5; White, supra note 2, at 374-75 (jury will be less likely to
empathize with defendant if it does "not perceive a bond between the defendant and his attorney").
184

See infra Guideline 10.7(A) and accompanying Commentary; Kammen & Norton, supra
note 176, at 32.
185

See Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981); see also Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 123
S.Ct. 732 (2003).
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Counsel in any event should be familiar enough with the client's mental condition to make
a reasoned decision - fully documented, for the benefit of actors at later stages of the case whether to assert the position that the client is not competent to waive further proceedings.186
The Temporal Scope of Counsel's Duties
The obligations imposed on counsel by this Guideline apply to all stages of the case. Thus,
post-conviction counsel, from direct appeal through clemency, must not only consult with the
client but also monitor the client's personal condition for potential legal consequences.187 For
example, actions by prison authorities (e.g., solitary confinement, administration of psychotropic
medications) may impede the ability to present the client as a witness at a hearing,188 and changes
in the client's mental state (e.g., as a result of the breakup of a close relationship or a worsening
physical condition) may bear upon his capacity to assist counsel and, ultimately, to be executed.189
In any event, as already discussed, maintaining an ongoing relationship with the client minimizes
the possibility that he will engage in counter-productive behavior (e.g., attempt to drop appeals,
act out before a judge, confess to the media). Thus, the failure to maintain such a relationship is
professionally irresponsible.190

186

See generally Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399-402 (1993) (setting forth minimum
competency standard that the Constitution requires).
See infra text accompanying note 338.
188

See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992) (defendant was constitutionally entitled to
have administration of anti-psychotic drugs cease before trial).
189

See infra text accompanying note 339.

190

See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4(a) (2002) ("A lawyer shall
keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with
reasonable requests for information.").
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Guideline 10.7
A.

B.

Investigation

Counsel at every stage have an obligation to conduct thorough and independent
investigations relating to the issues of both guilt and penalty.
1.

The investigation regarding guilt should be conducted regardless of any
admission or statement by the client concerning the facts of the alleged crime,
or overwhelming evidence of guilt, or any statement by the client that evidence
bearing upon guilt is not to be collected or presented.

2.

The investigation regarding penalty should be conducted regardless of any
statement by the client that evidence bearing upon penalty is not to be
collected or presented.

1.

Counsel at every stage have an obligation to conduct a full examination of the
defense provided to the client at all prior phases of the case. This obligation
includes at minimum interviewing prior counsel and members of the defense
team and examining the files of prior counsel.

2.

Counsel at every stage have an obligation to satisfy themselves independently
that the official record of the proceedings is complete and to supplement it as
appropriate.

History of Guideline
This Guideline is based on portions of Guideline 11.4.1 of the original edition. Changes in
this Guideline clarify that counsel should conduct thorough and independent investigations
relating to both guilt and penalty issues regardless of overwhelming evidence of guilt, client
statements concerning the facts of the alleged crime, or client statements that counsel should
refrain from collecting or presenting evidence bearing upon guilt or penalty.
Subsection B (1) is new and describes the obligation of counsel at every stage to examine
the defense provided to the client at all prior phases of the case. Subsection B (2) is also new and
describes counsel's ongoing obligation to ensure that the official record of proceedings is
complete.
Related Standards
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-4.1 ("Duty to
Investigate"), in ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION (3d ed. 1993).
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL
DEFENSE REPRESENTATION, Guideline 4.1 (1997) ("Investigation").

76

ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases • February 2003

Commentary
At every stage of the proceedings, counsel has a duty to investigate the case thoroughly.193
This duty is intensified (as are many duties) by the unique nature of the death penalty, has been
emphasized by recent statutory changes,194 and is broadened by the bifurcation of capital trials.195
This Guideline outlines the scope of the investigation required a capital case, but is not intended to
be exhaustive.
Guilt/Innocence
As noted supra in the text accompanying notes 47-49, between 1973 and 2002 some 100
people were freed from death row in the United States on the grounds of innocence.196
Unfortunately, inadequate investigation by defense attorneys - as well as faulty eyewitness
identification, coerced confessions, prosecutorial misconduct, false jailhouse informant
testimony,197 flawed or false forensic evidence,198 and the special vulnerability of juvenile
See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-4.1,4-6.1,
in ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION

(3d ed. 1993); N A T ' L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL
DEFENSE REPRESENTATION, Guideline 4.1 (1997) ("Investigation").
194

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), which, as amended by the AEDPA, precludes certain claims
from federal habeas corpus review if the petitioner "has failed to develop the factual basis" of
them "in State court proceedings." See also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000) (construing
this section).
See generally Lyon, supra note 2; Vick, supra note 3. Numerous courts have found
counsel to be ineffective when they have failed to conduct an adequate investigation for
sentencing. See, e.g. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395-96 (2000) (counsel ineffective for
failing to uncover and present evidence of defendant's "nightmarish childhood," borderline mental
retardation, and good conduct in prison); Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d 1043, 1070 (11 th Circuit
2002) (counsel ineffective for failing to "investigate, obtain, or present any mitigating evidence to
the jury, let alone the powerful mitigating evidence of Brownlee's borderline mental retardation,
psychiatric disorders, and history of drug and alcohol abuse"); infra note 203.
196

See DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER: Innocence and the Death Penalty, available
at http://www.deathpenaltyinfor.org/innoc.html (last visited November 5, 2002) (stating that there
are 102 people that have been wrongly convicted of capital crimes).
197

See generally Dodd v. State, 993 P.2d 778 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000) (canvassing special
unreliability of such testimony and restricting its use); supra note 48.
198

Recent years have seen a series of scandals involving the prosecution's use, knowingly or
unknowingly, of scientifically unsupportable or simply fabricated forensic evidence by
governmental agents. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. JUSTICE, OFF. INSP. GEN., The FBILabor-atory: An
Investigation into Laboratory Practices and Alleged Misconduct in Explosives Related and Other
Cases (1997) (Eighteen-months investigation into charges by whistleblower Frederic Whitehurst
that FBI Laboratory mishandled "some of the most significant prosecutions in the recent history of
77
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suspects - have contributed to wrongful convictions in both capital and noncapital cases.199 In
capital cases, the mental vulnerabilities of a large portion of the client population compound the
possibilities for error.200 This underscores the importance of defense counsel's duty to take
seriously the possibility of the client's innocence,201 to scrutinize carefully the quality of the
state's case, and to investigate and re-investigate all possible defenses.202
In this regard, the elements of an appropriate investigation include the following:
1.

Charging Documents:
Copies of all charging documents in the case should be obtained and
examined in the context of the applicable law to identify:
a.

the elements of the charged offense(s), including the element(s)
alleged to make the death penalty applicable;

b.

the defenses, ordinary and affirmative, that may be available to the
substantive charge and to the applicability of the death penalty;

c.

any issues, constitutional or otherwise, (such as statutes of
limitations or double jeopardy) that can be raised to attack the
charging documents; and

the Department of Justice" finds "significant instances of testimonial errors, substandard
analytical work, and deficient practices"); Paul C. Gianelli, The Abuse of Scientific Evidence in
Criminal Cases: The Need for Independent Crime Laboratories, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 439,
442-69 (1997) (summarizing numerous cases); supra note 49.
199

See BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: WHEN JUSTICE GOES WRONG AND HOW

TO MAKE IT RIGHT

(Signet 2001 ed.).

200

See generally Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2251-52 (2002) ("Mentally retarded
defendants may be less able to give meaningful assistance to their counsel and are typically poor
witnesses, and their demeanor may create an unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their
crimes."); see also Jurek v. Estelle, 623 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1980) (same), cert denied, 450 U.S.
1001 (1981).
As this Guideline emphasizes, that is so even where circumstances appear overwhelmingly
indicative of guilt. A recent study that includes both capital and non-capital DNA exonerations
has found that in 23 percent of the cases the client had confessed notwithstanding his innocence.
See SCHECK ET AL., supra note 199, at 92. See also Dan Morain, Blind Justice; John Cherry's
Killing Left Many Victims; Was the Accused One of Them? L.A. TIMES, July 16, 1989, View, at 6
(noting that Jerry Bigelow confessed many times, including to the media and was eventually
found to be innocent).
See Steven M. Pincus, "It's Good to be Free ": An Essay About the Exoneration of Albert
Burrell, 28 W M . MITCHELL L. REV. 27, 33 (2001).
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d.

2.

defense counsel's right to obtain information in the possession of the
government, and the applicability and validity of any obligation that
might arise to provide reciprocal discovery.

Potential Witnesses:
a.

Barring exceptional circumstances, counsel should seek out and
interview potential witnesses, including, but not limited to:
(1)

eyewitnesses or other witnesses having purported knowledge
of events surrounding the alleged offense itself;

(2)

potential alibi witness;

(3)

witnesses familiar with aspects of the client's life history that
might affect the likelihood that the client committed the
charged offense(s), the degree of culpability for the offense,
including:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

(4)
b.

3.

members of the client's immediate and extended family
neighbors, friends and acquaintances who knew the client or
his family
former teachers, clergy, employers, co-workers, social
service providers, and doctors
correctional, probation or parole officers;

members of the victim's family.

Counsel should conduct interviews of potential witnesses in the
presence of a third person so that there is someone to call as a
defense witness at trial. Alternatively, counsel should have an
investigator or mitigation specialist conduct the interviews. Counsel
should investigate all sources of possible impeachment of defense
and prosecution witnesses.

The Police and Prosecution:
Counsel should make efforts to secure information in the possession of the
prosecution or law enforcement authorities, including police reports,
autopsy reports, photos, video or audio tape recordings, and crime scene
and crime lab reports. Where necessary, counsel should pursue such efforts
through formal and informal discovery.
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4.

Physical Evidence:
Counsel should make a prompt request to the police or investigative agency
for any physical evidence or expert reports relevant to the offense or
sentencing. With the assistance of appropriate experts, counsel should then
aggressively re-examine all of the government's forensic evidence, and
conduct appropriate analyses of all other available forensic evidence.

5.

The Scene:
Counsel should view the scene of the alleged offense as soon as possible.
This should be done under circumstances as similar as possible to those
existing at the time of the alleged incident (e.g., weather, time of day, and
lighting conditions).

Penalty
Counsel's duty to investigate and present mitigating evidence is now well established.203
The duty to investigate exists regardless of the expressed desires of a client.204 Nor may counsel
"sit idly by, thinking that investigation would be futile."205 Counsel cannot responsibly advise a
2Ui

See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395-96 (2000) (counsel ineffective for failing
to uncover and present evidence of defendant's "nightmarish childhood," borderline mental
retardation, and good conduct in prison); Caro v. Woodford, 280 F.3d 1247, 1255 (9th Cir. 2002)
(counsel ineffective for failing to investigate and present evidence of client's brain damage due to
prolonged pesticide exposure and repeated head injuries, and failing to present expert testimony
explaining "the effects of the severe physical, emotional, and psychological abuse to which Caro
was subjected as a child"), cert, denied, 122 S. Ct. 2645 (2002); Coleman v. Mitchell, 268 F.3d
417, 449-51 (6th Cir. 2001) (though counsel's duty to investigate mitigating evidence is well
established, counsel failed to investigate and present evidence that defendant had been abandoned
as an infant in a garbage can by his mentally ill mother, was raised in a brothel run by his
grandmother where he was exposed to group sex, bestiality and pedophilia, and suffered from
probable brain damage and borderline personality disorder), cert, denied, 122 S. Ct. 1639 (2002);
Jermyn v. Horn, 266 F.3d 257, 307-08 (3d Cir. 2001) (counsel ineffective for failing to investigate
and present evidence of defendant's abusive childhood and "psychiatric testimony explaining how
Jermyn's development was thwarted by the torture and psychological abuse he suffered as a
child"); supra note 195.
204

See Blanco v. Singletary, 943 F.2d 1477, 1501-03 (11th Cir. 1991) (counsel ineffective for
"latch[ing] onto" client's assertions he did not want to call penalty phase witnesses and failing to
conduct an investigation sufficient to allow their client to make an informed decision to waive
mitigation), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 837 (1989); see also Karis v. Calderon, 283 F.3d 1117, 1136-41
(9th Cir. 2002), petition for cert, filed (U.S. Sept. 13, 2002) (No. 02-434).
205

Voyles v. Watkins, 489 F. Supp. 901, 910 (N.D. Miss. 1980); accord Austin v. Bell, 126
F.3d 843, 849 (6th Cir. 1997) (counsel's failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence at
the penalty phase of the trial, on grounds that he "did not think that it would do any good,"
constituted ineffective assistance), cert, denied, 523 U.S. 1079 (1998).
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client about the merits of different courses of action, the client cannot make informed decisions,
and counsel cannot be sure of the client's competency to make such decisions, unless counsel has
first conducted a thorough investigation with respect to both phases of the case.206
Because the sentencer in a capital case must consider in mitigation, "anything in the life of
the defendant which might militate against the appropriateness of the death penalty for the
defendant,"207 "penalty phase preparation requires extensive and generally unparalleled
investigation into personal and family history." In the case of the client, this begins with the
moment of conception.209 Counsel needs to explore:
(1)

Medical history (including hospitalizations, mental and physical
illness or injury, alcohol and drug use, pre-natal and birth trauma,
malnutrition, developmental delays, and neurological damage);

(2)

Family and social history (including physical, sexual or emotional abuse;
family history of mental illness, cognitive impairments, substance abuse, or
domestic violence; poverty, familial instability, neighborhood environment
and peer influence); other traumatic events such as exposure to criminal
violence, the loss of a loved one or a natural disaster; experiences of racism
or other social or ethnic bias; cultural or religious influences; failures of
government or social intervention (e.g., failure to intervene or provide

2U0

See, e.g., Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2002), cert, denied, 123 S. Ct.
342 (2002); Coleman v. Mitchell, 268 F.3d 417, 447 (6th Cir. 2001), cert, denied, 122 S. Ct. 1639
(2002); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1229 (10th Cir. 2001) ("In addition to hampering
[defense counsel's] ability to make strategic decisions, [defense counsel's] failure to investigate
[defendant's background] clearly affected his ability to competently advise [defendant] regarding
the meaning of mitigation evidence and the availability of possible mitigation strategies."); United
States v. Gray, 878 F.2d 702, 711 (3d Cir. 1989) ("[C]ounsel can hardly be said to have made a
strategic choice against pursuing a certain line of investigation when s/he has not yet obtained the
facts on which such a decision could be made."); Knighton v. Maggio, 740 F.2d 1344, 1350 (5th
Cir. 1984) (petitioner entitled to relief if record shows that "counsel could not make a valid
strategic choice because he had made no investigation"), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 924 (1984).
207

Brown v. State, 526 So. 2d 903, 908 (Fla. 1988) (citing Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393
(1987)). See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
208

Russell Stetler, Mitigation Evidence in Death Penalty Cases, THE CHAMPION, Jan./Feb.
1999, at 35; see also, ABA Criminal Justice Section, Report to the House of Delegates (Feb.
1990), reprinted in Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in State Death Penalty
Cases, supra note 84, at 63.

209

Norton, supra note 180, at 2 (mitigation investigation must encompass client's "whole
life"); EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE OF ALA., ALABAMA CAPITAL DEFENSE TRIAL MANUAL ch. 12
(3d ed. 1997) [hereinafter ALABAMA CAPITAL DEFENSE TRIAL MANUAL]; Lyon, supra note 2, at
703 (observing that "mitigation begins with the onset of the [defendant's] life" because "[m]any
[defendants'] problems start with things like fetal alcohol syndrome, head trauma at birth, or their
mother's drug addiction during pregnancy"); Vick, supra note 3, at 363.
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necessary services, placement in poor quality foster care or juvenile
detention facilities);
(3)

Educational history (including achievement, performance, behavior, and
activities), special educational needs (including cognitive limitations and
learning disabilities) and opportunity or lack thereof, and activities;

(4)

Military service, (including length and type of service, conduct, special
training, combat exposure, health and mental health services);

(5)

Employment and training history (including skills and performance, and
barriers to employ ability);

(6)

Prior juvenile and adult correctional experience (including conduct while
under supervision, in institutions of education or training, and regarding
clinical services);

The mitigation investigation should begin as quickly as possible, because it may
affect the investigation of first phase defenses (e.g., by suggesting additional areas for questioning
police officers or other witnesses), decisions about the need for expert evaluations (including
competency, mental retardation, or insanity), motion practice, and plea
negotiations.210
Accordingly, immediately upon counsel's entry into the case appropriate
member(s) of the defense team should meet with the client to:
1.

discuss the alleged offense or events giving rise to the charge(s), and any
improper police investigative practice or prosecutorial conduct which
affects the client's rights;

2.

explore the existence of other potential sources of information relating to
the offense, the client's mental state, and the presence or absence of any
aggravating factors under the applicable death penalty statute and any
mitigating factors; and

3.

obtain necessary releases for securing confidential records relating to any of
the relevant histories.

Counsel should bear in mind that much of the information that must be elicited for the
sentencing phase investigation is very personal and may be extremely difficult for the client to
discuss. Topics like childhood sexual abuse should therefore not be broached in an initial
interview. Obtaining such information typically requires overcoming considerable barriers, such
as shame, denial and repression, as well as other mental or emotional impairments from which the
client may suffer. As noted supra in the text accompanying note 101, a mitigation specialist who
is trained to recognize and overcome these barriers, and who has the skills to help the client cope

710

See supra text accompanying notes 11-26.
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with the emotional impact of such painful disclosures, is invaluable in conducting this aspect of
the investigation.
It is necessary to locate and interview the client's family members (who may suffer from
some of the same impairments as the client), and virtually everyone else who knew the client and
his family, including neighbors, teachers, clergy, case workers, doctors, correctional, probation or
parole officers, and others.211 Records - from courts, government agencies, the military,
employers, etc. - can contain a wealth of mitigating evidence, documenting or providing clues to
childhood abuse, retardation, brain damage, and/or mental illness,212 and corroborating witnesses'
recollections. Records should be requested concerning not only the client, but also his parents,
grandparents, siblings, and children. A multi-generational investigation frequently discloses
significant patterns of family dysfunction and may help establish or strengthen a diagnosis or
underscore the hereditary nature of a particular impairment.214 The collection of corroborating
information from multiple sources - a time- consuming task - is important wherever possible to
ensure the reliability and thus the persuasiveness of the evidence.215

? 11

Goodpaster, supra note 2, at 321; Lyon, supra note 2, at 703-04; Vick, supra note 3, at
366-67.
212

See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395 (2000) (counsel ineffective where they "failed
to conduct an investigation that would have uncovered extensive records graphically describing
Williams' nightmarish childhood, not because of any strategic calculation but because they
incorrectly thought that state law barred access to such records. Had they done so, the jury would
have learned that Williams' parents had been imprisoned for the criminal neglect of Williams and
his siblings, that Williams had been severely and repeatedly beaten by his father, that he had been
committed to the custody of the social services bureau for two years during his parents'
incarceration (including one stint in an abusive foster home), and then, after his parents were
released from prison, had been returned to his parents' custody.") (footnote omitted); Jermyn v.
Horn, 266 F.3d 257, 307 (3d Cir. 2001) (counsel ineffective for failing to obtain school records
that disclosed childhood abuse); see also ALABAMA CAPITAL DEFENSE TRIAL MANUAL, supra note
209; TEXAS DEATH PENALTY MITIGATION MANUAL, supra note 103, ch. 3; Norton, supra note
180, at 32-38.
213

In order to verify or corroborate witness testimony about circumstances and events in the
defendant's life, defense counsel must "assemble the documentary record of the defendant's life,
collecting school, work, and prison records "which might serve as sources of relevant facts. Vick,
supra note 3, at 367; see also Lyon, supra note 2, at 705-06.
214

Norton, supra note 180, at 3 (counsel should "investigate at least three generations" of the
client's family).
215

See id. (advocating "triangulation" of data).
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Counsel should use all appropriate avenues including signed releases, subpoenas, court
orders, and requests or litigation pursuant to applicable open records statutes, to obtain all
potentially relevant information pertaining to the client, his or her siblings and parents, and other
family members, including but not limited to:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.

school records
social service and welfare records
juvenile dependency or family court records
medical records
military records
employment records
criminal and correctional records
family birth, marriage, and death records
alcohol and drug abuse assessment or treatment records
INS records

If the client was incarcerated, institutionalized or placed outside of the home, as either a
juvenile or an adult, the defense team should investigate the possible effect of the facility's
conditions on the client's contemporaneous and later conduct.216 The investigation should also
explore the adequacy of institutional responses to childhood trauma, mental illness or disability to
determine whether the client's problems were ever accurately identified or properly addressed.217
The circumstances of a particular case will often require specialized research and expert
consultation. For example, if a client grew up in a migrant farm worker community, counsel
should investigate what pesticides the client may have been exposed to and their possible effect on
a child's developing brain.218 If a client is a relatively recent immigrant, counsel must learn about
the client's culture, about the circumstances of his upbringing in his country of origin, and about
the difficulties the client's immigrant community faces in this country.219

See TERRY KUPERS, PRISON MADNESS: THE MENTAL HEALTH CRISIS BEHIND BARS AND
WHAT W E MUST D O ABOUT IT

(1999).

917

See Craig Haney, Violence and the Capital Jury: Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement
and the Impulse to Condemn to Death, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1467 (1997) (noting damaging
effects of "social conditions and experiences" often inflicted on institutionalized juvenile
offenders).
218

See Caro v. Woodford, 280 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir. 2002), cert, denied, 122 S.Ct. 2645 (2002)
(described supra note 203).
219

See Mak v. Blodgett, 970 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1992) (positive testimony from defendant's
family, combined with expert testimony about difficulty of adolescent immigrants from Hong
Kong assimilating to North America would have humanized client and could have resulted in a
life sentence for defendant convicted of 13 murders).

84

ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases • February 2003

Miscellaneous Concerns
Counsel should maintain copies of media reports about the case for various purposes,
including to support a motion for change of venue, if appropriate, to assist in voir dire of the jury
regarding the effects of pretrial publicity, to monitor the public statements of potential witnesses,
and to facilitate the work of counsel who might be involved in later stages of the case.
Counsel must also investigate prior convictions, adjudications, or unadjudicated offenses
that could be used as aggravating circumstances or otherwise come into evidence. If a prior
conviction is legally flawed, counsel should seek to have it set aside.220 Counsel may also find
extenuating circumstances that can be offered to lessen the weight of a conviction, adjudication, or
9? i

unadjudicated offense.
Additional investigation may be required to provide evidentiary support for other legal
issues in the case, such as challenging racial discrimination in the imposition of the death penalty
or in the composition of juries. 222 Whether within the criminal case or outside it, counsel has a
duty to pursue appropriate remedies if the investigation reveals that such conditions exist.223
As discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 247-59, counsel should consider making
overtures to members of the victim's family - possibly through an intermediary, such as a clergy
person, defense-victim liaison, or representative of an organization such as Murder Victim's
Families for Reconciliation - to ascertain their feelings about the death penalty and/or the
possibility of a plea.

220

See Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 586 (1988); supra note 6.

221

See supra text accompanying notes 19-22.

222

See, e.g., Miller-el v. Cockrell, 2003 WL 431659 ***cite to sec. 1(B)*** (U.S. Feb. 25,
2003) (ruling for habeas petitioner in reliance on evidence presented at hearings on jury
discrimination claim conducted prior to trial and in state post-conviction proceedings); Sara
Rimer, In Dallas, Dismissal of Black Jurors Leads to Appeal by Death Row Inmate, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 13, 2002, at A24 (discussing memoranda and training manuals from prosecutor's office
documenting policy of racial discrimination injury selection); Stephen B. Bright, Challenging
Racial Discrimination in Capital Cases, THE CHAMPION, Jan./Feb. 1997, at 22.
223

224

See supra Guideline 10.10.2; text accompanying note 7.

See Russell Stetler, Working with the Victim's Survivors in Death Penalty Cases, THE
CHAMPION, June 1999, at 42; see also Michael Janofsky, Parents of Gay Obtain Mercy for His
Killer, N.Y. TIMES, NOV. 5, 1999, at Al (stating that the prosecutor decided to drop the death
penalty in the Matthew Shepard case because the parents of the victim requested him to do so).
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Guideline 10.8
A.

B.

C.

The Duty to Assert Legal Claims

Counsel at every stage of the case, exercising professional judgment in accordance
with these Guidelines, should:
1.

consider all legal claims potentially available; and

2.

thoroughly investigate the basis for each potential claim before reaching a
conclusion as to whether it should be asserted; and

3.

evaluate each potential claim in light of:
a.

the unique characteristics of death penalty law and practice; and

b.

the near certainty that all available avenues of post-conviction relief
will be pursued in the event of conviction and imposition of a death
sentence; and

c.

the importance of protecting the client's rights against later contentions
by the government that the claim has been waived, defaulted, not
exhausted, or otherwise forfeited; and

d.

any other professionally appropriate costs and benefits to the assertion
of the claim.

Counsel who decide to assert a particular legal claim should:
1.

present the claim as forcefully as possible, tailoring the presentation to the
particular facts and circumstances in the client's case and the applicable law
in the particular jurisdiction; and

2.

ensure that a full record is made of all legal proceedings in connection with the
claim.

Counsel at all stages of the case should keep under consideration the possible
advantages to the client of:
1.

asserting legal claims whose basis has only recently become known or
available to counsel; and

2.

supplementing claims previously made with additional factual or legal
information.

History of Guideline
This Guideline is based on Guideline 11.5.1 (The Decision to File Pretrial Motions) and
Guideline 11.7.3 (Objection to Error and Preservation of Issues for Post Judgment Review) of the
original edition. New language makes clear that the obligations imposed by this Guideline exist at
every stage of the proceeding and extend to procedural vehicles other than the submission of
86
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motions to the trial court.
In Subsection A (3)(b), the phrase "near certainty" is new and replaces the word
"likelihood" from the original edition. The change reflects recent scholarship indicating that
appellate and post-conviction remedies are pursued by almost 100% of capital defendants who are
convicted and sentenced to death.
Subsections B and C are new to this edition.
Related Standards
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-3.6 ("Prompt
Action to Protect the Accused") and Standard 4-4.5 ("Compliance with Discovery Procedure"), in
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION (3d

ed. 1993).
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE
REPRESENTATION (1995), Guideline 5.1 ("The Decision to File Pretrial Motions").
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE
REPRESENTATION (1995), Guideline 5.3 ("Subsequent Filing of Pretrial Motions").

Commentary
"One of the most fundamental duties of an attorney defending a capital case at trial is the
preservation of any and all conceivable errors for each stage of appellate and post-conviction
review. Failure to preserve an issue may result in the client being executed even though reversible
error occurred at trial."225 For this reason, trial counsel in a death penalty case must be especially
aware not only of strategies for winning at trial,226 but also of the heightened need to fully
preserve all potential issues for later review.
As the text of the first sentence of Subsection A makes clear, this obligation is not limited
to trial counsel or to motions made to the trial court. For example, if a state post-conviction court
rules on the merits of a claim for relief, the claim will be available for federal review even if the

Stephen B. Bright, Preserving Error at Capital Trials, THE CHAMPION, Apr. 1997, at 4243. For example, John Eldon Smith was executed by the State of Georgia even though he was
sentenced to death by a jury selected from a jury pool from which women were unconstitutionally
excluded. The federal courts refused to consider the issue because Mr. Smith's lawyers failed to
preserve it. Mr. Smith's co-defendant was also sentenced to death from a jury selected from the
same pool. The issue was preserved in the co-defendant's case, and the co-defendant's conviction
and death sentence were vacated. At retrial, the co-defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment.
Smith v. Kemp, 715 F.2d 1459, 1476 (11th Cir. 1983) (Hatchett, J., dissenting in part), cert,
denied, 464 U.S. 1003(1983).
226

See NAT'L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS'N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL
DEFENSE REPRESENTATION Guideline 5.1 (1995) (listing potential motions).

87

ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases • February 2003

state's rules required the issue to be raised at trial.227 So, too, it may be appropriate for counsel to
proceed on some claims (e.g., double jeopardy) by seeking an interlocutory supervisory writ from
an appellate court228 or by otherwise seeking relief outside the confines of the capital litigation
itself.229
As discussed in the text accompanying note 27 supra, most jurisdictions have strict waiver
rules that will forestall post-judgment relief if an issue was not litigated at the first opportunity.
An issue may be waived not only by the failure to timely file a pretrial motion, but also because of
the lack of a contemporaneous objection at trial, or the failure to request a jury instruction, or
counsel's failure to comply with some other procedural requirement established by statute, court
rule or caselaw. Counsel must therefore know and follow the procedural requirements for issue
preservation and act with the understanding that the failure to raise an issue by motion, objection
or other appropriate procedure may well forfeit the ability of the client to obtain relief on that
issue in subsequent proceedings.
Whether raising an issue specific to a capital case (such as requesting individual,
sequestered voir dire on death-qualification of the jury) or a more common motion shaped by the
capital aspect of the case (such as requesting a change of venue because of publicity), counsel
should be sure to litigate all of the possible legal230 and factual231 bases for the request. This will
227

See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75 (1985); see also Stewart v. Smith, 122 S. Ct. 2578
(2002) (per curiam),

228

See, e.g., Schumer v. Holtzman, 60 N.Y.2d 46,454 N.E.2d 522, 467 N.Y.S.2d 182 (1983)
(granting writ of prohibition sought by non-capital suspect to preclude investigation by improperly
designated prosecutor). Cf Hynes v. Tomei, 92 N.Y.2d 613, 706 N.E.2d 1201, 684 N.Y.S.2d 177
(1998) (invalidating portion of New York death penalty statute in proceeding for writ of
prohibition brought by prosecutor), cert, denied, 527 U.S. 1015 (1999).
See supra text accompanying notes 4-8.
230

Counsel should always cite to any arguably applicable provision of the United States
Constitution, the state constitution, and state law as bases for granting a claim. A reviewing court
may refuse to consider a legal theory different from that put forward originally. See Anderson v.
Harless, 459 U.S. 4 (1982) (refusing to consider violation of Due Process Clause of federal
constitution because defense counsel in state courts relied solely upon due process clause of state
constitution). For example, courts have refused to consider an assertion that a statement was taken
in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel because it was argued in earlier proceedings
only that the statement was obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment protection against selfincrimination. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991). Counsel should also present all of
the relevant facts at as early as feasible. See generally Bright, supra note 225, at 43, 44.

231

In this regard, as Subsection C indicates, counsel should bear in mind that in capital
litigation the courts tend to be much more responsive to supplemental presentations than they
might be in other contexts. See, e.g., Brooks v. Estelle, 697 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1982); Spaziano v.
State, 660 So.2d 1363 (Fla. 1995) (granting motions filed by defendant facing fifth death warrant
that "seek to open by rehearing an appeal that was finalized more than thirteen years ago and a
postconviction proceeding that was terminated with a denial of rehearing more than nine years
ago," and ordering a remand that eventually resulted in an in-court recantation by a key witness
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increase the likelihood that the request will be granted and will also fully preserve the issue for
post-conviction review in the event the claim is denied.
Because of the possibility that the client will be sentenced to death, counsel must be
significantly more vigilant about litigating all potential issues at all levels in a capital case than in
any other case.232 As described in the Commentary to Guideline 1.1, counsel also has a duty to
preserve issues calling for a change in existing precedent; the client's life may well depend on
how zealously counsel discharges this duty.233 Counsel should object to anything that appears
unfair or unjust even if it involves challenging well-accepted practices.234
Because "[preserving all possible grounds can be very difficult in the heat of battle during
trial,"235 counsel should file written motions in limine prior to trial raising any issues that counsel
anticipate will arise at trial. All of the grounds should be set out in the motion.236 Similarly,
requests for rulings during the course of post-conviction proceedings (e.g., for investigative
resources) should be made fully and formally.

and a life sentence, see DNA Tests to be Done in 74 Case,
B3).

ORLANDO SENTINEL,

Dec. 13, 2002 at

7"\1

See Bright, supra note 225, at 43 ("Failure to make an objection for fear of alienating the
judge or jury may be a valid consideration in a case in which there is a good chance of acquittal or
the length of sentence will be so short that appellate review will be irrelevant to the client. But in
a capital case, it may deprive the client of a life-saving reversal on direct appeal or in habeas
corpus proceedings.").
See supra text accompanying note 27. If a claim, whether then meritorious or not, is being
litigated anywhere in the country, counsel is likely to be charged with knowledge that the "tools to
construct their constitutional claim" exist and be expected to raise it. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S.
107, 133 (1982). In Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986), counsel failed to raise a "losing" issue
on behalf of Mr. Smith in one state court because the state supreme court had recently held the
issue was meritless. Mr. Smith raised the issue in all subsequent state and federal proceedings,
and, well before these were concluded, the United States Supreme Court ruled favorably on the
question. However, because of counsel's previous decision to forego the presentation of a claim
that was then meritless, Mr. Smith was executed.
For example, execution by electrocution has become de facto unconstitutional because
state governments have concluded that challenges to the practice have merit, even though the
contrary precedent remains in place. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890); compare Alabama:
Optional Execution by Injection, N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2002, at A20 (discussing how Alabama
enacted a law making lethal injection the state's primary method of execution when it looked as if
the Supreme Court might rule that the electric chair was cruel and unusual punishment); Sarah
Rimer, Florida Lawmakers Reject Electric Chair, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2000, at A13 (same in
Florida).
235

Bright, supra note 225, at 45.

236

See ALABAMA CAPITAL DEFENSE TRIAL MANUAL, supra note 209, at 53.
so
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In accordance with Subsection B (2), counsel should ensure that there is a complete record
respecting all claims that are made, including objections, motions, statements of grounds,
questioning of witnesses or venire members, oral and written arguments of both sides, discussions
among counsel and the court, evidence proffered and received, rulings of the court, reasons given
by the court for its rulings, and any agreements reached between the parties. If a court refuses to
allow a proceeding to be recorded, counsel should state the objection to the court's refusal, to the
substance of the court's ruling, and then at the first available opportunity make a record of what
transpired in the unrecorded proceeding.237 Counsel should also ensure that the record is clear
with regard to the critical facts to support the claim. For example, if counsel objects to the
peremptory strike of a juror as race-based, counsel should ensure that it is clear from the record
not only that the prosecutor struck a particular juror, but the race of the juror, of every other
member of the venire, and the extent to which the unchallenged venire members shared the
characteristics claimed to be justifying the challenge.238
Further, as reflected in Guideline 10.7(B)(2), counsel at all stages of the case must
determine independently whether the existing official record may incompletely reflect the
proceedings, e.g., because the court reporter took notes but did not transcribe them or because the
court clerk does not include legal memoranda in the record transmitted to subsequent courts, or
because of official negligence or misconduct.
As the nonexclusive list of considerations in Subsection A (3) suggests, there are many
instances in which counsel should assert legal claims even though their prospects of immediate
success on the merits is at best modest. Examples of such circumstances (in addition to those in
which counsel needs to forestall later procedural defenses (Subsection A (3)(c)), include instances
where:
the claim should be preserved in light of foreseeable future events (e.g., the
completion of an investigation, a ruling in a relevant case); or
asserting the claim may increase the government's incentive to reach an agreedupon disposition;239 or the presentation made in support of the claim may favorably
influence other relevant actors (e.g., the Governor).

151

See Dobbs v. Zant, 506 U.S. 357 (1993); Robinson v. Robinson, 487 S.W.2d 713, 714-15
(Tex. 1972); 4M Linen Co. v. W.P. Balard & Co., 793 S.W.2d 320, 323 (Tex. App. 1990), writ
denied (Oct 31, 1990), rehearing of writ of error overruled (Jan 9, 1991).
238

Bright, supra note 225, at 46.

239

See 3 CAL. ATT'YS FOR CRIM. JUSTICE, 3 CALIFORNIA DEATH PENALTY DEFENSE MANUAL

4(1993ed.).

on
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Guideline 10.15.1

Duties of Post-Conviction Counsel

A.

Counsel representing a capital client at any point after conviction should be familiar
with the jurisdiction's procedures for setting execution dates and providing notice of
them. Post-conviction counsel should also be thoroughly familiar with all available
procedures for seeking a stay of execution.

B.

If an execution date is set, post-conviction counsel should immediately take all
appropriate steps to secure a stay of execution and pursue those efforts through all
available fora.

C.

Post-conviction counsel should seek to litigate all issues, whether or not previously
presented, that are arguably meritorious under the standards applicable to high
quality capital defense representation, including challenges to any overly restrictive
procedural rules. Counsel should make every professionally appropriate effort to
present issues in a manner that will preserve them for subsequent review.

D.

The duties of the counsel representing the client on direct appeal should include filing
a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States. If appellate
counsel does not intend to file such a petition, he or she should immediately notify
successor counsel if known and the Responsible Agency.

E.

Post-conviction counsel should fully discharge the ongoing obligations imposed by
these Guidelines, including the obligations to:
1.

maintain close contact with the client regarding litigation developments; and

2.

continually monitor the client's mental, physical and emotional condition for
effects on the client's legal position;

3.

keep under continuing review the desirability of modifying prior counsel's
theory of the case in light of subsequent developments; and

4.

continue an aggressive investigation of all aspects of the case.

History of Guideline
This Guideline is based on Guideline 11.9.3 of the original edition. Subsections A, B, and
D are entirely new. Subsection C includes new language regarding the manner in which postconviction counsel must present all arguably meritorious issues. Subsection E includes new
language emphasizing the ongoing obligations imposed by these Guidelines upon post-conviction
counsel.
Related Standards
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-8.5 ("PostConviction Remedies") in ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION
AND DEFENSE FUNCTION (3d ed. 1993).
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Commentary
Almost all of the duties imposed by Guidelines 10.3 et seq. are applicable in the postconviction context. Subsection E notes this by way of reminder. Post-conviction counsel should
consult those Guidelines and accompanying commentaries.
The Paramount Duty to Obtain a Stay
No matter how compelling the client's post-conviction case may be, he faces the risk that
his execution will moot it.331 This is a phenomenon unique to capital litigation and one that must
be uppermost in the mind of post-conviction counsel.
When states fail to provide post-conviction counsel entirely or in a timely manner,332 or
request the setting of an execution date to advance the litigation,333 or impose short periods of time
for filing substantive post-judgment pleadings, the result is emergency requests for stays of
execution so that substantive pleadings will be considered.334 Although the ABA and other
331

See Brooks v. Estelle, 702 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1983) (dismissing appeal, which had received
certificate of probable cause from district court, as moot since petitioner had been executed
following the denial of a stay by Brooks v. Estelle, 697 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1982)).
332

There is no right to state post-conviction counsel in Georgia. Gibson v. Turpin, 270 Ga.
855, 513 S.E.2d 186, cert, denied, 528 U.S. 946 (1999). In August 1996, Georgia Supreme Court
Justice Robert Benham noted that several persons under sentence of death in Georgia were in
"immediate need of legal representation," and asked area law firms to volunteer. One Atlanta
civil firm that volunteered was assigned the case of Marcus Wellons. Three days after the firm
received a copy of the trial transcript, the trial court set an execution date for two weeks later.
The firm rushed to the Georgia Supreme Court and asked for more time to submit a formal postconviction petition. Hours before Mr. Wellons's scheduled execution, the Court denied the
request by a 4-3 vote. As guards were about to shave Mr. Wellons's head for that evening's
electrocution, the federal district court granted a stay of execution. State counsel and the federal
defender were given ten months to prepare the federal petition. Bill Rankin, When Death Row
Inmates Go To Court Without Lawyers: In the Late Stages of Their Fight to Stay Alive, Some
Must Represent Themselves, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec. 29, 1996, at D5; Bill Rankin & Rhonda
Cook, Death Penalty: Sudden Speed, Then a Delay, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec. 13, 1996, at Al.
333

For example, in Kentucky capital cases the Attorney General invariably requests an
execution date at the end of direct appeal, and the Governor invariably signs the death warrant.
No stay of execution may be granted until the state post-conviction petition is filed. As a result,
in order to obtain a stay, counsel must often file a state post-conviction petition well before the
time allowed under state law because there is an outstanding execution date. The practice is the
same in federal habeas proceedings. See, e.g., Execution of Killer Delayed, CINCINNATI
ENQUIRER, June 9, 2000, at DIB.
334

When a capital case enters a phase of being "under warrant" - i.e., when a death warrant
has been signed - time commitments for counsel increase, "due in large part to the necessary
duplication of effort in the preparation of several petitions which might have to be filed
simultaneously in different courts." Standing Comm. on Legal Aid & Indigent Defense, ABA
Bar Information Program, Time & Expense Analysis in Postconviction Death Penalty Cases, Feb.
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professional voices have repeatedly condemned this system, defense counsel must make the
best of it - by seeking stays or reprieves from any available source and challenging the unfairness
of any overly restrictive constraints on filing of substantive pleadings and/or stays.
And to the extent that counsel can responsibly reduce the stresses imposed upon the client
by this often-nightmarish system, counsel should of course do so (e.g., by reassuring the client of
the unlikelihood of the execution actually occurring on its nominal date, notwithstanding the
alarming preparations being made by the prison). 336
Keeping the Client Whole
Even if their executions have been safely stayed, however, the mental condition of many
capital clients will deteriorate the longer they remain on death row. This may result in suicidal
tendencies and/or impairments in realistic perception and rational decisionmaking.337 Counsel
should seek to minimize this risk by staying in close contact with the client.338
Counsel's ongoing monitoring of the client's status, required by Subsection E(2), also has
a strictly legal purpose. As described in the text accompanying notes 187-90 supra, a worsening
in the client's mental condition may directly affect the legal posture of the case and the lawyer
needs to be aware of developments. For example, the case establishing the proposition that insane
1987, at 10.
335

See, ABA House of Delegates Res. 15, Rec. 11 (adopted Feb. 13, 1990) (calling for
automatic federal stays throughout post-conviction period) reprinted in Toward a More Just and
Effective System of Review, supra note 84, at 38; Legislative Modification, supra note 11, at 855
("We agree with the Powell Committee [appointed by Chief Justice Rehnquist to study reform of
capital habeas corpus] that the current mechanisms for obtaining stays of execution are irrational
and indefensible. At best, they lead to an enormous waste of legal effort by all participants in the
system, and at worst they result in inconsistencies that have fatal consequences."); Eric M.
Freedman, Can Justice Be Served by Appeals of the Dead?, NATL. L.J., Oct. 19, 1992, at 13
(current situation respecting stays is "no way to run a judicial system").
336

See, e.g., Williams v. Missouri, 463 U.S. 1301 (1983) (Blackmun, J., in chambers)
(executions scheduled for prior to the expiration of the time for seeking certiorari on direct
appeal would be stayed "as a matter of course"); McDonald v. Missouri, 464 U.S. 1306 (1984)
(Blackmun, J., in chambers) ("I thought I had advised the Supreme Court of Missouri once
before, in Williams, that. . . I . . . shall stay the execution of any Missouri applicant whose direct
review of his conviction is being sought and has not been completed. I repeat the admonition to
the Supreme Court of Missouri, and to any official within the State's chain of responsibility, that
I shall continue that practice. The stay, of course, ought to be granted by the state tribunal in the
first instance, but, if it fails to fulfill its responsibility, I shall fulfill mine.")
See C. Lee Harrington, A Community Divided: Defense Attorneys and the Ethics of Death
Row Volunteering, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 849, 850 (2000) (noting that between 1977 and
March 1998, 59 condemned inmates had volunteered for execution, compared to 382 executed
unwillingly).
See supra text accompanying notes 187-90.
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persons cannot be executed was heavily based on notes on the client's mental status that
counsel had kept over a period of months.
The Labyrinth of Post-conviction Litigation
A.

The Direct Appeal

Practice varies among jurisdictions as to the limits of the appellate process and the
relationship between direct appeals and collateral post-conviction challenges to a conviction or
sentence.340 Issues that are only partially or minimally reflected by the record, or that are outside
the record, should be explored by appellate counsel as a predicate for informed decision making
about legal strategy.
As Subsection C emphasizes, it is of critical importance that counsel on direct appeal
proceed, like all post-conviction counsel, in a manner that maximizes the client's ultimate chances
of success. "Winnowing" issues in a capital appeal can have fatal consequences. Issues
abandoned by counsel in one case, pursued by different counsel in another case and ultimately
successful, cannot necessarily be reclaimed later.341 When a client will be killed if the case is lost,
counsel should not let any possible ground for relief go unexplored or unexploited.342

Jjy

Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).

In some states, there is a unitary appeal system in which direct appeal and collateral
challenges such as ineffective assistance of counsel claims are raised simultaneously. See, e.g.,
IDAHO CODE § 19-2719 (Michie Supp. 2000). In other jurisdictions, ineffective assistance of
counsel claims generally may not be raised on direct appeal but are reserved for separate postconviction proceedings. See, e.g., Lawrence v. State, 691 So. 2d 1068, 1074 (Fla. 1997) (claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel not cognizable on direct appeal) cert, denied, 522 U.S. 880
(1997).
341

For example, in Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986), appellate counsel failed to assert
on direct appeal that the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights had been violated by the testimony
of a psychiatrist who had examined the defendant without warning him the interview could be
used against him. The Virginia Supreme Court had rejected such claims at the time of the
defendant's direct appeal. The U.S. Supreme Court reached a contrary result, however, in Estelle
v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981). In a Catch-22 for the client, the Court concluded appellate
counsel was not ineffective, because '"winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing
on' those more likely to prevail, far from being evidence of incompetence, is the hallmark of
effective appellate advocacy." Murray, 477 U.S. at 536 (citation omitted). At the same time, the
claim was not deemed sufficiently "'novel'" to constitute cause for the procedural default
because "forms of the claim he now advances had been percolating in the lower courts for years
at the time of his original appeal." Id. at 536-37 (citations omitted). Mr. Smith was therefore
barred from raising the issue in federal habeas proceedings and was subsequently executed.
342

It is for this reason that, consistent with the text supra accompanying note 27, Subsection
C refers to "issues that are arguably meritorious under the standards applicable to high quality
capital defense representation."
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Appellate counsel must be familiar with the deadlines for filing petitions for state and
federal post-conviction relief and how they are affected by the direct appeal. If the conviction and
sentence are affirmed, appellate counsel should ordinarily file on the client's behalf a petition for
certiorari review in the United States Supreme Court. Under the AEDPA, a client's one-year
statute of limitations for filing a petition for federal habeas corpus relief generally begins to run
upon the denial of certiorari or when the 90 days for filing a petition has elapsed.343 Appellate
counsel should therefore immediately inform successor counsel if he or she does not intend to file
a petition for certiorari or when a petition for certiorari is denied; if successor counsel is not yet
appointed, counsel should promptly advise the Responsible Agency of the need to designate
successor counsel. (Subsection D)
Appellate counsel should also advise the client directly of all applicable deadlines for
seeking post-conviction relief and explain the tolling provisions of the AEDPA,344 emphasizing
that a state post-conviction motion should be filed sufficiently in advance of the one-year deadline
to allow adequate time to prepare a federal habeas corpus petition. In states in which the direct
appeal and state post-conviction review are conducted simultaneously,345 post-conviction
proceedings may be concluded at the same time as, or even before, the direct appeal, effectively
rendering the tolling provisions inapplicable.
In light of this mutual dependency among all the post-conviction legal procedures, it is of
the utmost importance that, in accordance with Guideline 10.13, appellate counsel cooperates fully
with successor counsel and turn over all relevant files promptly.
B.

Collateral Relief- State and Federal

As described in the Commentary to Guideline 1.1, providing high quality legal
representation in collateral review proceedings in capital cases requires enormous amounts of
time, energy and knowledge. The field is increasingly complex and ever changing. As state and
federal collateral proceedings become ever-more intertwined, counsel representing a capital client
in state collateral proceedings must become intimately familiar with federal habeas corpus
procedures. As indicated above, for example, although the AEDPA deals strictly with cases being
litigated in federal court, its statute of limitations provision creates a de facto statute of limitations
for filing a collateral review petition in state court. Some state collateral counsel have failed to
understand the AEDPA's implications, and unwittingly forfeited their client's right to federal
habeas corpus review.346
343

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); see LIEBMAN & HERTZ, note 27 supra § 5. lb.

344

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).

345

See, e.g., Policy 3, California Supreme Court Policies Regarding Cases Arising From
Judgments of Death (2002) (petitions for writ of habeas corpus to be filed within 90 days of final
due date for filing reply brief on direct appeal); 22 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1089(D)(1) (West
Supp. 2002) (motion for post-conviction relief must be filed within 90 days from filing of reply
brief on direct appeal).
346

See, e.g., Goodman v. Johnson, No. 99-20452 (5th Cir. Sept. 19, 1999) (unpublished),
cert, denied, 528 U.S. 1131 (2000); Cantu-Tzin v. Johnson, 162 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 1998), cert,
denied, 525 U.S. 1091 (1999). Spencer Goodman was executed by Texas in January 2000, and
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Collateral counsel has the same obligation as trial and appellate counsel to establish a
relationship of trust with the client. But by the time a case reaches this stage, the client will have
put his life into the hands of at least one other lawyer and found himself on death row. Counsel
should not be surprised if the client initially exhibits some hostility and lack of trust, and must
endeavor to overcome these barriers.
Ultimately, winning collateral relief in capital cases will require changing the picture that
has previously been presented. The old facts and legal arguments - those which resulted in a
conviction and imposition of the ultimate punishment, both affirmed on appeal - are unlikely to
motivate a collateral court to make the effort required to stop the momentum the case has already
gained in rolling through the legal system.347 Because an appreciable portion of the task of postconviction counsel is to change the overall picture of the case, Subsection E(3) requires that they
keep under continuing review the desirability of amending the defense theory of the case, whether
one has been formulated by prior counsel in accordance with Guideline 10.10.1 or not.
For similar reasons, collateral counsel cannot rely on the previously compiled record but
must conduct a thorough, independent investigation in accordance with Guideline 10.7.
(Subsection E(4)). As demonstrated by the high percentage of reversals and disturbingly large
number of innocent persons sentenced to death, the trial record is unlikely to provide either a
complete or accurate picture of the facts and issues in the case.348 That may be because of
information concealed by the state, because of witnesses who did not appear at trial or who
testified falsely, because the trial attorney did not conduct an adequate investigation in the first
instance, because new developments show the inadequacies of prior forensic evidence, because of
juror misconduct, or for a variety of other reasons.
Two parallel tracks of post-conviction investigation are required. One involves
reinvestigating the capital case; the other focuses on the client. Reinvestigating the case means
examining the facts underlying the conviction and sentence, as well as such items as trial
counsel's performance, judicial bias or prosecutorial misconduct. Reinvestigating the client
means assembling a more-thorough biography of the client than was known at the time of trial, not
only to discover mitigation that was not presented previously, but also to identify mental-health
claims which potentially reach beyond sentencing issues to fundamental questions of competency
and mental-state defenses.
As with every other stage of capital proceedings, collateral counsel has a duty in
accordance with Guideline 10.8 to raise and preserve all arguably meritorious issues.349 These
include not only challenges to the conviction and sentence, but also issues which may arise

Andrew Cantu-Tzin was executed by Texas in January 1999.
347

See generally Russell Stetler, Post-Conviction Investigation in Death Penalty Cases, THE
Aug. 1999, at 41, available at
http://www.criminaljustice.org/public.nsf/ChampionArticles/99Aug06/.
CHAMPION,

348

See supra text accompanying note 38.

349

See supra Guideline 10.8 and accompanying Commentary.
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subsequently.350 Collateral counsel should assume that any meritorious issue not contained in the
initial application will be waived or procedurally defaulted in subsequent litigation, or barred by
strict rules governing subsequent applications.351 Counsel should also be aware that any change in
the availability of post-conviction relief may itself provide an issue for further litigation.352 This
is especially true if the change occurred after the case was begun and could be argued to have
affected strategic decisions along the way.

350

For example, although the Justices disagree on the point, as shown most recently by their
varying opinions respecting the certiorari petition in Foster v. Florida, 123 S. Ct. 470 (2002), it
may well be that after a certain length of time continued confinement on Death Row ripens into
an Eighth Amendment violation.
351

See Mason v. Meyers, 208 F.3d 414, 417 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating that as a result of the
strict rules governing successive habeas corpus petitions enacted by the AEDPA and codified at
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), "it is essential that habeas petitioners include in their first petition all
potential claims for which they might desire to seek review and relief).
352

See, e.g., Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997) (discussing the retroactive application of
various procedural provisions in the AEDPA to pending cases).
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Menzies' Journal Entries Mentioned In Ruling and Brief

December 22, 1998
December 22, 1998/Matt Hunsaker addressed court
Went to court. Angela F. Micklos & Voros for the State. Ed Brass for me.
Ms. Micklos argued to dismiss habeas again & Ed argued against. Judge
Uno is going to look at the record & make up his mind hopefully by next
week. Ms Micklos filed a motion to compel me to have a deposition but Ed
said he wanted to respond. He has until Jan. 4, 1999 to respond & Ms.
Micklos has until Jan. 11, 1999 to respond to Ed's response. Ms. Micklos
said her last day on my case & working for the A.G.'s office is 12-31-98.
She said the new lawyer's name, but I can't remember it. I spoke briefly to
Ed both before and after court & he gave me his word he wouldn't tell me
anymore stories & that he would deal with the $ today. He also said I need
to trust him more & I told him I'd try. I told Ed his secretary keeps refusing
to accept my calls & he said she never told him I was trying to call & he
promised to take care of it. One last thing. Judge Uno let Maureen
Hunsaker's son "Matt Hunsaker" address the court. He said I should be
executed as soon as possible like his mom was & that bringing me before
the court for a hearing 2 days before Christmas was making his & his
families x-mas hard. He also said all the delays was really hard on his
grandparents, & he said his mom did have any civil rights & I shouldn't
either. He talked a lot of bullshit, but he was decent about it & I felt bad for
him. He seems like a good guy, & in my heart I wish him the best in life.
(Also, Ed gave me a copy of the "State's Motion for an Order Compelling
Petitioner's Deposition". I told Ed, no go & to contact Karen Chaney &
Tim Ford. He said he would call Tim Ford.
March 4, 1999
Tried to call Ed Brass at 12:40 pm. Brass picked up the phone, but when he
heard it was me who was calling, he hung up on me. I called back and Ed
Brass picked up the phone & when he heard it was a collect call, he hung up
again. I called back in about 5 minutes and he picked up the phone again,
but hung up as soon as he heard it was a collect call. I had Mike Archuleta
try to call Ed Brass 5 minutes later for verification and both myself and
Mike listened. Ed Brass picked up the phone and then hung up when he
heard it was me trying to call. 14 minutes later I had Doug Lovell try to call
when he came out for recreation. Doug said a male voice picked up the
phone and hung up when he found out it was from me. It pisses me off. I
still haven't seen my habeas corpus he supposedly amended & the experts
& investigator still haven't been hired to my knowledge. I guess I'll write
him this weekend to try & find out what's up. I really don't think the dump

truck will respond.
January 23, 2002
Called Ed Brass's office with Mike Archuleta. We both actually spoke with
Ed. Ed told me that he was bringing Amy D. out to see me on the 30th or 31 st
while he was seeing Archie. He was going to see me also. He told me to call
Amy D. on the 24th to get the details. He also said that the State was trying to
get a summary judgment against me. Ed said it was for failure to prosecute
our writ but not to worry as it was the state's fault as they had a stay for
discovery. I asked him how the State could ask for a summary judgment when
it was their stay & he said "exactly," not to worry. I like Ed and he is an
awesome attorney. (Go Ed!!!)
January 2, 2003
Got letter from Ed Brass. He said state got a summary judgment against me,
for I don't know what. Weird Letter.
Wrote Brass a letter- Have a copy, Told him I thought he was awesome, but
left my life up to him. (See file for copy of letter to Brass)
March 5, 2003
Saw Ed Brass. (Yea! Surprise, surprise!) Ed came out to tell me that he has
put a motion in to Judge Lewis to set aside part of my habeas that Judge Uno
screwed me on just before he left (retired). He said that Judge Lewis was
prepared to rule in my behalf but that because she was such good friends with
Ed and Amy (she even married them), that it might be a conflict of interest for
both him to represent me & her to be my judge. He told me I had to choose
between him & Judge Lewis. I told Ed it was a no brainer. He was my
attorney & I didn't want a new attorney under any circumstances and while I
like Lewis, I would rather she left than him. Ed said cool & that he would try
to have her sign the order for me to set aside Uno's fuck-up before she got off
my case! (Right on Ed Brass! You're cool & a good man.)

Menzies' Written Correspondence to Brass
June 16, 1998
September 24, 1998
December 1998
March 24, 1999
March 28, 1999
September 8, 1999
June 12, 2000
December 1,2001
October 15, 2002
December 2002
January 2, 2003
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December 30. 2002
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December 18, 1998

EDWARD K. BRASS
ATTORNEY AT LAW

321 SOUTH 6TH EAST
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84102
PHONE (801) 322-5678
FAX (801) 322-5677

December I

Ralph L. Menzies
Box 250 Draper, Utah

84020

Dear Ralph:
We are going to argue the motion to dismiss portions of your petition
on Tuesday. This is in fact the same motion which was previously argued
and that is all I intend to argue.
We will a] so be talking about whether you s'hould have to 'have your
deposition taken.

I have passed along your 'position that you should not.

Cal ] me on Monday if 'you have questions.
/£in<^rely,

^~,
/

EDWARD K. BRASS

A.

EDWARD K. BRASS
ATTORNEY AT LAW

321 SOUTH 6TH EAST
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84102
PHONE (801) 322-5678
FAX (801) 322-5677

May lh l^" 1

Mr. Ralph Menzies
c/o Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250'
Draper, Utah 84020
I\t

Interview With Nicole Reitze

Dear Ralph:
I have signed a consent allowing Nicole Reitze to interview you for her thesis paper on the
death penalty. I urge you to sign a release and allow yourself to be interviewed. Your identity will
remain anonymous and nothing will be used that may identify you or your responses to the questions
Ms. Reitze may ask.

December 30, 2002

EDWARD K. BRASS
ATTORNEY AT LAW

175 EAST 400 SOUTH, SUITE 400
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111
PHONE (801) 322-5678
FAX (801) 322-5677
i)<u i t u n - :

PETITIONER'S
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JXHIBI
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Attorney Client Mail
Ralph Leroy Menzies
Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020
Dear Ralph:
I he Attorney General's office has managed to obtain a summary judgment in your writ
based upon our alleged failure to comply with certain discovery requests on their part. This is
my responsibility and not yours, I am doing what is necessary to have this set aside. However, if
this should cause you to lose any faith in me, I would not blame you. You should let me know,
by writing me a letter, what your desires are with respect to this matter.
If you would like to discuss this by telephone, you can call my secretary who will accept
your call and then schedule a time when the phone is available to you and when I will be in the
office.

EKB/hbb

